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I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
FJORUM NON CONVENIENS is the doctrine by which an ap-
propriate forum may divest itself of jurisdiction if it appears
that the action would more appropriately be conducted in an-
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other forum in which the action might originally have been
brought.' Dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens "will
ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiffs chosen
forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court,
and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of
convenience supporting his choice."2
A. SINOCHEM INTERNATIONAL CO. V. MALAYSIA
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORP.
In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping
Corp.,3 the underlying controversy related to alleged misrepre-
sentations by a Chinese importer to a Chinese admiralty court
that resulted in the arrest of a Malaysian shipping company's
vessel in China.4 The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit
decision, which had found that the district court should not
have dismissed the case under the forum non conveniens doctrine
unless and until it had determined definitively that it had both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction.5
The Supreme Court indicated that discovery concerning per-
sonal jurisdiction would have burdened the Petitioner-Plaintiff
with expense and delay, "[a] nd all to scant purpose. '6 In find-
ing that the district court was not required to establish its own
jurisdiction before dismissing the suit on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, the Supreme Court explained that "where sub-
ject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and
forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dis-
missal, the court properly takes the less burdensome course."7
The Supreme Court further stated:
The Court said in Gulf Oil that "the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens can never apply if there is [an] absence of jurisdiction,"
. [however,] the Court said nothing that would negate a
court's authority to presume, rather than dispositively decide, the
propriety of the forum in which the plaintiff filed suit.
I See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
2 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil, 330
U.S. at 508-09).
3 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
4 Id. at 1188.
5 See id. at 1193-94 (citing Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co.,
436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006)).
6 Id. at 1194.
7 Id.
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[Additionally,] Gulf Oil did not present the question we here
address: whether a federal court can dismiss under the forum non
conveniens doctrine before definitively ascertaining its own juris-
diction.... [W]e find in Gulf Oil no hindrance to the decision we
reach today.'
The Supreme Court concluded that this was a "textbook case
for immediate forum non conveniens dismissal."9
B. IN RE AIR CRASH NEAR ATHENS, GREECE ON
AUGUST 14, 2005
In In re Air Crash Near Athens, Greece on August 14, 2005,1°
the representatives of ninety-two crew members and passengers
killed in the crash of Helios Airways Flight 522 from Cyprus to
Prague brought seven actions against Boeing, the aircraft manu-
facturer, alleging wrongful death claims based on strict products
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.11 After discovery
had commenced, Boeing moved to dismiss the claims on
grounds of forum non conveniens in favor of litigation in Cyprus
or Greece. 12
In deciding the motion, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois first examined the availability of an ade-
quate alternative forum and then considered the various private
and public interest factors relating to the proper location of the
litigation.'" The defendant bears the burden of persuasion
under the forum non conveniens doctrine. 4
In applying this analysis, the district court found that both the
courts of Greece and Cyprus were "available" in the sense that
Boeing had agreed to consent to the jurisdiction of both coun-
tries, and that Plaintiffs did not dispute the availability of those
courts.' 5 In considering whether Greece and Cyprus were "ade-
quate" fora, the district court found that Boeing had offered evi-
dence that both offer "potential avenues for redress."' 6
Plaintiffs did not dispute that they could assert claims based
upon negligence in both fora.17 The district court reasoned that
8 Id. at 1193.
9 Id. at 1194.
10 479 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
I' Id. at 796.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 797-805.






"[w] hile the procedures in the courts in Cyprus and Greece dif-
fer from those of the United States courts, adequate procedural
safeguards exist in both Cyprus and Greece."' 8 Further, al-
though the plaintiffs argued that certain limitations in the Cy-
prus and Greek legal systems reflected a lesser public interest in
those fora, Plaintiffs did not contend that these limitations ren-
dered those fora inadequate. 9
Regarding the private and public interest factors, the district
court noted that only two of the ninety Plaintiffs in the case were
U.S. residents, five were Greek and the remaining were Cypriot,
and stated that "a foreign plaintiffs choice to bring suit in the
United States is entitled to less deference because trial of a for-
eign plaintiff's claims in the United States is likely to be less con-
venient."20 With respect to the Greek Plaintiffs, who were
entitled to status equal to Americans under the treaty between
the United States and Greece, 21 it was "still likely to be less con-
venient for the Greek plaintiffs to pursue their claims in the
United States. '' 22 The district court found that the relevant pri-
vate interest factors in this case included
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of com-
pulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of ob-
taining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive.28
In its analysis, the district court found that most of the evi-
dence relating to the investigation of the crash, including the
wreckage of the accident airplane and information relating to
the post-mortem examinations of the decedents, was located in
Greece.24 Most of the evidence relating to Helios, a Cyprus-
based airline, would be located in Cyprus.25 While most, if not
all, of the evidence and witnesses with knowledge relating to the
design and manufacture of the Boeing airplane and its compo-
18 Id.
19 Id. at 797-98.
20 Id. at 798 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981)).
21 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, art. 1,
Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829.
22 In re Air Crash Near Athens, Greece on Aug. 14, 2005, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 798
(citing In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2003)).
23 Id. (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d. 702, 704 (7th Cir.
2005)).
24 Id. at 800.
25 Id.
2008]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
nent parts were located in the United States, Boeing agreed to
make relevant evidence or witnesses in its possession, custody, or
control available in Cyprus or Greece. 26 Further, most of the
damages evidence was located in Cyprus.27
In light of Boeing's agreement to produce its documents and
witnesses in Cyprus and Greece, the district court found that the
relative ease of access to proof favored those fora over the U.S.
courts. 28 The district court concluded that the deference usu-
ally given to a plaintiffs choice of forum was outweighed by
other relevant factors. 29 Namely, the district court found that,
given the ease of access to sources of proof in Cyprus, the strong
public interest of both Cyprus and Greece in having the actions
decided in their respective countries, and pending related litiga-
tion between Helios and Boeing in Greece, either Cyprus or
Greece would be a more convenient forum and therefore dis-
missed the action. 0
C. ESHEVA V. SIBERIA AIRLINES
Esheva v. Siberia Airlines"' concerned claims relating to the Si-
berian Airlines' ("Sibir") crash that occurred on July 9, 2006.2
Of the 203 passengers and crew members onboard a Sibir flight
from Moscow to Irkusk, Russia, 124 died when the aircraft over-
ran the runway in Irkusk.3 ' None of the passengers were U.S.
residents or were scheduled for continuing travel to the United
States 4.3 The aircraft was designed and manufactured in France
by Airbus, S.A.S., owned by Wilmington Trust Company, and
leased to Defendant Airbus Leasing II, Inc. ("Airbus"), a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Vir-
ginia. 5 Airbus, in turn, subleased the aircraft to Sibir 6 The
aircraft was registered in France and it was maintained in Russia
and Germany.
26 Id. at 799-800.
27 Id. at 800.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 805.
30 Id.
31 499 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).








Complaints were filed on behalf of 158 passengers and crew
members alleging negligence and vicarious liability against Sibir
and vicarious liability against Airbus.3 8 Later, a separate com-
plaint was filed on behalf of an additional twenty-six passengers
and crew members, alleging similar causes of action against the
same defendants. 9
Airbus entered into an agreement in which certain plaintiffs
agreed to waive punitive damages claims against Airbus, not to
sue any other Airbus entity, not to sue Airbus outside the district
except in France, and to dismiss all claims against Airbus if their
claims against Defendant Sibir were dismissed.40 Airbus agreed
to sue Sibir, to refrain from moving to dismiss the claims filed in
New York on forum non conveniens grounds, "and to oppose ef-
forts to sever or dismiss the New York action."'41 Plaintiffs and
Airbus also "agreed that French law govern[ed] the claims
amongst them. '4 2 In accordance with this agreement, Airbus
filed a cross-claim against Sibir in both of the actions pending
before the district court.43
Defendant Sibir then "moved to dismiss both actions on the
ground of forum non conveniens."44 Sibir agreed "not to contest
liability in Russia, to pay full compensatory damages to all plain-
tiffs as determined by a Russian court, and to waive any statute
of limitations for actions filed in Russia within six months of dis-
missal [in the United States].""
In evaluating the motions to dismiss both actions, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the
Second Circuit's three-step analysis:
At step one, a court determines the degree of deference properly
accorded the plaintiffs choice of forum. At step two, it considers
whether the alternative forum proposed by the defendants is ade-
38 Id.
39 Id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued this
decision for two related cases, Nos. 06 Civ. 11347 (DLC) and 06 Civ. 13409
(DLC). Id. at 493.




44 Id. at 497. By the time the district court ruled on the motion, Airbus's cross-
claim against Sibir had been resolved. Id. at 496. Thus, although "much" of
Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss relied upon the cross-claim by
Airbus against Sibir and the "contractual relationship" between these Defend-
ants, the district court found that these arguments had "no remaining relevance
to the motion." Id. at 497 n.2.
45 Id. at 497.
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quate to adjudicate the parties' dispute. Finally, at step three, a
court balances the private and public interests implicated in the
choice of forum.4 6
First, the district court found that the plaintiffs' choice of fo-
rum in this case was entitled to "substantially reduced defer-
ence."4 7 Most of the surviving plaintiffs and representatives of
decedents were Russian residents, and the witnesses and
"[e]ssentially all of the relevant evidence" also were in Russia.4 8
Further, the district court criticized the U.S. based plaintiffs'
counsel, stating that it appeared that they had filed lawsuits on
behalf of foreign plaintiffs "who were injured abroad to gain ad-
vantage in settlement discussions from the substantial damage
awards that may be obtained from American juries and to incon-
venience the principal defendant, a Russian corporation.""
The district court also noted
There [was] a compelling argument that Airbus was added to
this litigation solely to provide some American nexus to the litiga-
tion, albeit not a New York nexus. To the extent that it is facing
a claim of derivative liability, Airbus is absolutely immune for
such liability in the United States. American law provides that a
"lessor ... is liable for personal injury, death or property loss or
damage ... only when a civil aircraft ... is in the actual posses-
sion or control of the lessor ... ""
Next, the district court found that the alternative forum was
adequate, rejecting Plaintiffs' arguments that Russia's courts op-
erated "under a cloud of corruption." 1 The district court stated
that "[s] everal judges in this district . . . have refused to hold
that the Russian judicial system is too corrupt to constitute an
adequate alternative forum. 52
46 Id. (quoting Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 153
(2d Cir. 2005)).
47 Id. at 498.
48 Id. at 498, 500.
49 Id. at 498.
50 Id. at 499 n.4 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2000)).
51 Id. at 499.
52 Id. (citing Overseas Media v. Skvortsov, 441 F. Supp. 2d 610, 617-18
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (collecting cases); Base Metal Trading, S.A. v. Russian Alumi-
num, 253 F. Supp. 2d 681, 708 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that, inter alia, an
expert's "broad and conclusory allegations, founded on multiple levels of hear-




Finally, the district court found that the private and public
interest factors weighed strongly in favor of transfer.53 The
court explained that, inter alia, Russia had a stronger "interest in
responding to an accident that occurred in its territory," that
resulted in injuries to its citizens, "and that involved a Russian
airline. 15 ' Furthermore, Russia already had conducted an inves-
tigation and was still pursuing a criminal investigation relating
to the accident.5 5 Accordingly, the district court granted Sibir's
motion to dismiss on the condition that Sibir would "concede
liability if sued in Russian courts by any plaintiff in [the] actions
within six months of entry of [its] Opinion and Order, [would]
waive any statute of limitations in such actions, and [would] pay
full compensatory damages as determined by a Russian court to
all such plaintiffs. 56
D. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY Co. OF AMERICA V.
DHL DANzAs AIR & OCEAN
Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. DHL Danzas.Air &
Ocean 7 involved an action for damages in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York arising from a shipment of
pharmaceuticals from Gurabo, Puerto Rico to Uterson, Ger-
many. 58 Defendant Air Express 59 removed the action originally
filed in New York State Supreme Court to the district court pur-
suant to the Warsaw Convention and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a).6 ° De-
fendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum
non conveniens to Germany or, alternatively, to transfer the ac-
tion to the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).6'
Plaintiff Travelers Property Casualty Company of America
("Travelers"), which has a New York City office and is authorized
to conduct business in New York, was subrogated to the interests
of its insured, Janssen Ortho LLC ('Janssen"), a Connecticut
company.62 Air Express, an international shipping company, is
53 Id. at 500.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 id. at 501.
57 No. 05 Civ. 6303 (DC), 2006 WL 1443201 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
58 Id.
59 Air Express was incorrectly named in the complaint as "DHL Danzas Air &
Ocean a/k/a Danzas Corporation and DHL Holdings (USA), Inc." Id. at *1 n.1.
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an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Flor-
ida, but also operated an office at John F. Kennedy Airport in
New York.61 Janssen had employed Air Express to ship three
skids of pharmaceuticals from Puerto Rico to Germany.64 Trav-
elers alleged that the goods arrived in damaged condition due
to Air Express' "negligence during shipping. 65
In analyzing Defendant's forum non conveniens motion, the dis-
trict court found that Plaintiffs choice of forum was entitled to
some deference. 66 The choice of New York as a forum would be
convenient to Janssen, as it was based in Connecticut, while
Travelers, Janssen, and Air Express were all companies organ-
ized under laws of the United States, "and Air Express [was]
amenable to suit in New York. ' 67 Furthermore, "at least some
documents and witnesses [were] located in New Jersey and Con-
necticut," within 100 miles of the forum, and there was no evi-
dence that suggested that Travelers was forum-shopping on the
basis that U.S. laws were more favorable to it than the laws of
other countries.68
The district court explained that although Germany may have
been an adequate alternative forum, Defendant Air Express had
not shown that the public and private factors that favored out-
right dismissal of the case outweighed the deference due to
Plaintiff's choice of forum.69 Based on the foregoing, the dis-
trict court denied Defendant's forum non conveniens motion.70
However, the district court granted the alternative request for
transfer, explaining that "[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court
may transfer any civil action to any other district where the case
might have been brought if the transfer serves 'the convenience
of parties and witnesses, [and is] in the interest of justice."'71
The district court found that Defendant had satisfied its bur-








70 Id. at *3.
71 Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000)).
72 The party seeking a § 1404(a) transfer has the burden to present facts that
are "clear and convincing" in support of transfer. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
and Millennium L.P. v. Dakota Imaging, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1838 (RWS), 2003 WL
22940488, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2003)).
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Puerto Rico because all of the most important witnesses and
documents were located there, or at least outside of New York.73
Also, courts in Puerto Rico and New York were "equally able to
apply the laws of the Warsaw Convention."74 Accordingly, the
action was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico.75
E. BRITrON v. DALLAs AIRMOTIVE, INC.
In Britton v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 6 the California Court of Ap-
peal addressed a forum non conveniens based motion to dismiss
filed by a party that already had made a general appearance.77
In affirming a stay of litigation on forum non conveniens
grounds,7" the Court of Appeal confirmed that, absent unrea-
sonable delay or other prejudice to the parties, a defendant may
properly bring a forum non conveniens motion after making a gen-
eral appearance in the action, and that a trial court has the au-
thority to raise the forum non conveniens issue on its own
motion.79
Britton involved the crash of a helicopter near Webb, Idaho, in
August of 2003.80 Plaintiff John Britton piloted the helicopter
during a firefighting operation when the engine allegedly failed,
resulting in a "hard landing" that injured Britton and damaged
the helicopter. 81 Plaintiffs included Mr. Britton, his wife, and
the helicopter owner, Silverhawk Aviation. 2 Plaintiffs com-
menced an action against Rolls Royce Engine Services Oakland,
Inc. ("RRES"), and Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (both of which alleg-
edly serviced the engine), as well as Rolls Royce Corporation,
which manufactured the engine through a predecessor
company.13
73 Id. at *3.
74 Id.
75 Id. at *4.
76 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487 (Ct. App. 2007).
77 Id. at 488.
78 When Dallas Airmotive renewed the motion to stay or dismiss the action on
the ground of forum non conveniens, Rolls Royce and Rocky Mountain filed join-
ders. Id. at 489. Another judge of the superior court stayed the action pending
initiation and conclusion of litigation in the Idaho court. Id.
79 Id. at 490-92.
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Defendant RRES moved to stay or dismiss based on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, and Dallas Airmotive and Rolls
Royce filed a joinder to the motion. 4 The California Superior
Court concluded that RRES had not met its burden of present-
ing sufficient evidence of relevant contacts in the proposed al-
ternative forum, Idaho, and that RRES had "essentially
eschewed all discussion of the public interest factors" and thus,
the Court denied Defendants' forum non conveniens motion with-
out prejudice.85 However, after the action was remanded follow-
ing removal to federal court by Defendant Dallas Airmotive, the
trial court granted RRES's unopposed motion for summary
judgment.8 6 Defendant Dallas Airmotive thereafter renewed the
forum non conveniens motion to dismiss or stay the claim, and
Rolls Royce and additional Defendant, Rocky Mountain Hold-
ings, filed joinders.8 7 The renewed motion was filed almost a
year after most of the defendants had answered 8 The Superior
Court granted Dallas Airmotive's motion to stay, "pending initia-
tion and conclusion of litigation in the Idaho court. '89
Plaintiffs appealed, contending "that the renewed forum non
conveniens motion was untimely," that the defendants had
"waived" the forum non conveniens defense by answering the com-
plaint, and that the Superior Court had no discretion to con-
sider the matter on its own motion. ° The Court of Appeal
accepted the Superior Court's weighing of the public and pri-
vate forum non conveniens factors and its stay of the action in favor
of an Idaho forum.9'
The Court of Appeal stated that the Superior Court had con-
cluded that "the defendant Dallas [Airmotive] had 'offered sub-
stantial and persuasive evidence that the private factors of access
to witnesses not otherwise subject to having their appearance at
trial in California compelled, and to other evidence, favor an
Idaho forum."92 The Court of Appeal continued that "as the
accident did not occur here, no party resides here, and there is
no other significant connection with the California forum ...
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 488-89.
87 Id. at 489.
88 Id. at 490.
89 Id. at 489.
90 Id. at 489-90.
9' Id. at 492 (citing Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 16-18 (Cal. 1991)).
92 Citing unpublished text within Britton, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 492 (quoting the
trial court's unpublished decision) (citation omitted).
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[t]he balance of the public and private interest thus heavily fa-
vors an Idaho forum over a California forum.
93
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Defendants
had waived their forum non conveniens defense because they had
answered the complaint and participated in the action.94 The
Court of Appeal construed the relevant statutes on motions to
stay or dismiss relating to forum non conveniens motions as acting
in harmony.95 Where the defendant has not yet appeared, the
first statute applied, and the second applied after the defendant
had appeared. 96 As the court explained, "to retain a case for the
entire duration of the litigation because the lack of connection
to California was unclear at the outset would impair the state's
interest in avoiding burdening courts and potential jurors with
litigation in which the local community has little concern.
9 7
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA")98
with the intention of reducing costs and improving the effi-
ciency, quality, and innovation of the airline industry by relying
on maximum market competition.9 9 To prevent states from en-
acting legislation that would undermine this federal goal, the
ADA prohibits states from enforcing or enacting any law or reg-
ulation "related to the price, route or service of an air car-
rier."100 The Supreme Court has held that the ADA preempts
any state law or cause of action that has a "forbidden significant
93 Id.
94 Id. at 491. The court explained that where a defendant had not appeared,
§ 418.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure "applies and specifies the pro-
cedure for bringing a forum non conveniens motion." Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 418.10 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008)). Section 410.30 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure applies after a defendant has appeared. Id. (citing CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.30 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008)). The court found that this
harmony between the two statutes was reasonable since "it may be necessary to
conduct discovery to develop the factual underpinnings of a forum non conveniens
motion." Id. (citing Morris v. AGFA Corp., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 308-09 (Ct. App.
2006)).
95 Id. at 491 (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 410.30, 418.10).
96 Id. (citing CAL. CI,. PROC. CODE §§ 410.30, 418.10).
97 Id. at 492 (citing Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991)).
98 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000).
99 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
100 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
2008]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
effect" on airfares, routes, or services.'0 1 Exceptions include
state actions that are "too tenuous" or "remote" to affect airline
fares, routes, or services or actions that concern a breach of an
airline's own contracts, terms, policies, or stipulations. 10 2
1. Signer v. DHL Worldwide Express, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida in Signer v. DHL Worldwide Express, Inc.,1°3 in-
volved the loss and subsequent sale of Plaintiff designer's "one-
of-a-kind" clothing. 10 4 Plaintiff contracted with Defendant ship-
ping company to transport a trunk of clothing worth over
$100,000 from New York to Cincinnati, Ohio." 5 Defendant ac-
cepted the trunk, but failed to deliver it to the agreed-upon des-
tination. 106 Less than four months later, a "one-of-a-kind" dress
from the trunk was offered for sale on eBay by a liquidator of
Defendant shipping company's lost items.107 Plaintiff com-
menced an action in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judi-
cial Circuit in Broward County, Florida, for "conversion, civil
theft, violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act, and fraud."' 08
Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, arguing that Plaintiffs
claims were preempted by the ADA or, alternatively, governed
by federal common law and, therefore, the district court had
federal question jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331.109 Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that be-
cause the complaint raised solely state-law claims, no federal
question appeared on the face of the complaint, and therefore
the district court did not have jurisdiction under the well-
pleaded complaint rule.110 Plaintiff further argued that none of
the exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule applied, be-
101 Harrington v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-12558-NMG, 2006 WL
1581752, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2006) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 388).
102 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 100 n.21 (1983)); see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228,
232-33 (1995); Harrington, 2006 WL 1581752, at *3.
103 No. 06-61932-CI, 2007 WL 1521497 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2007).









cause the state law claims did not present a substantial question
of federal law, and the ADA did not "completely" preempt the
claims. 111
In considering Plaintiff's motion, the district court explained
the "well-pleaded complaint rule," stating:
A case does not arise under federal law unless a federal ques-
tion is presented on the face of the plaintiffs complaint. This is
known as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, because "it directs
our focus to the terms of the complaint as the plaintiff chooses to
frame it. If the plaintiff elects to bring only state law causes of
action in state court, no federal question will appear in the com-
plaint that could satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, and the
case may not be removed to federal court.
Because a federal question must appear on the face of the
plaintiffs complaint to satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, a
defense which presents a federal question can not create removal
jurisdiction."112
However, the district court noted two exceptions to the well-
pleaded complaint rule: (1) when a substantial question of fed-
eral law is disputed and is an essential element of the "well-
pleaded state claims;""'  or (2) where the area of law is pre-
empted "so completely" by federal law such that any claims in
that area are "necessarily federal in character."1 4
Defendant conceded that Plaintiffs claims did not necessarily
involve a substantial question of federal law, but rather at-
tempted to argue "that federal common law and/or the ADA
have 'completely preempted' all state law claims, so the only re-
maining viable claims are based on federal common law.""' 5 In
considering Defendant's complete preemption argument, the
district court contrasted complete preemption with "ordinary
preemption," stating:
"[O]rdinary preemption may be invoked in both state and fed-
eral court as an affirmative defense to the allegations in a plain-
tiffs complaint. Such a defense asserts that the state law claims
have been substantively displaced by federal law. However, a case
III Id.
112 Id. at *2 (quoting Kemp v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 109 F.3d 708, 712 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
11 Id. at *3 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
114 Id. (quoting Kemp, 109 F.3d at 712).
115 Id. at *4.
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may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense, including that of federal preemption."'1 16
. "Complete preemption, on the other hand, is a doctrine dis-
tinct from ordinary preemption. Rather than constituting a de-
fense, [complete preemption] is a narrowly drawn jurisdictional
rule for assessing federal removal jurisdiction when a complaint
purports to raise only state law claims." Complete preemption
"looks beyond the complaint to determine if the suit is, in reality,
'purely a creature of federal law,' even if state law would provide
a cause of action in the absence of the federal law. It transforms
the state claim into one arising under federal law, thus creating
the federal question jurisdiction requisite to removal to federal
courts." 17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
had explained that the complete preemption analysis turns on
whether the federal law in question shows Congress' intent to
provide both a valid defense, as well as the right to remove the
case to federal court."l8 It also had stated that only federal laws
with "extraordinary preemptive force" will completely preempt
state law.' The district court observed that "[t]he majority of
courts to consider the question of whether there is complete
preemption under the ADA have held that the ADA does not
completely preempt state law." 120 The district court agreed and
found that because "Congress did not intend for the ADA to
completely preempt state law," removal was not proper on com-
plete preemption grounds.121
The district court similarly rejected Defendant's argument
that it had federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiffs
claims were preempted by "federal common law."' 122 The dis-
trict court noted that several of the courts holding that the ADA
did not completely preempt state law claims also found that fed-
eral common law did not preempt state law claims. 123 Further,
as previously noted, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that com-
plete preemption depends on congressional intent, but the dis-
trict court indicated that federal common law is not developed
116 Id. at *3 (quoting Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1352-53
(11th Cir. 2003)).
117 Id. (quoting Geddes, 321 F.3d at 1353).
118 Id. (citing Geddes, 321 F.3d at 1352-53).
119 Id. (quoting Geddes, 321 F.3d at 1353).
120 Id. at *4 (collecting cases).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (collecting cases).
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or driven by congressional intent.124 To recognize federal juris-
diction solely on this basis "would contradict the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's instructions on the differences between complete and
ordinary preemption. 125
The district court also rejected the argument that federal
question jurisdiction was present when the claim "arises under
federal common law.' 1 26 It noted, inter alia, that "[b]ringing a
claim framed in terms of the federal common law is a very differ-
ent situation from bringing a claim in terms of state law and
having a defendant assert that the claim is preempted by federal
common law."' 127 The district court further noted that the latter
"is the very situation that the Eleventh Circuit ha[d] indicated
does not have the [requisite] 'extraordinary force to create fed-
eral removal jurisdiction.' "128
Defendant's final argument was that "the 'only viable cause of
action against [it] is one for breach of contract under federal
common law. ' "' 129 However, the district court found that not
only was this an ordinary preemption argument, but also that
"the Supreme Court has held that 'the ADA permits state-law-
based court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract
claims.' ' 3  Because the district court found that Plaintiff's
claims were not preempted, it thus determined that it did not
have federal question jurisdiction over the action and, accord-
ingly, granted Plaintiff's motion to remand. 31
2. Buck v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Buck v. American Airlines, Inc.,' 32 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit addressed Plaintiff airline ticket purchasers'
124 Id. at *5 (citing Merkel v. Fed. Express Corp., 886 F. Supp. 561, 566 (N.D.
Miss. 1995)).
125 Id.
126 Id. at *5-*6 (quoting Sam L. MajorsJewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 929
(5th Cir. 1997)).
127 Id. at *6.
128 Id. (quoting Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir.
2003)).
129 Id. at *7 (quoting Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, 9-11,
Signer v. DHL Worldwide Express, Inc., No. 06-61932-C1V, 2007 WL 1521497
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 620938).
130 Id. (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-36 (1995)).
131 Id. Plaintiff also had moved for attorneys' fees and costs, but the district
court denied the motion, finding that Defendant had a sufficient "objectively
reasonable basis" for removal. Id.
132 476 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
claims that Defendant airlines.. improperly withheld fees and
taxes collected as part of the purchase of "non-refundable" pas-
senger tickets after they failed to use the tickets for travel.'
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in Massachusetts state court, how-
ever, Defendants removed the action to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts.13 5 The district court granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims as preempted by the
ADA 136 and Plaintiffs appealed."17
Plaintiffs' "core theory" was that the word "nonrefundable" re-
lated only to passenger ticket base fares and not to the associ-
ated fees and taxes.' 38 Although the First Circuit noted that
" [P] laintiffs cloaked this theory in pleochroic raiment" by claim-
ing, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty and civil
conspiracy, the sole federal claim was an implied right of action
under federal regulations. 1 9 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that
Defendants' retention of the fees violated federal regulations,
most notably 14 C.F.R. § 253.7, which provides, in pertinent
part:
A passenger shall not be bound by any terms restricting refunds
of the ticket price, imposing monetary penalties on passengers,
or permitting the carrier to raise the price, unless the passenger
receives conspicuous written notice of the salient features of
those terms on or with the ticket.'4 '
Plaintiffs contended that Defendant airlines failed to provide
them notice that they would forfeit their fees if they did not util-
ize their tickets and, because "the regulations' goal is to protect
consumers . . . it is appropriate to imply a private right of ac-
tion." '141 The First Circuit rejected Plaintiffs' argument, stating
133 Plaintiffs' amended complaint named thirteen airlines, the FAA, and two
trade associations as Defendants. Id. at 31-32.
134 Id. at 31.
135 See id.
136 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000).
137 Buck, 476 F.3d at 32.
138 Id. at 31.
139 Id. at 32-33 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 253.4, 253.7 (2008)).
140 Id. at 32 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 253.7). Plaintiffs also alleged that Defen-
dant's actions were in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 158.5 (2008) (passenger facility
charges); 19 C.F.R. § 24.22(g)(1) (2008) (customs fees); 8 C.F.R. § 286.2 (2008)
(immigration fees); 7 C.F.R. § 354.3(f) (2008) (agricultural quarantine fees); 49
C.F.R. § 1510.5 (2007) (security fees); "and charges on behalf of foreign sover-
eigns." Id.
141 Id. at 33.
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that "[r]egulations alone cannot create private rights of action;
the source of the right must be a statute. 1 42 The First Circuit
noted that "[e]very court faced with the question of whether a
consumer protection provision of the ADA allows the implica-
tion of a private right of action against an airline has answered
the question in the negative," and refused to create a circuit
split on the issue.14 The First Circuit thus held Plaintiffs could
not pursue their federal claims because "the consumer protec-
tion provisions of the ADA do not permit the imputation of a
private right of action against an airline," and turned to the
question of preemption. 144
The First Circuit noted that, as the federal law cause of action
failed, Plaintiffs were "relegated to their array of state law
claims." '145 Plaintiffs argued that their claims were not pre-
empted by the ADA's express preemption provision, which "de-
clares that no state may 'enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of the air carrier.' ,,146 The First Circuit
noted that there is "considerable guidance as to how this pre-
emption provision should be construed. ' 147 In Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 48 the Supreme Court discussed the breadth
of the ADA's express preemption provision and specifically
"held that the provision should be construed broadly.' 1 49 The
Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed this holding in Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,150 and the First Circuit had previously
held that "the ADA preempts both laws that explicitly refer to an
airline's prices and those that have a significant effect upon
prices."'1 5 ' However, the Supreme Court, in Wolens, also "carved
out an exception" that avoids preemption "for 'suits alleging no
violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery
142 Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001); Iverson v. City
of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2006)).
143 Id. at 34 (citing Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 522 n.7 (5th Cir.
2002); Statland v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1993)).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 34 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000)).
147 Id.
148 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992).
149 Buck, 476 F.3d at 34 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 384-85).
150 Id. at 35 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 (1995)).
151 Id. at 34-35 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323,
335 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed
undertakings.' "152
Plaintiffs' contended that the claims were not within the
scope of the ADA's express preemption provision because they
"s[ought] to enforce federal, not state, regulatory require-
ments. ' 153 The First Circuit was not persuaded by this "sleight of
hand," stating that Plaintiffs were "attempting to invoke state
remedies to further a state policy: that those who are wronged
should have individualized access to the courts in order to reme-
diate that wrong." '154 The First Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs'
argument that their suit did not "affect the prices (or rates),
routes, or services [of airlines], since the redress occurs only af-
ter the prices (or rates), routes, and services have been deter-
mined by the Air Industry."' 55 The First Circuit further stated
that:
It is freshman-year economics that higher prices mean lower
demand, and that consumers are sensitive to the full price that
they must pay, not just the portion of the price that will stay in
the seller's coffers. For that reason, an airline must account for
the fees when setting its own rates. It follows that a finding for
plaintiffs in this case would impact base fares-and since past
judgments affect future behavior, this is as true of the retrospec-
tive relief requested by the plaintiffs as it is of the prospective
relief that they request.
1 56
Accordingly, the First Circuit noted that there was an "inevita-
bility of a finding of preemption" and turned its attention to
focus on Plaintiffs' argument that their claims qualified for the
Wolens breach of contract exception." 7
With respect to Plaintiffs' contract claims, the First Circuit
stated that "plaintiffs' amended complaint identifies only a sin-
gle word-'nonrefundable'-as common to their contracts of
carriage with a multitude of airlines. It seems fanciful to sug-
gest, in the circumstances of this case, that the word 'nonrefund-
able' alone can anchor a breach of contract claim.
15 8
152 Id. at 35 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228).
153 Id.
154 Id. (citing Santagate v. Tower, 833 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
("discussing how Massachusetts provides an 'equitable remedy' for those without
'an adequate remedy at law"')).
155 Id. (quoting Brief of the Appellants at 19-20, Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476
F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007), 2006 WL 3226462).





Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order
of dismissal. '59
3. DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc.
In DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 6' the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts addressed an action brought by
skycaps at Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, arising from
a $2 baggage handling fee instituted by American Airlines for
curbside assistance.' 6 ' Skycaps, as airport porters, customarily
receive the major portion of their compensation through pas-
senger tips. 16 2 Following the imposition of the fee, the skycaps'
compensation was drastically diminished because many passen-
gers stopped paying a tip above and beyond the $2 charge, alleg-
edly because Defendant airline had not made clear that the $2
charge was a fee retained by the airline, rather than a tip re-
tained by the skycaps.' 63
Plaintiffs filed this action, claiming violation of the Massachu-
setts Tips Law'64 and the state minimum wage law, 16 5 among
other common law claims.' 66 Defendant moved to dismiss, argu-
ing that the ADA'67 expressly preempted Plaintiffs' claims and
impliedly preempted Plaintiffs' claims under 49 U.S.C.
§ 41704.168 In analyzing the preemption question, the court
noted that the ADA's express preemption provision was "not un-
limited" in scope, and that courts generally agreed that claims
by airline employees are not usually preempted. 6 9 The district
court cited to precedent from the Supreme Court that "ex-
plained that 'some state actions may affect airline fares in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have preemptive
effect," 170 and that claims for breach of contract were similarly
,59 Id. at 38.
160 483 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2007).
161 See id. at 123-24.
162 Id. at 124.
163 See id.
164 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 152A (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2008).
165 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151, §§ 1, 7 (LexisNexis 1999).
166 DiFiore, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
167 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (2000).
168 DiFiore, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 124, 126.
169 Id. at 125 (collecting cases).
170 Id. (quoting Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390
(1992)).
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not preempted because the ADA did not prohibit recovery for
an airline's self-imposed obligations.-7 '
The district court explained that Plaintiffs' wage-related
claims were issues of employment law, an area that has been tra-
ditionally subject to state regulation and thus subject to a
"heightened presumption against preemption."' 7 2 Further, the
court reasoned that because the Massachusetts Tips Law states
that voluntary tips belong to the employee, not the employer,
the law could have only a limited relationship with airline pric-
ing, routes, or services.' 73 The court therefore concluded that
the state employment laws at issue were too tenuously related to
airline prices, routes, or services to fall within the scope of the
ADA's express preemption provision.174
Turning to the implied preemption analysis, the court found
that the Massachusetts Tips Law was not preempted, either by
implied conflict preemption or implied field preemption, be-
cause it is essentially unrelated to 49 U.S.C. § 41704.17 Under
§ 41704, a carrier is allowed to impose "reasonable charges and
conditions" to cover its potential liability for the loss or damage
to passenger's property that is checked because it is not allowed
onboard the aircraft pursuant to U.S. law or regulations. 176 De-
fendant argued that the $2 fee was a reasonable fee within the
scope of § 41704, because it was designed to offset additional
fees that carriers were required to pay the Transportation Secur-
ity Administration ("TSA") for airport security reform measures
taken in the wake of the September 11th attacks.177 Defendant
further argued that the Massachusetts Tips Law conflicted with
the intent of § 41704, and, apparently, that § 41704 "evinces
congressional intent to occupy the field of baggage liability,"
raising both conflict and field preemption issues.'17
The court rejected Defendant's arguments, noting that even if
the heightened TSA screening procedures increased carriers'
potential liability, this liability did not "clearly relate" to air carri-
ers' potential liability for mandatorily stowed baggage and there-
171 Id. (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995)).
172 Id. at 125-26 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252
(1994)).
173 Id. at 126.
174 Id. But see Fitz-Gerald v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 913, 921-22
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2007).
175 DiFiore, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 126-27.
176 Id. at 126 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41704 (2000)).
177 Id. at 126-27.
178 Id. at 127.
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fore could not support a finding of implied conflict preemption
between the Massachusetts Tips Law and § 41704.179 The court
similarly rejected Defendant's field preemption argument, find-
ing that neither the purpose nor the language of § 41704 sup-
ported the conclusion that Congress intended to occupy the
field of baggage liability to the extent that state laws relating to
airline employment issues were preempted."' Accordingly, the
court determined that Defendant "ha[d] failed to overcome the
presumption against preemption" and denied Defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss. 18
1
4. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Ha-
waii in Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc.18 2 involved, inter
alia, the alleged breach of a confidentiality agreement between
air carriers. 183 Plaintiffs, two local airlines, served the Hawaiian
Islands and controlled (along with a third airline uninvolved in
the litigation) the majority of local service.'8 4 In 2006, Defen-
dant airline entered the market and began to offer below-cost,
inter-island flights, allegedly in an attempt to monopolize the
market and drive Plaintiffs out of business.18 5
Plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy in December 2004, allegedly af-
ter discovering Defendant had conducted a study and was ad-
vised to enter the market and force Plaintiffs out.'86
Subsequently, Plaintiffs and Defendant began negotiations re-
garding potential investment opportunities, entering into two
different confidentiality agreements in the process. 87 Under
the agreements, Plaintiffs allowed Defendant access "to confi-
dential and proprietary trade secrets and commercial informa-
tion" and Defendant was barred from utilizing the information
for any purpose other than potential investment.' 88 Thereafter,
Defendant entered the market and began offering low-cost ser-
179 Id.
180 Id. (citing, inter alia, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
181 Id. at 127-28 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux,
69 F.3d 608, 610 (lst Cir. 1995)).
182 CV No. 07-00007 DAE-MBK, 2007 WL 842064 (D. Haw. Apr. 2, 2007).
183 Id. at *1-*2.
184 Id. at *1.
185 Id. at *1-*2.
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vice, allegedly aided by information obtained under these
agreements. 8 9
Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court, alleging breach of con-
tract because Defendant misused confidential information ob-
tained under the agreements, fraud, and attempted
monopolization and predatory pricing in violation of the Sher-
man Act, and sought monetary damages and equitable relief.19 °
Defendant moved to dismiss the contract and fraud claims, ar-
guing that they were preempted by the ADA, but did not chal-
lenge Plaintiffs Sherman Act claims.' 9
In reviewing Defendant's preemption argument, the district
court began by quoting the ADA's preemption provision:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route or service of an air carrier
that may provide air transportation under this subpart. 9 2
The district court then examined this provision in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.'93 In Morales, the Supreme Court found that "the ADA pre-
empted guidelines for airline fare advertising."' 94 Specifically,
Morales broadly interpreted the phrase "related to" as used in
the ADA's preemption provision.' 95
However, the district court noted that Morales did not "set
down a blanket rule preempting state law claims; rather, it left
open the possibility that the ADA would not preempt nonprice-
related claims or any other state claim that is 'too tenuous, re-
mote or peripheral' . . . to have pre-emptive effect."' 96 The dis-
trict court further noted that in American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens,'97 the Supreme Court had specifically "excluded breach
of contract claims from preemption" and, accordingly, "under
Wolens, a party may seek relief under state contract law from an
airline that has 'dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated'
in a contract, without fear of enlarging or enhancing rights
189 Id. at *2.
190 Id.
191 Id. at *3.
192 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000)).
193 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992)).
194 Id. (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390-91).
195 Id.
196 Id. (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).
197 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995).
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under the ADA 'based on state laws or policies external to the
agreement."' 118 Defendant attempted to distinguish Wolens and
argued that "it created a narrow exception" that had been fur-
ther restricted by subsequent case law, citing to, inter alia, Buck v.
American Airlines, Inc 99 The district court rejected the argu-
ment, finding the cases cited were inapposite because "[n]one
of those situations mirror that presented here, where [Plain-
tiffs'] claim is based on express, contractual provisions that are
nothing but contractual in nature. '20 0 Furthermore, the district
court found that Plaintiffs' claims furthered the policies under-
lying the ADA, i.e., deregulation, because Defendant's alleged
misappropriation of confidential proprietary information in or-
der to overpower competitors, if true, essentially cheated the
system. 2
0 1
Defendant, however, contended that two federal defenses
"provide[d] another avenue for its preemption argument. "202
First, that the ADA granted it the right of entry into the market,
by whatever means, because it encouraged entry into the air
transportation market (a public interest) ;203 and, second, that
several Department of Transportation regulations204 relating to
pricing requirements for "interstate and overseas air transporta-
tion," applied to travel within the Hawaiian islands and pre-
empted Plaintiffs state law claims.20 5 The district court noted
that Defendant appeared to "contend that, because it raises fed-
eral defenses that 'arise from law external to the terms of the
contract itself, the ADA preempts the claims under Wolens.'
206
In this regard Defendant cited Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black2 °7
and Smith v. Comair.20 8 The district court was not persuaded and
found these cases distinguishable because they both involved
boarding procedures, and explained that as found in Black, "to
allow state common law to govern such actions could open the
198 Aloha Airlines, 2007 WL 842064, at *4 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232).
199 Id. (citing Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2007);
Breitling U.S.A., Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (D. Conn.
1999); and Stone v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823, 826 (D. Haw. 1995)).
200 Id.
201 Id. at *5.
202 Id.
203 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(13) (2000).
204 Aloha Airlines, 2007 WL 842064, at *5 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 253.7 (2008)).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 116 S.W.3d 745, 754-56 (Tex. 2003).
208 134 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 1998).
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door to 'extensive multi-state litigations, launching inconsistent
assaults on federal deregulation in the airline industry, every
time an airline reassigned a passenger's seat.' "209 However, the
district court found that Plaintiffs' breach of the confidentiality
agreement claim did not involve any standard airline service
under the ADA, and thus did not directly implicate any defenses
under federal law, as was the case in Comair.2 10 Further, the dis-
trict court found that the defenses actually raised were only indi-
rectly related to Plaintiffs' claim, and to allow such defenses to
escape the Wolens exception and find preemption under the
ADA would incite future airline-defendants "to think of creative
federal defenses external to the terms of the contract, in any
contract case involving airlines, to invoke the ADA's preemption
provision and to avoid the Wolens breach of contract excep-
tion. ' 211 The district court also rejected Defendant's argument
that the claims also should be preempted because the measure
of damages sought would force the court to look beyond the
contract to airline prices and service, explaining that it is the
nature of the claim that is germane to the preemption analysis,
not the nature of the remedy.212
Defendant next argued that Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were pre-
empted by the ADA.213 The district court rejected this argu-
ment as well, relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in West v.
Northwest Airlines, InC.,214 which "upheld a claim for breach of
implied warranty and fair dealing for compensatory damages,
though not for punitive damages, because the claim was 'too
tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger preemption
under the ADA.'" 21 5 The district court rejected Defendant's at-
tempts to distinguish West, finding Plaintiffs' claim to be 'Just as
tenuously connected to airline prices, routes, or services ' 216 The
Defendant's reliance on several "out-of-district cases," as the dis-
trict court noted, was misplaced because each case involved at-
tempts to "extend or to contradict the terms of the contract,"
rather than to enforce express contractual terms, as here.21 7
209 Id. (quoting Black, 116 S.W.3d at 756).
210 Id. at *6.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at *7.
214 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993).
215 Aloha Airlines, 2007 WL 842064, at *7 (quoting West, 995 F.2d at 151).
216 Id. at *7, *9.
217 Id. at *8 (collecting cases).
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Thus, the district court found "no reason to distinguish the
Ninth Circuit's decision in West, which permits claims of breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where
such claims are tenuously connected to an airline's prices,
routes, or services," and found that the ADA did not preempt
Plaintiffs' claim. 1
The district court similarly found that Plaintiffs' claims for
fraudulent inducement, punitive damages, and injunctive relief
were not preempted by the ADA because of the tenuous rela-
tionship between Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's "prices,
routes, and services. 21' 9 Accordingly, the district court denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss.22 °
5. Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.
The decision in Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. 221 involved a
wrongful discharge claim brought by a former pilot-employee
against his former employers. 222 Plaintiff alleged that he was
fired because he refused to fly certain aircraft on multiple occa-
sions because the aircraft did not meet the Minimum Equip-
ment List ("MEL") standard in accordance with FAA
regulations. 223 Defendants alleged that there were additional
grounds supporting the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employ-
ment, including a complaint about his behavior toward a female
flight attendant.224
Plaintiff filed suit claiming wrongful discharge, "breach of em-
ployment contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent mis-
representation, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, and wage and hour viola-
tions. ' 2 25 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants, finding, inter alia, that Defendants had established
218 Id. at *9.
219 Id. at *9-*12.
220 Id. at * 13.
221 229 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
222 Id. at 363-64. Plaintiffs complaint named several corporate Defendants,
namely Raytheon Aircraft Co. ("RAC"), Raytheon Travel Air, and Flight Options,
LLC ("FOG") because, due to corporate restructuring and a series of mergers,
the company that had initially hired Plaintiff, RAC, was not the party that fired
him, FOC. Id. The court addressed the claims against each series of corporate
Defendants separately, but for clarity's sake this summary will not focus on the
corporate issues before the court.
223 Id. at 364-65.
224 Id. at 364.
225 Id. at 365.
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other grounds for Plaintiffs discharge claims besides refusal to
perform illegal acts and that Plaintiff's claims were preempted
by the ADA.226 Plaintiff appealed to the Texas State Court of
Appeals, First District, arguing that:
(1) summary judgment was improper on his wrongful discharge
claims under the Sabine Pilot227 exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, and the trial court erred in considering hearsay in a
summary judgment affidavit, (2) his wrongful discharge claims
are not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,221
(3) summary judgment on his breach of contract claims was im-
proper because he was not an at-will employee, and (4) summary
judgment was improper on his common law tort, conspiracy, and
unpaid wages claims.220
Addressing Plaintiffs Sabine Pilot claim, the Court of Appeals
began by explaining that although an employer generally may
fire an employee for any reason under Texas law, absent a con-
trary agreement, "[i] n Sabine Pilot Service Inc. v. Hauck, the Texas
Supreme Court recognized an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine for an employee discharged 'for the sole reason
that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.' ,,230 To in-
voke this exception, a plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that his refusal to perform an
illegal act was the sole cause for his discharge, because if an em-
ployer has any other legitimate grounds for terminating plain-
tiffs employment he is not liable for wrongful discharge. 231 The
Court of Appeals found that, on the facts presented, the trial
court had properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's
Sabine Pilot claim, because the evidence presented indicated that
Defendant had terminated all of its pilots due to corporate
restructuring.232
Plaintiff further argued that the trial court had erred in dis-
missing his Sabine Pilot claim as preempted by the ADA.2 33 In
226 Id. at 363-64.
227 Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
228 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000).
229 Miller, 229 S.W.3d at 363-64.
230 Id. at 367 (quoting Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735).
231 Id. (citing, inter alia, Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629,
633 (Tex. 1995)).
232 Id. at 368.
233 Id. Plaintiff also argued that the ADA did not apply to his claims, because
his employer was not an "air carrier" under the ADA, but presented no evidence
raising a question of fact and Defendant produced an FAA certification of its
status as an air carrier. Id. at 372.
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rejecting Plaintiffs argument that his Sabine Pilot claim was not
preempted, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent from the
Supreme Court234 and the Texas Supreme Court235 in its analy-
sis, and indicated that it had previously been determined that "if
a court cannot adjudicate a contract claim without resort to ex-
ternal law, the ADA preempts the claim. '236 The Court of Ap-
peals applied the two-part ADA preemption test set forth by the
Texas Supreme Court in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer.237
Under this test, the Kiefer court first "examined whether the
claims related to airline rates, routes, or services. Second, the
court examined whether the claims constituted the enactment
or enforcement of a state law, rule, regulation, standard, or
other provision. 238
Applying this test, the Court of Appeals first found that, under
the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of claims "related to"
airline rates, routes, and services under the ADA, Plaintiff's re-
fusal to fly, resulting in grounding aircraft, "directly affected
[Defendant] FOC's point-to-point transportation services. '2 9
Next, the Court of Appeals found that allowing Plaintiff to pur-
sue his Sabine Pilot claim and seek money damages for wrongful
termination because of his refusal to perform an illegal act (i.e.,
to fly an aircraft in violation of FAA regulations) would consti-
tute the enactment or enforcement of state law relating to air-
line services. 240  Despite contrary Texas state public policy
relating to Sabine Pilot wrongful termination claims, the Court of
Appeals held that Plaintiffs specific claims were preempted by
the ADA, but noted the narrowness of its holding because of its
belief the ADA would not preempt Sabine Pilot claims unrelated
to an air carrier's prices, routes, or services.241
The Court of Appeals similarly found that the trial court prop-
erly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs remaining con-
234 Id. at 369-70 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995);
Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992)).
235 Id. at 370-72 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745 (Tex.
2003); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996)).
236 Id. at 370 (collecting cases).
237 Id. at 372-74 (Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 281-82).
238 Id. at 370.
239 Id. at 372-73 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 384).
240 Id. at 374.
241 Id. at 373-75. As the Court of Appeals stated, "[a] Sabine Pilot claim repre-
sents a policy determination by the State of Texas that an employee terminated
for refusing to perform a criminal act should have a tort action against his em-
ployer." Id. at 373.
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tract and common law claims.242 For example, Plaintiff alleged
that he was not employed at-will, but the court found that the
evidence presented "including the offer letter and employment
agreements .... does not indicate any intent on the part of [De-
fendants] to be bound not to terminate [Plaintiff] except under
clearly specified circumstances. '24" Because Plaintiff failed to es-
tablish any contractual employment agreement, he could not
claim breach of contract.24 4 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's orders granting summary judgment.24 5
6. Ing v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Ing v. American Airlines, Inc.,246 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California addressed claims arising out
of the death of a two-year-old English bulldog following air
transportation as cargo from New York to San Francisco. 247 It
was undisputed that the dog was alive upon arrival at San Fran-
cisco. 248 However, the dog was lethargic and breathing shal-
lowly.249  Plaintiff, the dog's owner, discovered the dog's
condition after going to retrieve him from the "baggage area,"
and immediately requested to take him to a veterinarian.2 50
However, Defendant's cargo agent refused to release the dog
until a veterinarian had performed a necropsy. 251 It was undis-
puted that "four or five hours" passed between when Plaintiff
asked Defendant for his dog and when the dog actually was re-
turned.252 The dog died during that time.253 It was undisputed
that the dog was not given veterinary care prior to its return to
Plaintiff.254
Plaintiff had filed an action in the Superior Court claiming
"negligence, gross negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion...
intentional infliction of emotional distress . . .breach of bail-
ment contract, breach of contract" and violations of sections of
242 Id. at 384.
243 Id. at 377.
244 Id. at 377-78.
245 Id. at 384.
246 No. C 06-02873 WHA, 2007 WL 420249 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007).
247 Id. at *1.
248 Id. at *8.
249 Id. at *1-*2.
250 Id. at *2.
251 Id.
252 Id. at *8.
253 Id. at *2.
254 Id. at *8.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the California Civil Procedure and California Business and Pro-
fessions Codes.255 Defendant removed the case to the district
court and then moved for summary judgment as to its responsi-
bility for Plaintiffs damages or, alternatively, partial summary
judgment limiting its liability to $50 under the terms of the air
waybill.256
The district court noted that "[h]istorically, federal common
law applied to claims of loss of or damage of goods [trans-
ported] by interstate common carriers. ' 57 It observed that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the
ADA "did not preempt 'run-of-the-mill-contract' personal injury
claims or routine contract claims," but that claims relating to the
"loss or damage to shipped goods fit into neither category. 258
The district court found that Plaintiffs claims other than his
breach of contract claim were preempted "at least for the time
that the dog was in transit. '259 In so finding, the district court
rejected Plaintiffs argument that his claim under the California
Business and Professions Code was not preempted because, ac-
cording to Plaintiff, it arose from a violation of the Animal Wel-
fare Act,26 ° a federal law. 261 The district court found that the
Animal Welfare Act provided no private right of action, but
rather, "at most," a standard of care.262
With respect to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim, the district
court first examined the validity of Defendant's air waybill liabil-
ity limitation.263 The district court noted that the air waybill was
the contract between the shipper and the air carrier, 264 and a
provision limiting a carrier's liability is "prima facie valid if the
face of the contract (or, in this case, air waybill) recites the liabil-
ity limitation and the means to avoid it."'265 The district court
255 Id. at *3.
256 Id. at *1, *3.
257 Id. at *3 (citing Deiro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.
1987)).
258 Id. at *3 (quoting Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd., 186 F.3d
1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)).
259 Id. at *4 (citing Se. Exp. Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28, 30
(1936)).
260 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. (2000).
261 Ing, 2007 WL 420249, at *4.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id. (citing S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336,
342-43 (1982)).
265 Id. at *4 (quoting Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd., 186 F.3d
1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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noted that the subject air waybill allowed the shipper to "opt
out" of the limited liability provision by declaring the value of
the goods and paying a higher rate for the shipment.266 The
court found that Defendant's provision established a prima facie
showing that the limit applied, as the face of the air waybill pro-
vided space for the shipper to declare a higher value for the
goods and Defendant to impose a correspondingly higher fee.2 6 7
Finding a prima facie showing of validity, the court then
turned to the next step in the analysis of the validity of the limi-
tation, the "released-valuation doctrine. ' 268 The released-valua-
tion doctrine provides that a shipper "'is deemed to have
released the carrier from liability beyond the amount stated' in
exchange for a low shipping rate. '269 Under the doctrine, the
shipper is bound by its release so long as it "(1) has reasonable
notice of the rate structure; and (2) is given a fair opportunity to
pay a higher rate in order to obtain greater protection. 27 ° The
face of the air waybill provided, in pertinent part:
This non-negotiable air waybill is a contract governed by law
and by the provisions, on the reverse side. Such provisions,
among other things, exclude or limit the carrier's liability for
loss, damage, or delay in certain instances.271
The reverse side of the air waybill provided that Defendant's
liability was limited to:
"50 cents per pound per shipment (but not less than USD 50.00)
unless a higher value (not to exceed USD 1500.00) is declared
on the Air Waybill at the time of acceptance by the Carrier, and
the applicable charges pertaining to such higher value have been
paid by the shipper. 272
The district court noted that the language on the face of the
air waybill was "highlighted with a contrasting background and
appeared just above the line for the shipper's signature" and
referred the shipper to the "actual provisions" on the reverse
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the provision also was sub-
ject to the reasonable communicativeness doctrine, which applies to limitations
of liability for checked baggage, because Plaintiff had chosen to ship the dog as
Priority Parcel instead of checked baggage. Id.
269 Id. at *5 (quoting Deiro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.
1987)).
270 Id. (quoting Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1365).
271 Id.
272 Id. at *1.
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side which provided that additional liability coverage could be
purchased at an additional charge.273 In addition, the left por-
tion of the face of the waybill contained a blank where the ship-
per could declare a value and an additional space "next to that"
where an "excess value fee" could be added to the shipping
charges based on this declared value. 274 Noting that reasonable-
ness of notice is a question of law for the court, the district court
concluded that the language was sufficiently conspicuous to put
a shipper on notice of the limitation.275
Plaintiff then had the burden to show that he was not af-
forded a fair opportunity to purchase additional coverage.276
The shipper, whom the court found to be acting as the Plain-
tiffs agent in shipping the dog, argued that she was not ex-
pressly informed of this option during the transaction.277
Nonetheless, the court found that the terms of the waybill were
sufficient to provide a fair opportunity to avoid the limitation.27s
Because Plaintiff did not meet his burden to show denial of a
fair opportunity to obtain greater coverage, the court found the
limited liability provisions were presumptively valid and enforce-
able unless subsequently invalidated by acts of the carrier.279
The district court went on to note that the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit had held that a limited liability provi-
sion shields carriers from liability for any form of negligence,
even gross negligence. 2 ' The district court noted that because
shippers have the option of purchasing additional coverage,
"nothing short of intentional destruction or conduct in the na-
ture of theft of the property will permit a shipper to circumvent
[valid] liability limitations. '"281 Plaintiff argued that Defendant's
conduct in refusing to release the dog after his request consti-
tuted conversion, nullifying the limitation on liability.2 2 The
district court, accepting Plaintiff's factual allegations as true,
stated that Defendant's refusal to return the dog to Plaintiff for
273 Id. at *5.
274 Id.
275 Id. (citing Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1364).
276 Id. (citing Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1365).
277 Id. at *5-*6.
278 Id. at *6.
279 Id.
280 Id. (citing Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1366).
281 Id. (quoting Am. Cyanamid Co. v. New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 979 F.2d
310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 1992)).
282 Id.
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veterinary care, caused or contributed to the dog's death.28
The district court then found that "[a] reasonable jury could
conclude that American committed conversion by not releasing
the dog to [Plaintiff] until after it was dead ... [and, if it] con-
cluded that American's conduct was intentional, the limited lia-
bility provision would not apply. 284
Plaintiff further argued that the liability limitations of the air
waybill did not apply because Defendant had breached its tariff,
which the air waybill incorporated by reference. 285 The tariff
provided that "pug- or snub-nosed dogs 'will be refused tender if
the temperature at any point in theirjourney is 75'F (22.5'C) or
higher."' 286 The tariff, however, incorrectly converted Fahren-
heit to Celsius, as 22.5°C converts to 72.5'F.287 Defendant, dur-
ing litigation, described this policy as "calling for the refusal of
transport of pug-nosed dogs if the temperature exceeds 750F or
24 0C (which is very close to 75'F)."288
Plaintiff alleged that the temperature was between 75'F and
780 F and, therefore, claimed that Defendant had breached its
tariff by shipping the dog despite the fact that the air tempera-
ture at JFK exceeded the maximum allowable for shipment of
snub-nosed dogs.289 Defendant contended that the temperature
was "at or below 75'F.''29" However, the district court noted that
because "the carrier is the tariffs author, ambiguities in its lan-
guage must be strictly construed against the carrier," and thus
concluded that the lower stated temperature controlled. 29 1 As
such, it found that a jury could conclude that the temperature
exceeded the lower limit (72.5'F) set forth by the tariff.29 2 The
district court noted that Defendant could not enforce the provi-
sions of a contract it had violated, and found that the facts of the




285 Id. at *2, *7.
286 Id. at *2.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at *2, *7.
290 Id. at *2.






Plaintiffs final argument was "that the air waybill and federal
common law ceased to apply after he demanded receipt of his
dog," and that Defendant's subsequent conduct provided a sep-
arate basis for liability.294 The court found that this argument
also raised triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment,
as "[i]t defies logic to think that the air waybill still insulates
American from liability after it refuses to return property to the
consignee. '295 Accordingly, the district court granted Defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in
part holding that: (1) all of Plaintiff's claims for harm incurred
while the dog was in transit were preempted by federal common
law, with the exclusion of breach of contract; (2) the air way-
bill's limited liability provision was valid and enforceable unless
Plaintiff established that Defendant "intentionally interfered
with possession of the dog" or breached its contract; and (3) a
reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's acts following
the arrival of the dog at the airport "constituted a separate inci-
dent not covered by the air waybill. 29 6
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958297 ("Federal Aviation Act")
was enacted in response to "a series of fatal air crashes between
civil and military aircraft operating under separate flight
rules. 298 The Federal Aviation Act was intended "to promote
safety in aviation and thereby protect the lives of persons who
travel on board aircraft" 299 and "to create and enforce one uni-
fied system of flight rules."300 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has stated that the Act "illustrates Congress' intent
to make the Federal Aviation Administration the sole arbiter of
air safety. °30 1
294 Id. at *8.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2000).
298 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United
States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969)).
299 Id. (quoting In re Mex. City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 406
(9th Cir. 1983)).
300 Id. (quoting Christensen, 419 F.2d at 1404).
301 Id. at 472.
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1. In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006,302 the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ad-
dressed Plaintiffs' motions to remand wrongful death actions
arising out of the crash of Comair Flight 5191 in Lexington,
Kentucky, on August 27, 2006, that had been removed to federal
court: °. Plaintiffs had filed actions in Fayette Circuit Court
against "various Comair corporate entities" (collectively "Defen-
dant") .3o4 Defendant's removal was based upon alleged federal
question jurisdiction because "federal law governs the Plaintiff's
right of recovery and because Plaintiff's Complaint includes alle-
gations that raise a substantial issue of federal law."' 05 Plaintiffs'
actions were consolidated for "pretrial purposes. '36
Plaintiffs subsequently moved to remand. 7 In addressing the
motions, the court stated that the "critical issue" was "whether
there is original federal question jurisdiction to support the re-
moval of these cases from state court."3 '' In their motions,
Plaintiffs argued that: their wrongful death actions were "cre-
ated by state law, not federal law," and that they relied on state
law for relief; that no federal question was set forth on the face
of their complaints; that as "master of their complaints," they
were "entitled to maintain their actions in state court;" that the
defense of preemption did not support jurisdiction in federal
court; and that Defendant "failed to demonstrate Congressional
intent to preempt completely all state law causes of action. 30 9
In examining Defendant's removal, the district court noted
that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question
must be presented "on the face of the plaintiffs properly
pleaded complaint. ' 310 Further, the district court noted that
"'[i]t is settled law that 'a case may not be removed to federal
court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of
pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs
complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal de-
302 486 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Ky. 2007).





308 Id. at 647.
3 9 Id. at 644.
310 Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 (1987)).
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fense is the only question truly at issue.'" 311 The two "narrow"
exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule occur if "(1) fed-
eral law completely preempts the state-law claims; or (2) the
state-law claims raise substantial questions of federal law.
31 2
In evaluating Plaintiffs' motions, the district court addressed,
inter alia, express preemption, implied ordinary preemption and
implied complete preemption . 13  In considering express pre-
emption, the district court stated that the ADA amended the
Federal Aviation Act to set forth an "express prohibition against
enactment or enforcement of state laws, rules, regulations, stan-
dards, or other provisions 'having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.'"314 How-
ever, the district court noted that Defendant did not claim that
Plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the ADA's express preemp-
tion clause and that "[a] number of courts ha[d] rejected argu-
ments that the ADA expressly preempt[ed] various state law
claims. 3 1
5
The district court then turned to implied "ordinary" preemp-
tion.316 It stated that a federal statute can "implicitly override[ ]
state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Con-
gress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively . . . or
when state law is in actual conflict with federal law."'317 Further,
''congressional intent to supersede state laws must be 'clear and
manifest.' "318
It noted that implied preemption may be ordinary or com-
plete. l9 Ordinary preemption will provide a basis for preemp-
tion if the federal law that allegedly preempts state law "is
alleged in a well-pleaded complaint. '321 It will not provide a ba-
sis for removal, however, if plaintiff framed the complaint
"based solely on state law" and preemption was only raised as a
defense by defendant. 21
311 Id. at 645 (quoting Roddy v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., Inc., 395 F.3d 318, 322
(6th Cir. 2005)).
312 Id. (citing Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2006);
Dunlap v. G & L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004)).
313 Id. at 645-46, 648, 654.
314 Id. at 645 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000)).
315 Id. at 646 (collecting cases).
316 Id.
317 Id. (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
318 Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
319 Id.
320 Id. at 647.
321 Id.
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Defendant argued that there was "evidence of Congressional
intent for the standard of care for airline safety to be uniform
and to be exclusively determined by federal law. '3 22 The district
court, however, stated that whether there was ordinary preemp-
tion was not at issue, rather the issue was whether there was
"original federal question jurisdiction" to support removal. 23
The district court rejected Defendant's heavy reliance on, inter
alia, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Abdullah v.
American Airlines, Inc.,3 24 which held that "federal law establishes
the applicable standards of care in the field of air safety. '3 25 The
district court stated that under Abdullah "state law remedies or
causes of action remain [ed] available, despite ordinary preemp-
tion of the standard of care" and, furthermore, Abdullah con-
tained no discussion "regarding the jurisdiction of the federal
court, but the holding itself precludes a complete preemption
decision.31 26 Thus, after "carefully" considering the case law re-
lied upon by Defendant relating to ordinary preemption, the
district court held that those authorities were irrelevant to
whether it had original jurisdiction over the removed cases.327
The district court then considered whether there was original
jurisdiction pursuant to implied complete preemption.328 After
engaging in an analysis of several decisions addressing complete
preemption,329 the district court found that:
In summary, "complete" preemption replaces not only state
substantive law with federal law, but also replaces state causes of
action with claims "arising under" federal law. Because of the
serious implications regarding the Constitutional allocation of
authority between state and federal courts, there must be a clear
manifestation of congressional intent for federal law to super-
sede both state substantive law and state causes of action to cre-
ate federal removal jurisdiction. The plaintiff must remain "the
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
325 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (quoting Abdullah, 181
F.3d at 368).
326 Id. (citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 368).
327 Id. (citing, inter alia, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.S. 624 (1973)).
328 Id.
329 Id. at 648-50 (citing Palkow v. CSX Transp. Inc., 431 F.3d 543 (6th Cir.
2006); Roddy v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., Inc., 395 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2005); Musson
Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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master of the claim," and the plaintiff's choice of forum should
prevail unless there is "preemption on steroids."' 0
In determining whether the Federal Aviation Act completely
preempted state law, the district court observed that until the
Act was amended by the ADA, it had no express preemption
clause.3 31 Thereafter, the ADA expressly preempted only state
law relating to "price, route or service of an air carrier," which
the Supreme Court had found implied that "matters beyond
that reach are not preempted.3 3 2 The district court found that
the presence of a preemption clause, while not conclusive, sup-
ported the inference that there was no implied preemption in
the Federal Aviation Act.3 33 Further, the district court noted
that the Federal Aviation Act contained a savings clause. 3 4 The
district court therefore concluded that the ADA's preemption
clause, read in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Act's sav-
ings clause, "stops States from imposing their own substantive
standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but not from
affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an airline
dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated. 3 5
The court noted that in the decision in Cleveland v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 6 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Federal Avia-
tion Act did "not indicate[ ] a 'clear and manifest' intent to
occupy the field of airplane safety to the exclusion of state com-
mon law. To the contrary, it appears through the savings clause
that Congress has intended to allow state common law to stand
side by side with the system of federal regulations it has
developed.
33 7
The district court distinguished the decision of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in Curtin v. Port
330 Id. at 650.
331 Id.
332 Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)).
333 Id. (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).
334 Id. The district court noted that the Federal Aviation Act savings clause
provided that "[n]othing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
Act are in addition to such remedies." Id. n.5 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506
(1994)). The savings clause was amended to provide: "A remedy under this part
is in addition to any other remedies provided by law." Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 40120(c) (2000)).
335 Id. at 650-51 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-33
(1995)).
336 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
337 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (quoting Cleveland, 985
F.2d at 1444).
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Authority of New York, 338 which it found to be the only case that
supported Defendant's preemption arguments. 3 9 In Curtin, the
district court found that a state negligence claim relating to per-
sonal injuries resulting from an emergency aircraft evacuation
presented a federal question and was properly removed. 340 The
district court in the present matter, however, disagreed with
Curtin to the extent it held that removal jurisdiction "directly
follows from ordinary preemption," and noted that "a number
of jurisdictions" had found that the Federal Aviation Act does
not completely preempt state law causes of action.3 1' Accord-
ingly, the district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Act:
does not completely preempt state law causes of action for
wrongful death or survivor benefits in aviation cases. To the ex-
tent [Defendant] relied on [Federal Aviation Act] preemption as
a basis for removal, its reliance was misplaced. This Court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction based on complete preemp-
tion of wrongful death claims by the [Federal Aviation Act].342
In addition, Defendant contended that its removal of several
actions was proper pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. 43 The
district court commented that there is a split in the circuits
about whether the Convention completely preempted state law
causes of action, but ordered the parties to brief this issue
further. 44
The district court also considered Defendant's argument that
removal was proper because Plaintiffs' claims "necessarily de-
pend[ed] on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law. '34 5 In this respect, the district court noted that the Su-
preme Court had provided that "in certain cases federal ques-
tion jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate
significant federal issues" but that this is not "a password open-
ing federal courts to any state action embracing a point of fed-
eral law."31 4 6 Rather, the issue is whether a state law claim
necessarily raises a "stated federal issue, actually disputed and
318 183 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
339 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
340 Id. (citing Curtin, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72).
341 Id. (collecting cases).
342 Id. at 654.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. (quoting Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir.
2006)).
3- Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 312, 314 (2005)).
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substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without dis-
turbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities. 3 47
The district court noted that "even when a plaintiff relies on
federal law as part of a state law claim, there is not necessarily a
substantial federal question to support removal jurisdiction. 348
The district court then found that Defendant had failed to iden-
tify "a single federal statute relied upon by the plaintiffs and
about which the parties have any serious dispute as to its inter-
pretation. There is no such federal statute because Plaintiffs'
claims are based entirely upon state law."'3 43 While Defendant
argued that "the substantial and disputed federal issue is
whether the [Federal Aviation Act] displaces state and common
law in establishing the standard of care applicable to [Defen-
dant] under the circumstances alleged, ' 350 the district court re-
lied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Williams,351 which stated that the presence of a federal ques-
tion in a defensive argument was not sufficient to overcome the
well-pleaded complaint rule, i.e., that a plaintiff is the master of
the complaint.3 5 2 Caterpillar further provided that if a defendant
could transform a state law claim into a claim arising under fed-
eral law by merely "injecting a federal question into an action"
and thereby select the forum in which the claim would be liti-
gated, plaintiff would be a "master of nothing." 53
The district court stated that Defendant's reliance upon the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Bennett
v. Southwest Airlines Co.,354 which found that a substantial federal
question was raised in an action for personal injury claims aris-
ing out of an aircraft crash, was misplaced.3 55 The district court
in the present matter found that, inter alia, the plaintiff in Ben-
nett, unlike here, "specifically alleged violations of the Federal
Aviation Regulations and violation of the FAA approved flight
347 Id. at 654-55 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314).
348 Id. at 655.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 656.
35, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
352 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 655-56 (quoting Caterpillar,
482 U.S. at 398-99).
353 Id. at 656 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99).
354 No. 06 C 317, 2006 WL 1987821 (N.D. I11.July 13, 2006), rev'd, 484 F.3d 907
(7th Cir. 2007).
355 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
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manual, raising a federal issue in [the] complaint. 35 6 The dis-
trict court concluded that Plaintiffs' motions to remand should
not be denied on the ground that there was a substantial ques-
tion of federal law.357 Accordingly, the district court, inter alia,
granted Plaintiffs' motions to remand to the extent that they
were not subject to additional briefing relating to the Warsaw
Convention. 58
2. Levy v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
Levy v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 359 arose out of injuries Plaintiff
allegedly sustained while traveling as a passenger onboard De-
fendant airline's flight from Houston, Texas, to Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, after a large ceramic bowl fell on her head from
an allegedly faulty or improperly secured overhead storage bin
above.360
Plaintiff initially filed an action for negligence in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, but Defendant removed
the action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 6 1 Plaintiff
thereafter amended her complaint to include negligence
claims, as well as violations of Pennsylvania State and Local Mu-
nicipal Ordinances, the "pertinent provisions" of the Federal
Aviation Act, and 14 C.F.R. §§ 25, 121, and 125.362 Defendant
moved to dismiss, arguing that "Plaintiffs claims arising from
common law standards, state statutes, and local ordinances
should be dismissed because they are preempted by federal
law," and that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support
the claims brought pursuant to federal aviation safety
standards. 63
Relying on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,364 the district
court found that Plaintiffs common law, state statutory, and lo-
356 Id. (citing Bennett, 2006 WL 1987821, at *1).
357 Id.
358 Id. at 654, 658.
359 No. 07-1266, 2007 WL 2844592 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2007).
360 Id. at *1.
361 Id. Plaintiff's complaint raised only state law grounds, and Defendant
moved to dismiss on preemption grounds. Id. However, Plaintiff was granted
leave to amend the complaint to include federal grounds and Defendant's first
motion was mooted. Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
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cal ordinance standards of care were preempted by the Federal
Aviation Act. 65 In Abdullah, the Third Circuit held "that [be-
cause] federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in
the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire field
from state and territorial regulation," claims cannot be based on
violations of state law standards of care. 66 The district court
noted that other courts within the Third Circuit had adopted
Abdullah's reasoning and found that state standards of care were
preempted in similar cases, and rejected Plaintiffs argument
that Abdullah was no longer good law in light of the September
11th Victims' Compensation Fund (the "Fund")367 and the Su-
preme Court's decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.3 68
Plaintiff argued that the Fund was evidence that Congress did
not intend to displace state standards with respect to aviation
safety, because it explicitly directs that "[t] he substantive law for
decision in any such suit shall be derived from the law, includ-
ing choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash oc-
curred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by
Federal law. ' 3 69 However, the district court was not persuaded
by this argument and noted that, in light of the limited applica-
bility of that language, "[p]inning congressional intent to over-
turn or alter widespread, if not uniform, interpretation of other
[Federal Aviation Act] provisions and to clarify a national pre-
emption standard on this narrow statute would be
inappropriate. 370
The district court also rejected Plaintiffs reliance on Geier, in
which the Supreme Court held that the "savings clause" of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 "pre-
served state law causes of action for violation of automobile stan-
dards imposed by the states.31 71 Unlike the Federal Aviation
Act, the savings clause interpreted by the Geier Court expressly
preserved state law standards, whereas the provision in the Fed-
365 Levy, 2007 WL 2844592, at *3.
366 Id. (citing Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Margolies-Mezvinski v. U.S. Air Corp., No. 98-1526, 2000 WL 122355 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 28, 2000)).
367 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000)); Levy, 2007 WL
2844592, at *4.
368 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
369 Air Transportation and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b) (2)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
370 Levy, 2007 WL 2844592, at *4.
371 Id. (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 868).
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eral Aviation Act does not and accordingly has been held to pre-
serve state law remedies, rather than state standards.37 2 The
district court found that "under the [Federal Aviation Act], fed-
eral law provides the pertinent standard of care for aviation
safety," and therefore dismissed Plaintiffs claims for violation of
state and local statutory, as well as common law, standards of
care.
373
However, the district court denied Defendant's motion to dis-
miss with respect to Plaintiffs claims for violation of federal
standards of care under the Federal Aviation Act.374 Although
Defendant argued that Plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient
facts to establish the violation of any specific provisions, "[t]he
court infer[red] that the . . . 'pertinent provisions' language al-
lege [d] violations of general standards of operation and mainte-
nance promulgated pursuant to the [Federal Aviation Act] ."7
The district court noted that under Abdullah, the general stan-
dard of care in an aviation negligence action was not merely that
of specific regulations, but also the:
overall concept that aircraft may not be operated in a careless or
reckless manner .... [T]he applicable standard of care is not
limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it expands to
encompass the issue of whether the overall operation or conduct
in question was careless or reckless.376
The district court found that, while Plaintiffs complaint was
not extensively detailed, the allegation that her injuries resulted
from a "broken and/or improperly closed overhead storage
compartment" was sufficient to put Defendant on notice of the
event at issue and to implicate a federal standard of care derived
from the Federal Aviation Act.37 7 The district court further
found that Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to pursue her
claims for violation of 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.589 and 125.289, which
"relate to carriage of cargo in the passenger [area] and training
of crewmembers," because it was possible that her injuries
stemmed from failure to adequately secure carry-on luggage or
372 Id. (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999)).
373 Id.
374 Id. at *5.
375 Id.
376 Id.; see also Aldana v. Air E. Airways, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D. Conn.
2007) (finding that the Federal Aviation Act preempts common law negligence
standards, but not the right to pursue negligence claims).
377 Ley, 2007 WL 2844592, at *6.
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inadequate crew training. 8 However, the district court dis-
missed Plaintiffs claims for violation of 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.787 and
25.853, as they related to "type certification" and duties of a
manufacturer with respect "to production and design, not oper-
ation," and could not be violated by the Defendant. v9 The
court thus granted Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect
to Plaintiffs claims relating to the alleged violation of common
law, state law, local ordinances, and C.F.R. parts relating to a
manufacturer's duties, but denied it with respect to the alleged
violation of standards of care derived from the Federal Aviation
Act and the C.F.R. parts relating to baggage storage and crew
3180training.
3. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Robinson
Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Robinson3 8 arose out of Plaintiff air am-
bulance service's receipt of notice from the Defendant Tennes-
see Board of Emergency Medical Services ("the Board") that
Plaintiff was operating in violation of the Board's rules requiring
helicopters licensed in the state to be equipped with certain spe-
cific avionics equipment.3 2 Plaintiff challenged the rules at a
hearing before the Board, arguing that the rules were pre-
empted by federal law and therefore invalid. 3  Two days before
the Board issued its final order, which rejected the challenge
and found that the rules were valid and not preempted, Plaintiff
commenced this action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee 4.38  The parties cross-moved for summary
judgment on preemption grounds, and Defendants moved to
dismiss the claims, urging the court to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction under Younger v. Hanis.38 5
378 Id.
379 Id. at *7.
380 Id.
381 486 F. Supp. 2d 713 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (denying Plaintiffs motion to
amend its complaint to include a claim that Defendants' "aircraft crew safety and
training" regulations were preempted by federal law).
382 Id. at 715 (the United States also filed a Statement of Interest in the case).
383 Id.
384 Id. Plaintiffs complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Board did
not have the power to issue rules regarding aviation safety, and an injunction
enjoining the enforcement of any such rules. Id. Following the Board's order,
Plaintiff amended its complaint to allege that the Board's rules in question were
preempted by federal law. Id.
-5 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Air Evac, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 715-16.
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In addressing the abstention issue, the Air Evac court noted
that although there is a "virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal forum to exercise its jurisdictional powers, ' in Younger
v. Harris, the Supreme Court made clear that in certain limited
and extraordinary situations, the concerns of equity, comity, and
federalism render it appropriate for a federal court to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction out of deference to parallel state
proceedings.38 7 As the Air Evac court explained:
The Sixth Circuit has held that abstention pursuant to Younger
is appropriate only when a court can answer the following three
questions in the affirmative: (1) do the relevant state proceed-
ings "constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding;" (2) do the
proceedings "implicate important state interests;" and (3) is
there "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges. 388
Although it was undisputed that the state proceedings in ques-
tion were 'Judicial" in nature, the district court noted that it was
not clear that they were ongoing because the Board already had
entered its final order.3 8 ' The district court then found that
there was no substantial state interest involved to satisfy the sec-
ond Younger factor.39 ° It stated that the relevant state interest in
this analysis was not the outcome of the Board's proceedings
with respect to this Plaintiffs claims, but rather "whether [Ten-
nessee] has a substantial, legitimate interest in regulating the
avionics equipment aboard air ambulances operating, at times,
within its borders. ' 39 1 There was no evidence or precedent to
support the proposition that regulation of avionics equipment is
an important state interest, and the Air Evac court noted that
regulation with respect to Plaintiffs helicopters could affect
multiple states' interests because the "helicopters are based in
eleven states, including Tennessee" and "[m]any of [Plaintiffs]
flights to Tennessee hospitals originate from its bases in Ken-
tucky, Mississippi and Alabama.119 2 Any relevant state interest in
386 Air Evac, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citing United States v. Anderson County,
Tenn., 705 F.2d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1983)).
387 Id. at 718.
388 Id. (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Common of Ohio, 926 F.2d
567 (6th Cir. 1994)).
89 Id. at 718-19 (noting that it need not resolve the issue of whether or not
the proceeding was "ongoing" because it found Younger abstention inappropriate
on other facts).
390 Id. at 719-20.
319 Id. at 719.
392 Id. at 720.
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the proceedings was further weakened because the Board's rules
were preempted by federal law. 93 Finally, although the district
court found, and Plaintiff did not dispute, that it had an "ade-
quate opportunity at the state level to raise its constitutional
challenges" during the Board's proceeding," 4 the district court
concluded that this was insufficient to support Younger absten-
tion in light of the insignificant state interest involved, and thus
exercised its jurisdiction to decide the motion on preemption
grounds. 95
In addressing whether the Board's rules were preempted by
federal law, the district court noted that in Greene v. B.F. Goodrich
Avionics, 396 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had
held "that 'federal law establishes the standards of care in the
field of aviation safety and thus preempts the field from state
regulation.' -39 7 Based on this, the Air Evac court found that the
Board's rules were preempted pursuant to field preemption. 98
In so finding, the district court rejected Defendants' argument
that Congress had not preempted the field of "helicopter ambu-
lance safety," noting the extensive number of FAA regulations
addressing navigational equipment.3 99 Accordingly, the district
court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss on abstention
grounds and granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
on preemption grounds.400
C. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 1994
Congress' intent to deregulate the motor carrier industry is
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 14501.4° 1 The statute was amended and
incorporated into the Federal Aviation Administration Authori-
zation Act of 1994 ("FAAAA") to prohibit the enforcement of
any state law "related to a price, route, or service of any motor
393 Id.
394 Id. at 720-21.
395 Id. at 721.
396 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir. 2005).
397 Air Evac, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 721, 723-24.
400 Id. at 724.
401 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 82 (1994); see also Tocher v. City of Santa
Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000).
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carrier. 40 2 Congress determined that the FAAAA would have
the same preemptive scope as the ADA. 03
1. Barber Auto Sales, Inc. v. United Parcel Services, Inc.
In Barber Auto Sales, Inc. v. United Parcel Services, Inc.,40 4 the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama addressed
an action relating to UPS's alleged manipulation of its audit pro-
cedures for determining the size and weight of packages result-
ing in artificially high shipping charges.40 5 Under Defendant's
shipping system, the shipping charges were based upon the size
and weight of the package as entered by the customer. 6 Defen-
dant's Customer Agreement granted Defendant the right to au-
dit customer's shipments in order to verify that the customer
paid the appropriate charge and submit an adjusted invoice to
the customer if it determined the customer had not paid the
appropriate charge.40 7 The Customer Agreement allowed cus-
tomers 180 days following receipt of the invoice to challenge any
disputed charge, and further described "compliance with those
notice and claims periods as a contractual condition precedent
to discovery. "408
Plaintiff, a domestic shipper, brought both an individual ac-
tion against Defendant for breach of contract, and a class action
on behalf of similarly situated persons for breach of contract,
both seeking:
"(1) monetary damages for breach of contract, (2) an order void-
ing all contracts 'to the extent that [Defendant] assessed im-
proper increased shipping charge corrections' on packages; and
(3) an injunction prohibiting [Defendant] from assessing im-
proper shipping charges and requiring [Defendant] to conform
its practices to comply with the terms and conditions and courses
of dealing between the parties."409
402 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2000).
403 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 83.
404 494 F. Supp. 2d. 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2007).
-5 Id. at 1292.
406 Id. at 1291.
407 Id.
408 Id. at 1291-92.
409 Id. at 1292. Defendant also brought a motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Id. This summary does not address the




Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the
grounds that Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief was pre-
empted by the FAAAA.41°
In considering Defendant's argument, the district court noted
that the preemptive language adopted by Congress in the
FAAAA provision was identical to that of the ADA provision, and
that courts have therefore relied on cases addressing the pre-
emptive effect of the ADA in deciding FAAAA preemption ques-
tions.4 11 The district court reasoned that because the Supreme
Court has made clear that the ADA preempts state action relat-
ing to the "price, route, or service of any air carrier," but not
"routine breach of contract claims," the FAAAA had a similarly
broad, but not unlimited, scope.4 12
Both parties agreed that Plaintiffs breach of contract claim
was not preempted by the FAAAA.4" 3 The district court con-
curred, and therefore the only preemption question for deci-
sion was whether the equitable claims were preempted.414
Defendant argued that the claims were preempted because
granting the requested injunctive relief would constitute an en-
largement of the parties' bargain and exceed the bounds of
usual contractual remedies.41 5 Plaintiff countered that because
the claims arose out of Defendant's contractual obligations, they
were not preempted.41 6
The district court found that granting equitable relief would
"constitute an ... enhancement of the parties' bargain" on the
basis of a state policy, and therefore the claims were preempted
by the FAAAA.417 Accordingly, the district court granted Defen-
dant's motion for partial summary judgment.41
2. Kuehne v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Kuehne v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,419 the Indiana Court of
Appeals addressed an appeal relating to a negligence action
brought by Plaintiff homeowner for injuries allegedly sustained
410 Id.
411 Id. at 1293.
412 Id. (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222-23 (1995);
Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992)).
413 Id. at 1293.





419 868 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
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as a result of tripping over a package Defendant left on her
doorstep. 420 An Indiana state trial court had granted summary
judgment for Defendant, finding that Plaintiffs claims were pre-
empted by the FAAAA as related to Defendant's price, route, or
service, and the Interstate Commerce Act.4 21
The Court of Appeals reversed,422 finding that the purpose of
the FAAAA express preemption provision was not to preclude
all tort actions arising under state law, and it was unlikely "that
Congress was attempting to displace state personal injury tort
law concerning incidents that involve the safety of an individual
who receives a package at a doorstep. 4 2 The Court of Appeals
noted that other courts had concluded that the FAAAA
preempts claims arising out of circumstances that occurred
before a package reached its destination, but found that con-
duct after that point was "categorically distinct" and unrelated to
the operation of an aircraft.424 Furthermore, in looking to the
plain language of the preemption provision of the FAAAA, it
found that the juxtaposition of "service" to "rates" and "routes"
referred to issues such as scheduling. 425 The Court of Appeals
noted that if a court were to interpret the FAAAA provision of
"service" any broader, it would run the risk of interpreting the
FAAAA to preempt all airline activities, which could not be the
intended result of the drafters of the FAAAA. 426 Therefore, the
Court of Appeals ordered the judgment reversed and
remanded.4 27
D. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Torts Claims Act428 ("FTCA") waives U.S. sover-
eign immunity for injury to or loss of property, personal injury
or death resulting from "the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion" of any government employee acting in the scope of his
420 Id. at 872.
421 Id. at 872-73 (Defendant specifically argued that the Carmack Amend-
ment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (2000 & Supp. 2005), "exclusively governs a carrier's
liability and shippers' remedies that arise from contracts regarding the interstate
shipment of property.").
422 Id. at 878.
423 Id. at 877.
424 Id. at 876-77 (citing Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83
(D. Mass. 1999)).
425 Id. at 877 (citing Somes, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 83).
426 Id.
427 Id. at 878.
428 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (2000).
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employment, under the same circumstances in which a private
individual would be held liable.429 The FTCA has several exemp-
tions, most notably against claims based upon government em-
ployees' performance or omission of a "discretionary function
or duty" while "exercising due care. 4 °30
1. Wojciechowicz v. United States
Wojciechowicz v. United States4"1 arose out of the crash of a small
aircraft in Puerto Rico that resulted in the deaths of the pilot
and four related passengers onboard.432 The estates of the dece-
dent-pilot and a decedent-passenger, his daughter, filed claims
for wrongful death with the FAA, and subsequently brought suit
against the Government in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Puerto Rico seeking damages for wrongful death pursu-
ant to the FTCA.133 The Government moved to dismiss the
claims of certain Plaintiffs, specifically the unnamed adult family
members of each estate, arguing that the district court had no
jurisdiction over their claims under the FTCA because they were
not specifically identified in the administrative claims and,
therefore, those Plaintiffs could not pursue judicial relief. 4
The United States Government, "as a sovereign, is immune
from suit unless it waives its immunity by consenting to be
sued. '435 The FTCA provides a limited waiver of this immunity,
under which the Government may be liable for damages "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. 43 6 This waiver of immunity is subject
to "a requirement that those seeking relief present their claim to
the pertinent federal dependency prior to seeking judicial re-
lief."'43 7 This claim must be made in writing and filed within two
years of accrual, in order to allow the Government a reasonable
opportunity to investigate the claims and its potential liability.43 8
As explained by the district court, claimants must pursue, or ex-
haust, every available administrative remedy before filing suit
429 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
430 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
431 474 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D.P.R. 2007).
432 Id. at 285.
433 Id. at 285-86.
434 Id. at 288. The Government did not challenge the claims asserted by the
executors individually, and there was no discussion of any minor children. Id.
435 Id. at 286 (citations omitted).
436 Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
437 Id.
438 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000); Wojciechowicz, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
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pursuant to the FTCA to facilitate fair settlements and "avoid
litigation where a claim can be resolved administratively.1
439
The First Circuit has stated that it does not strictly interpret or
apply the notice requirement, but has "attempted instead to
achieve a balance, recognizing that persons wishing to hold the
federal sovereign [state] liable in tort must satisfy the strictures
of the law, but also recognizing that Congress did not intend to
shield the federal fisc behind an impenetrable thicket of lawy-
erly technicalities. '44" The language of an administrative claim
must be sufficient to put the agency on due notice of. (1) the
conduct to be investigated; and (2) the amount of damages
sought, which "requires enough information regarding the
identity of the persons seeking relief, the underlying grounds
therefore and the sums demanded, to allow for a meaningful
investigation of the facts and an assessment of potential liabil-
ity. '44 1 The agency must have notice of who the individual
claimants are, and the allegations within the administrative
claim must 'jibe" with the allegations in any subsequent
complaint.44
2
The Government argued that because the administrative com-
plaints at issue were filed by the estates' executors on behalf of
themselves individually and as representative for the estates, but
did not name all Plaintiffs in this action individually, it did not
have notice of those individual claims.4 43 The Government fur-
ther argued that the standing of the representatives of the es-
tates was not at issue; rather, the issue was whether the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over those Plaintiffs' claims
under the FTCA because they had not complied with the notice
requirement.444
The district court rejected the Government's argument, find-
ing the issues of standing and notice to be "inextricably inter-
twined," and stated that:
Notice cannot be examined in a vacuum. It is necessarily con-
nected to the law which gives rise to the cause of action being
asserted. The scope of the representation capacity of a plaintiff
as well as the nature of the damages which may be collected
thereby and on whose behalf will be determined by the state's
439 Wojciechowicz, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
440 Dynamic Image Tech., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2000).
441 Wojciechowicz, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
442 Id. (citing Dynamic Image Tech., 221 F.3d at 41).




applicable law. Hence, the adequacy of the notice may vary de-
pending on which law is used to examine the scope of the repre-
sentation, i.e., standing.445
After noting that the Government's liability for tort claims
under the FTCA "is determined in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred, '446 the district
court found that the applicable substantive law in this case was
that of Puerto Rico.447 Under Puerto Rico law, "an estate is not
ajuridical person and as such does not have the legal capacity to
prosecute a wrongful death claim. '448 Therefore, as the district
court noted, to comply with the FTCA's notice requirement,
each claimant must file a claim in his or her individual capacity
because damages for wrongful death do not inure to the benefit
of the estate.449
In light of this, under Puerto Rico law, the fact that two ad-
ministrative claims were submitted by the executors of the re-
spective estates both individually and as representatives of each
of the estates "does not necessar[ily] translate into notice of the
individual claims of the members of the two estates. ' 450 The dis-
trict court found that even if the claims filed with the FAA were
inadequate, " [t] he claims for the two estates were filed the same
day through the same counsel, all bore the same last name and
the FAA denied all the claims via a single letter" and, therefore,
the agency had sufficient additional evidence indicating the
identities of the members of each estate.45 Further, the district
court noted that because the Government also had the means to
further investigate the identities of the individual claimants by
requiring them to submit the full names of decedents' survi-
vors,4 5 2 the FTCA's jurisdictional notice requirement was satis-
fied.4 53  Thus, the district court denied the Government's
motion to dismiss.454
445 Id. at 289.
446 Id. at 288 (quoting Scanlon v. Dep't of the Army, 277 F.3d 598, 600 (1st Cir.
2002)).
447 Id. at 288-89.
448 Id. at 289.
449 Id. at 290.
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a) (3) (2008)).
453 Id. at 290-91.
454 Id. at 291.
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2. Torjagbo v. United States
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida in Torjagbo v. United States455 addressed an action
brought by Plaintiff, a flight instructor at Patrick Air Force Base
("PAiFB"), for injuries allegedly sustained during an emergency
landing after the aircraft he was piloting during a training flight
lost partial engine power.4 56 Plaintiff also claimed that PAFB's
air traffic controller had negligently handled his request for as-
sistance because air traffic control had initially provided Plaintiff
with the wrong radio frequency to request directions to the
nearest airport.457 Plaintiff had filed an administrative claim
with the PAFB claims office, alleging that his injuries resulted
from the negligence of PAFB personnel in the repair, mainte-
nance, and inspection of the aircraft.458 The administrative
claim was denied, as was his request for reconsideration, after
investigation yielded no evidence of negligence.459 Plaintiff,
construing the letter he received denying his request as an invi-
tation to submit further evidence, replied and raised an admin-
istrative claim alleging negligence on behalf of PAFB's air traffic
controller in responding to his request for assistance. 46 ° Plain-
tiff was informed that his administrative claims had been re-
jected and were no longer in consideration, and any response to
his latest allegation would be inappropriate."6'
Prior to receiving the denial of his request for reconsidera-
tion, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the district court seeking
to recover damages from the Government pursuant to the FTCA
for negligent maintenance of the aircraft and negligent re-
sponse to his emergency. 46 2 Defendant moved to dismiss his al-
legations of air traffic controller negligence on the ground that
455 No. 6:05-cv-419-Orl-28KRS, 2007 WL 1970867 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2007).
456 Id. at *1.
457 Id. The PAFB controller had initially advised Plaintiff of the radio fre-
quency of Daytona Approach Control, instead of the Miami Center. Id. Al-
though the PAFB controller attempted to provide the Miami Center frequency
fifty-five seconds later, there was no evidence Plaintiff received the transmission,
and by the time Daytona advised Plaintiff of the Miami frequency, Plaintiff was
already committed to the emergency landing. Id. The controller "initially ad-
vised Plaintiff of the radio frequency for Daytona Approach Control for direc-
tions to the nearest airport, but fifty-five seconds later the controller corrected
the transmission and attempted to provide the frequency." Id.
458 Id.
459 Id. at *1-2.





the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the action under the FTCA.463
The district court began by noting that, "[u]nder the FTCA,
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon a district court
only after a plaintiff has first made a claim to the appropriate
federal agency and received a final denial of that claim," and
discussing the policies behind requiring that a plaintiff exhaust
all available administrative remedies, as well as the need to pro-
vide the government with sufficient notice of the claims
involved.464
Plaintiff argued that his letter in response to the denial of his
request for reconsideration constituted an amendment of his
original administrative claim, but the district court rejected the
argument.465 Because the letter was not sent until after Plain-
tiff's administrative claim had been investigated and reconsid-
ered, the district court found that the jurisdictional notice
requirement was not satisfied because "[n] othing in his adminis-
trative complaint could have suggested to Defendant that Plain-
tiff also linked his injuries to the actions of PAFB's air traffic
controllers. ' 46 6 In addition, the administrative claim relating to
the air traffic controllers' negligence was not raised until over
three years after the accident and was time-barred under the
FTCA.4 67 Therefore, the district court granted Defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss the air traffic controller claims.4 68
3. Garland v. U.S. Airways, Inc.
Garland v. U.S. Airways, Inc.469 arose out of an allegedly wrong-
ful termination claim brought by a former U.S. Airways pilot
who claimed he was fired because he no longer had a valid pi-
463 Id. Defendant also moved for summary judgment on the maintenance
claims on evidentiary grounds. Id.
464 Id.
465 Id. at *4.
466 Id.
467 Id.
4- Id. The district court also granted Defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on the negligent maintenance claims, finding that Plaintiff had executed a
valid and enforceable "Covenant Not to Sue and Indemnity Agreement" in con-
nection with his role as an instructor in the PAFB's "Aero Club." Id. at *6-*8.
Although Plaintiff alleged during his deposition that he did not recall ever sign-
ing the agreement, the district court found that "overwhelming evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that Plaintiff did execute the Covenant Not to Sue," and that
there was not a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summaryjudgment. Id.
at *6.
469 No. 05-140, 2007 WL 320832 (W.D. Pa. jan. 30, 2007).
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lot's license. 471 Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, asserted an action
against U.S. Airways and employees of the FAA for depriving
him of his license. 47' The Federal Defendants moved to dismiss,
arguing that the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania did not have jurisdiction over the case under the
FTCA because Plaintiff "failed to present a proper administra-
tive claim as required under the FTCA,
4 7 2
The court granted the Federal Defendant's motion, finding
that the FTCA's provision requiring "that a claimant 'present'
an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency prior
to commencing suit against the United States in federal court"
was a necessary condition precedent that could not be waived.473
Because there was no evidence that Plaintiff had ever filed an
administrative claim with the FAA prior to commencing suit, the
district court did not have jurisdiction over the action and Plain-
tiffs claims were dismissed.474
E. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Railway Labor Act 475 ("RLA") was passed in 1926 to gov-
ern all railway labor disputes and was amended in 1936 to apply
to disputes in the airline industry as well. 476 The purpose of the
RLA is "to promote stability in labor-management relations by
providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor dis-
putes. 477 Primarily, the RLA imposes requirements for prompt
arbitration, encouraging the settlement of labor disputes to pre-
vent workforce strikes or other labor interruptions in the railway
and airline industries.478 Courts have interpreted the RLA as
classifying disputes as "major" or "minor."47 9 Major disputes in-
volve disputes relating to contractual rights or collective bargain-
ing agreements ("CBA") concerning "rates of pay, rules, or
470 Id. at *1.
471 Id. At the time Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint against twenty-
four defendants, two defendants, Rich Davies and Harold Simpson ("Federal De-
fendants"), were employees of the FAA. Id. Plaintiff claimed the Federal Defend-
ants conspired with others to deprive him of his Airline Transport Pilot
Certification, ultimately leading to his termination. Id.
472 Id. at *3.
473 Id.
474 Id.
475 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
476 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 151(a), 181.
477 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (citing Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987)).
478 See id. at 252-53; see also 45 U.S.C. § 151(a).
4- See Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252-53.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
working conditions. '"480 Minor disputes concern the interpreta-
tion, application, or enforcement of the contractual rights or
labor agreements. 4 1 The Supreme Court has held that the RLA
does not preempt state law claims involving "rights and obliga-
tions that exist independent" of any labor agreements.482
1. Gilmore v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
In Gilmore v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,4"3 Plaintiff, who suffered
from "major recurrent depression," was employed by Defendant
as a customer service agent under terms governed by a CBA.4"4
Plaintiff's depression had caused her to miss work on several oc-
casions. 48 5 On one occasion, Plaintiff submitted a Family Medi-
cal Leave Act ("FMLA") certification from her doctor stating
that she would be absent from work for two weeks due to her
depression.4"6 However, Plaintiff was unable to return to work
at the end of the two-week period. 4 7 Thereafter, Plaintiff sub-
mitted another FMLA certification from her doctor with
amended dates to cover her extended expected absence.4"8 The
time period covered by the second FMLA certification elapsed
and Plaintiff still was unable to work.489 Thereafter, Plaintiffs
supervisor "advised [Plaintiff] that she could fill out new FMLA
paperwork when she returned to work. '490 Plaintiff eventually
returned to work after nearly two months, at which time "she
was fired for poor attendance, including her failure to report to
work during her FMLA-leave period. 491
After pursuing a grievance under the CBA, Plaintiff filed suit
against Defendant claiming negligent infliction of emotional
distress and violations of the FMLA and the Minnesota Human
Rights Act.49 2 Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings
480 Id.; 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a) (4).
481 See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a) (5); Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252-53, 256-57.
482 Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 260.
483 504 F. Supp. 2d 649 (D. Minn. 2007).








492 Id. at 652-53.
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Plain-
tiff's action was preempted by the Railway Labor Act.493
In addressing Defendant's motion, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Minnesota noted that Northwest's "activities" as
an airline were regulated by the Railway Labor Act.494 The dis-
trict court then commented on the "contours" of the Railway
Labor Act, which established a "mandatory arbitral regime for
all 'minor' disputes. '495 "Minor" disputes are controversies that
arise out of "the application or interpretation of [a] collective
bargaining agreement. "496 "Major" disputes, however, "relate to
the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to
secure them" (e.g., "rates of pay, rules or working condi-
tions").497 The Act preempts federal subject matter jurisdiction
if a dispute is found to be minor.49 The district court noted
that the line between minor and major disputes is a "fine
one,"" but that disputes were presumed to be minor in the
Eighth Circuit.50
In its motion, Defendant argued that because Plaintiffs
claims could not be addressed without reference to the CBA,
they were minor disputes preempted by the Railway Labor
Act. 50 1 The CBA set forth all Northwest "rules, regulations and
orders" relating to the employee attendance policy.50 2 It pro-
vided that
an absence from work is either "accountable" or "excusable," de-
pending on the reason for the absence. While absences that qual-
ify for FMLA leave are "excusable," the attendance policy
requires an employee unexpectedly absent who believes that her
absence qualifies as "excusable" to notify her manager within ei-
ther two business days or four calendar days (whichever is
longer) from the date she became aware of the need for leave.50 3
493 Id. at 653 (citing Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
494 Id. (quoting Carpenter v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. CIV 00-2490ADM/AJB,
2001 WL 1631445, at *1 (D. Minn. June 7, 2001)).
495 Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 184 (2000); Pittari v. Am. Eagle Airlines, 468 F.3d
1056, 1060 (8th Cir. 2006)).
496 Id. at 654 (quoting Pittari, 468 F.3d at 1060).
497 Id. (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994)).
498 Id. at 653 (citing Pittari, 468 F.3d at 1060).
499 Id. at 654 (citing Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Burlington N. Santa
Fe R.R., 270 F.3d 637, 639 (8th Cir. 2001)).
500 Id. (citing Bloemer v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 935, 939 (8th Cir. 2005)).
501 Id. (citing Schiltz v. Burlington N.R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir.
1997)).




Defendant argued that Plaintiff had not provided appropriate
notice to it under the CBA when she took "unforeseen FMLA
leave" and, in order to decide whether her notice and, corre-
spondingly, her termination was proper, the district court had
to interpret the terms of the CBA.504 Plaintiff countered that
her termination was improper based on the FMLA even if "it was
'arguably justified' under the CBA due to insufficient notice. ' 50 5
As the district court observed, Plaintiff claimed that the FMLA
imposed "greater restrictions on [Defendant's] ability to termi-
nate her employment" than the CBA.5 °6
In addressing Defendant's motion, the district court noted
that it was not aware of a single case that had found that the
Railway Labor Act preempted an FM[A claim.50 7 It observed
that this likely was because FMLA rights arise under federal law
and not by contract.5 8 In light of this, when a unionized em-
ployee seeks to enforce FMLA rights, the claim generally can be
resolved without reference to a CBA and, as a result, it is not a
"minor" dispute and is not preempted. 50 9 The district court
found that Plaintiffs right to be absent from work at Northwest
due to a qualifying "serious health condition," without reprisal,
was a right that existed independent of the CBA and her claim
was not preempted. 10 In so finding, the district court indicated
that "not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially
involving a provision of a [CBA], is preempted. '511 Further,
Plaintiffs filing of a grievance under the CBA before commenc-
ing her federal action did not transform the dispute from "ma-
jor" to "minor. 5 12 Accordingly, the district court denied
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.50 3
2. Fitz-Gerald v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.
In Fitz-Gerald v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.,51 4 the California Court of
Appeal addressed whether flight attendants' claims of alleged
airline violations of California labor law relating to minimum
504 Id. at 656.
505 Id.
506 Id.
507 Id. at 654.
508 Id.
509 Id. (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994)).
510 Id. at 656.
511 Id. at 657 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 260).
512 Id.
513 Id. at 658.
514 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 913 (Ct. App. 2007).
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wage, overtime, and meal and rest breaks were preempted by,
inter alia, the Railway Labor Act ("RIA") 51 5 where flight attend-
ant compensation was based on a CBA.516 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
individually and on behalf of former and current flight attend-
ants working for Defendant SkyWest Airlines, Inc. in California,
had filed a complaint alleging that SkyWest had not provided
"uninterrupted rest periods or meal breaks[,] . . .overtime or
state minimum wage for block time. 517 Plaintiffs sought dam-
ages for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid meal and rest breaks,
overtime, waiting time penalties and "relief under the Unfair
Business Practices Act. '518 Defendant moved for summary judg-
ment, which the court granted, finding that the action was, inter
alia, preempted by the RLA.519 Plaintiffs appealed. 2 °
The Court of Appeal stated that the SkyWest In-Flight Associa-
tion (the "Association"), the flight attendants' employee associa-
tion, and Defendant had negotiated a SkyWest Airlines
Crewmember Policy Manual, which had "all the attributes of a
collective bargaining agreement. '52 ' The Association was the
"exclusive bargaining representative" for Defendant's flight at-
tendants, which had 1,100 members, and had "negotiated com-
pensation and workplace rules for the past [ten] years. '522 The
Association had bargained for a new compensation agreement
"[a]bout every two years. '523  Once negotiated, Association
members voted on the agreement and, if approved, it became
part of Defendant's Crewmember Policy Manual.524
Pursuant to the CBA, Plaintiffs received flight pay, also re-
ferred to as "block to block time" starting at the time the aircraft
blocks are removed at takeoff and ending with arrival at the des-
tination.525 Plaintiffs also received a $1.60 per-hour per diem
wage for "block time" while the aircraft was readied for flight,
while passengers boarded and disembarked, and for flight
standbys and layovers.5 2 6 The ratio of block time to flight time
515 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
516 See Fitz-Gerald, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914-15.
517 Id. at 915.
518 Id. (citing, inter alia, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (2008)).
519 See id. at 914-15.
520 Id.







was typically two to one on a work day.5 27 This method of com-
pensation was "standard in the airline industry. "528
The flight attendant compensation system under the CBA im-
plicated an order5 29 by the California Industrial Welfare Com-
mission ("IWC"), a state agency granted the power to "formulate
regulations (known as wage orders) governing employment. 53 0
The Order required that "certain persons employed in the
transportation industry be paid not less than the minimum wage
and receive meal/rest breaks and overtime.""5 1 The Order fur-
ther required payment of the minimum wage "for all hours [or-
dered] in the payroll period, whether the remuneration is
measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise. 532
With respect to their claim for unpaid minimum wages, Plain-
tiffs argued that the hourly $1.60 per diem wage paid by Defen-
dant violated the applicable minimum wage regulation.5 33
Defendant countered that the flight attendant compensation
averages were $23.13 per hour, an amount significantly higher
than the state minimum wage, based upon flight time and block
time averaged over a one-month period.534 Plaintiffs con-
tended, however, that "wage averaging does not trump state
minimum wage law. 535
Plaintiffs relied on Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.,53 6 which held that
California's labor law reflected a "strong public policy in favor of
full payment of wages for all hours worked," in support of their
argument.53 7 The Fitz-Gerald court distinguished Armenta on sev-
eral grounds: it involved a company that serviced utility poles
527 Id.
528 Id. Specifically, the court noted that pursuant to the CBA, flight attendants
"bid each month for their work schedules and receive flight pay, per diem block
pay, vacation and holiday pay, and compensation for flight cancellations and
overnight stayovers .... SkyWest FAs are guaranteed 3.75 hours flight pay each
work day. The CBA provides that FAs may not eat meals during critical phases of
flight and that FAA regulations prohibit FAs from working more than 14 hours at
a stretch." Id. "Per diem block time includes standby time and layovers." Id. at
915 n.1.
529 IWC Order No. 9-2001 (2001).
530 Fitz-Gerald, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 916.
531 Id. at 915 (citing IWC Order No. 9-2001).




536 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460 (Ct. App. 2005).
537 Fitz-Gerald, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 916-17 (citing Armenta, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
468).
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rather than an interstate air carrier; "it [did] not involve the
RLA or a CBA sanctioned under the RLA, and it did not involve
a state wage order that contained an RLA exemption.""53 Fur-
ther, California labor law provided that "all hours must be paid
at the statutory or agreed rate. ' 539 In Armenta, the employer had
violated its own CBA and written employment policies by not
paying its employees for "time spent driving company vehicles to
and from job sites. '54 ° In Fitz-Gerald, however, there was no evi-
dence that Defendant paid its flight attendants "less than what
was collectively bargained for."541
In turning to Plaintiffs' claim for overtime wages, the Court of
Appeal examined the RLA.542 It noted that the Act "regulates
labor relations between common interstate air carriers and their
employees, ' 543 and set forth the "heart" of the Act,544 stating:
It requires that carriers "exert every reasonable effort to make
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and
working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out
of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to
avoid any interruption to commerce or the operation of any car-
rier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the em-
ployees thereof. 54 5
The Fitz-Gerald court stated that in United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Welfare Commission,546 the Court of Appeal had ruled that an
IWC Order requiring employers to pay for flight attendant
uniforms was inapplicable to an interstate airline because it was
preempted by the RLA.547 The Industrial Welfare court illus-
trated the potential interference of the regulation on interstate
commerce and the need for a uniform rule throughout the car-
rier's system by noting the possibility of two flight attendants
"working side by side, one with a free uniform, the other with a
538 Id. at 916.
539 Id. at 917 (quoting Armenta, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 467).
540 Id. at 916 (citing Armenta, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 467).
541 Id. at 917.
542 Id.
543 Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 181 (2000); DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 733 P.2d 614, 618 (Cal. 1987)).
344 Id. (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 377-78 (1969)).
545 Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
546 28 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Ct. App. 1963).




uniform a part only of the cost of which United paid" as a result
of where they were based (i.e., one in California and one not). 548
Moreover, the IWC Order at issue in Fitz-Gerald itself con-
tained an RLA exemption, providing that overtime wages did
not have to be paid to "employees who have entered into a
[CBA] under and in accordance with" the Act.5 49 The Court of
Appeal rejected Plaintiffs' argument that there was no CBA be-
cause Defendant was a non-union employer.550 It noted that
under the RLA, airline employees have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through their chosen representatives and
such representatives include, inter alia, any "person or persons"
designated by a carrier or by its employees, to act on its be-
half.551 The Court of Appeal noted that California law was con-
sistent with the RLA and that Plaintiffs had failed to cite any
authority that the RLA exemption for overtime wages in the
IWC Order did not apply to the subject CBA.55 2
With respect to Plaintiffs' minimum wage and meal and rest
break claims, the Court of Appeal noted that California courts
had "interpreted the RLA to preempt state law causes of action
that depend upon interpretation of a CBA. ' '55 3 It further noted
that the California Supreme Court had held that RLA preemp-
tion extended to "any claim premised on facts inextricably inter-
twined with matters subject to the grievance procedures of the
[CBA."4 The Court of Appeal rejected Plaintiffs' argument
that "the statutory right to meal breaks and rest periods is 'non-
negotiable' and may not be subject to a [CBA] opt-out provi-
sion. 555 It noted that the CBA provided for a "bundle of bene-
fits" (e.g., "flight pay, block time, overtime, flight standbys and
layovers, vacation, and meal/rest breaks") and that rest periods
and meal breaks were referenced in the CBA, which incorpo-
rated FAA regulations that flight attendants were prohibited
from eating meals "during critical phases of flight. '5 6 The
Court of Appeal continued that, assuming arguendo, a court
548 Id. at 918 (quoting Indus. Welfare, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 248).
549 Id. (quoting IWC Order No. 9-2001 § 1(E) (2001)).
550 Id.
55, Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (2000)).
552 Id. at 918-19.
53 Id. at 919 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253-54
(1994); Soldinger v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 755 (Ct. App. 1996)).
554 Id. (quoting DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 733 P.2d 614, 621
(Cal. 1987)).
555 Id. at 920.
556 Id.
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found violations relating to meal and rest breaks, it would have
to determine whether a flight attendant was receiving flight pay
or block time pay when the violations occurred, which could not
be determined without interpreting the CBA.557
The Court of Appeal concluded that Plaintiffs' state minimum
wage, meal, and break time claims were preempted by the
RLA.558 Further, the subject IWC Order exempted Defendant
from having to pay overtime wages because the claim for over-
time wages was subject to a CBA "under and in accordance with
the [RLA] .-55' The Court of Appeal found that Plaintiffs' causes
of action for waiting time penalties and violation of the Califor-
nia Unfair Business Practices Act also were barred.560 Accord-
ingly, the judgment was affirmed.56'
III. THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS
On November 4, 2003, the Montreal Convention 56 2 came into
force as to its ratifying signatories,563 unifying and replacing the
Warsaw Convention 564 liability system for claims arising from "in-
ternational carriage" by air.565 Specifically, the Montreal Con-
557 Id.
558 Id.
559 See id. at 918 (quoting 1WC Order No. 9-2001 § I(E) (2001)).
560 Id. at 920-21. With respect to the trial court's "alternative" ruling that the
complaint was barred by the ADA, the Court of Appeal found only the cause of
action for violation of the Unfair Business Practices Act barred under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978. Id. at 921. It stated that Defendant cited "no author-
ity" supporting ADA preemption relating to the enforcement of minimum wage
laws or state laws governing meal and rest breaks. Id.
561 Id. at 922.
562 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 [herein-
after Montreal Convention].
563 The Montreal Convention was created and signed by representatives of
fifty-two countries at an international conference convened by the International
Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") in Montreal on May 28, 1999; however,
under the terms contained in Article 53(6) of the Convention, it was not to
"enter into force" until the "sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirti-
eth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." Id. art. 53(6).
Hence, the Montreal Convention entered into force following its ratification by
the United States on Nov. 4, 2003. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES
IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN FORCE ON JAN. 1, 2006, http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/65515.pdf [hereinafter AGREEMENTS].
564 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
565 Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 55(1) (a).
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vention sets forth a liability system for the delay or loss of, or
damage to, baggage or cargo, as well as the delay or death of, or
bodily injury to, ticketed passengers arising from international
carriage by air.566 However, because all "High Contracting Par-
ties"'567 to the Warsaw Convention have not yet ratified the Mon-
treal Convention, claims arising from "international carriage" by
air may still be subject to the Warsaw Convention liability sys-
tem.568 Accordingly, this Article addresses both the Montreal
and Warsaw Convention liability systems.
A. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MONTREAL AND
WARSAW CONVENTIONS
1. Knowlton v. American Airlines, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Ma-
ryland in Knowlton v. American Airlines, Inc. 569 addressed Plain-
tiffs motion to remand to the state court a claim removed by
Defendant. 570 Plaintiffs claim was based on Defendant's elec-
tronic confirmation of her travel itinerary, which included the
notation "breakfast. ' 571 During the subject flight, Defendant's
employees informed Plaintiff that Defendant no longer pro-
vided free breakfast and that Plaintiff could purchase breakfast
for $3.00.572
566 Id. art. 1(1). International carriage by air is defined by Article 1(2) of the
Montreal Convention to mean "any carriage in which, according to the agree-
ment between the parties [i.e., the passenger ticket], the place of departure and
the place of destination" are situated either: a) within the territories of two States
that are parties to the Montreal Convention; or b) within the territory of a single
State party to the Montreal Convention if there is an agreed stopping place
within the territory of another State, even if that State is not such a party. Id. art.
1(2).
567 The Warsaw Convention refers to parties to the Convention as "High Con-
tracting Parties."
568 Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 55(1) (a). Liability under the
Warsaw Convention, as defined by Article 1, applies to claims arising from "inter-
national transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for
hire" where, "according to the contract made by the parties, the place of depar-
ture and the place of destination ... are situated either within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sover-
eignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that
power is not a party to this convention." Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art.
1.
569 No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL 273794 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2007).
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The district court began its discussion by noting that the pur-
pose of the Montreal Convention, like the Warsaw Convention,
was to "promote uniformity in the laws governing airliner liabil-
ity for the 'international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo
performed by aircraft.' ' 5 73 However, the district court noted
that the Montreal Convention is "unique" because, as was previ-
ously found by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, while the Montreal Convention still shields airlines
from unlimited liability, it also "shows increased concern for the
rights of passengers and shippers. 5 7 4 Under the Montreal Con-
vention, carriers are subject to three categories of strict liability:
Article 17 provides for carrier liability in the event of accidental
death or bodily injury of a passenger while on board, embarking,
or disembarking the plane. Article 17 also includes liability for
damage to or loss of baggage. Article 18 of the Montreal Con-
vention addresses liability for damage to cargo, and Article 19
imposes liability for damages resulting from delay of passengers,
baggage, or cargo.575
Article 29 expressly provides that these categories are in-
tended as the exclusive grounds of carrier liability for damages
arising out of international air travel or transport.576
Defendant argued that the district court properly had re-
moval jurisdiction because Plaintiffs claims necessarily arose
under an international treaty, thus supporting federal question
jurisdiction.577 Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that her
claim did not arise under a treaty of the United States s.5 7  The
573 Id. at *2 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 1).
574 Id. (citing Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp 2d 361, 364-65
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
575 Id. (citations omitted).
576 Id.
577 Id. at *3. It was unclear from the facts alleged in the complaint whether the
Warsaw or Montreal Convention would be controlling because Plaintiff failed to
include whether she was traveling on a one-way or round-trip ticket between the
United States and the Dominican Republic. Id. at *1 n.1. The United States is a
party to both the Warsaw Convention and the more recent, and superseding,
Montreal Convention. AGREEMENTS, supra note 563, at 377, 384-85. Because the
Dominican Republic is a party to the Warsaw Convention, but not the Montreal
Convention, "a one-way trip from the United States to the Dominican Republic
would only be governed by the Warsaw Convention while a round-trip ticket
would be governed by the superseding Montreal Convention." Knowlton, 2007
WL 273794, at *1 n.I. Defendant moved for removal on the grounds that the
claims would be preempted in either situation, but the district court thereafter
found sufficient facts to decide that Plaintiffs itinerary fell within the scope of
the Montreal Convention. Id.
578 Id. at *3.
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district court found that Plaintiffs complaint did not satisfy the
well-pleaded complaint rule, because it did not mention the
Montreal Convention, nor did it appear from the face of the
complaint that the Convention "create [d]" her state law cause of
action. 7 ' The district court also noted that Plaintiff's right to
relief "does not 'necessarily depend[ ] on resolution of a sub-
stantial question of federal law.' ",580 However, the district court
noted that "the doctrine of complete preemption provides an
alternative means of satisfying the well-pleaded complaint rule,"
and therefore the precise question for decision was whether the
Montreal Convention completely preempted Plaintiffs state law
breach of contract claim by providing the exclusive means of
recovery.581
Turning to its preemption analysis, the district court noted
that while "[o]rdinarily, federal preemption serves as a defense
to state law claims," the Supreme Court has held that when the
claim "does not 'arise under' federal law, a federal preemption
defense cannot serve as the basis of federal question jurisdic-
tion. ' 82 However, if a claim is "completely preempted," because
"Congress 'so completely pre-empts a particular area that any
civil complaint raising the select group of claims is necessarily
federal in character,"' it is deemed to constitute a federal claim
appearing on the face of the complaint. 583 Courts are reluctant
to find complete preemption, "the [Supreme] Court has articu-
lated exacting standards that must be met before it will find
complete pre-emption,' 584 and has only found three statutes
that satisfy these standards.5 85
The district court noted that there was a dearth of persuasive
authority interpreting the Montreal Convention, as it had only
entered into force four years earlier.586 However, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York had previously
579 Id.
580 Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 27-28 (1983)).
581 Id.
582 Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)).
583 Id. (quoting Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 449 (4th Cir. 2005)).
584 Id. at *4 (quoting Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 441 (4th Cir. 2005)).
585 Id. (citing Dunlap v. G & L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has only found the following statutes
to "completely preempt related state-law claims: (1) § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, (2) § 1132 of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; and (3) §§ 85 and 86 of the
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq.").
586 Id.
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found that, due to the similarity of the language of the respec-
tive provisions, the exclusivity provisions of the Warsaw and
Montreal Conventions have the identical effect and both treaties
"preempt all state law claims within their scope."5"7 The district
court also noted that in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,5 8 the
Supreme Court had interpreted the Warsaw Convention provi-
sion to preempt all claims within its scope for personal injury
brought under state law, even if the result precluded recovery
because the treaty does not provide liability for the damages.589
While the Tseng court had not expressly stated that the Warsaw
Convention "completely" preempts state law claims, "several
courts have addressed that issue and taken the position that the
Warsaw Convention completely preempts all claims arising out
of international flights.
590
Plaintiff argued that preemption is avoided if the state law
claims are outside of the treaty's scope, relying on Wolgel v. Mexi-
cana Airlines50 and O'Callaghan v. AMR Corp.592 for the proposi-
tion that breach of contract claims are not preempted by the
Warsaw Convention when they do not fit into any of its three
categories or seek "damages only for the nonperformance of the
contract, not for any injury that occurred because of that non-
performance. 593 The district court recognized the split of au-
thority on the issue, but was more persuaded by the reasoning
favoring a finding of preemption. 594 The district court noted
that the intent of the treaties was to create a uniform system of
liability for situations involving international travel by air, citing
the Supreme Court's statement in Tseng that it "would be hard
put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject
air carriers to the distinct, nonuniform liability rules of the indi-vidual signatory nations. ''5 1 5 Further, the district court noted
587 Id. (quoting Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
588 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999).
589 Knowlton, 2007 WL 273794, at *4.
590 Id. (citing Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th
Cir. 1999) (state personal injury claim); Singh v. N. Am. Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 2d
38, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (state personal injury claim); Donkor v. British Airways
Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 963, 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("state tort and breach of contract
claims for damages due to detention after a long delay")).
59' 821 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987).
592 No. 04 C 4005, 2005 WL 1498870 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2005).
593 Knowlton, 2007 W 273794, at *5 (quoting O'Callaghan, 2005 WL 1498870,
at *1 n.1)
594 Id.
595 Id. (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999)).
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that "[a] s a matter of public policy, airlines should not be sub-
ject to contract claims in state courts involving a three-dollar
breakfast. '59 6 Accordingly, the district court denied Plaintiff's
motion to remand.59 7
2. In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006,598 the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled on
Plaintiffs' motion to remand claims for wrongful death to state
court.599 The decedent-passenger was traveling from Lexington,
Kentucky, to St. Lucia on a roundtrip ticket aboard the Comair
flight that crashed in Lexington.6 °° Plaintiffs initially brought
suit in Kentucky state court, and Defendant removed the case
on the grounds that the district court had subject matter juris-
diction under the Montreal or Warsaw Conventions.60 1
Plaintiffs' motion to remand alleged, inter alia, that because
St. Lucia was not a signatory to either the Warsaw or the Mon-
treal Conventions, neither treaty applied to their claims.60 2
Plaintiffs also argued that neither Convention applied because
Plaintiffs had pled only state law claims and neither Convention
was "completely" preemptive of the claims; that Defendant had
waived any preemption defense by not pleading it as an affirma-
tive defense and failing to raise it in response to Plaintiffs' re-
mand motion; and that Defendant "must prove compliance with
the contractual requirements of a convention before it may avail
itself of the convention benefits."60 In response, Defendant
contended that it was not necessary for St. Lucia to have signed
the treaties for them to apply;604 it had not waived its preemp-
tion defense and would amend its pleadings accordingly; Plain-
596 Id.
597 Id.
598 501 F. Supp. 2d 902 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
599 Id. at 904.
600 Id. at 905.
-1 Id. (noting that Defendant had removed this and other cases on the ground
of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to an international treaty).
602 Id.
603 Id. Plaintiff argued that more discovery would be required to determine
whether Defendant had complied with the requirements of the Montreal Con-
vention, specifically "regarding the e-ticket and confirmation allegedly delivered
to [decedent-passenger] as to whether [Defendant] complied with the notice re-
quirements under the convention." Id.
604 Id. Defendant argued alternatively "that St. Lucia may be considered a sig-
natory to the Warsaw Convention because it ratified other treaties or because it
was a colony at the time the United Kingdom ratified it." Id.
2008]
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tiffs' claims were completely preempted because "federal law
exclusively governs and completely preempts claims arising
under the conventions;" and that it had complied with the nec-
essary requirements of both Conventions.60
The district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that neither
Convention applied because St. Lucia was not a signatory to the
Warsaw or Montreal Conventions, finding that "[t]he plain lan-
guage of each convention includes within its scope a round-trip
ticket from the United States with an agreed stopping place
within another state, even if that state is not a signatory to the
convention. 60 6 Because the decedent-passenger's ticket in-
volved roundtrip transportation from the United States, a signa-
tory of the Montreal Convention, it was within the scope of the
Montreal Convention "notwithstanding the fact that St. Lucia is
not a signatory to that convention."60
Turning to the preemptive effect of the Conventions, the dis-
trict court surveyed the case law addressing the issue and noted
that the decisions focusing on whether the Conventions are "or-
dinarily" or "completely" preemptive, with respect to removal ju-
risdiction, came to conflicting results. 60 8 The district court
found that a more appropriate analysis focuses on the exclusivity
of the Conventions, i.e., "whether the claim must be brought
under federal treaty law or not at all. ' 60 9 The district court
noted that the procedural posture presented by a motion to re-
mand on the grounds of jurisdiction pursuant to the Conven-
tions "confounds the analysis somewhat by misdirecting the
[court's] focus to the question of which court may hear the
claim."61 0 Instead, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 1' the district court found that
"[t]he focus of the analysis should be on whether any claim
within the scope of the treaties can be brought under state
law. ' 61 2 The district court noted that this is broader than tradi-
605 Id.
606 Id. at 908.
607 Id. Because the district court found that the claim was subject to the Mon-
treal Convention, it did not decide whether the claim would have been subject to
the Warsaw Convention. See id.
608 Id. (citing Knowlton v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL
273794, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2007) (discussing the split of authority regarding
the extent of preemption under the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions)).
609 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
610 Id. at 913.
611 525 U.S. 155, 162 (1999).
612 In re Air Crash at Lexington, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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tional conflict preemption, and in the wake of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Tseng that claims for personal injury under
state law are preempted by the Warsaw Convention, "the circuit
courts considering the issue.., all agree the Warsaw and Mon-
treal Conventions provide the exclusive remedy for claims
within the scope of the treaties. '613 The court further rejected
Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant had waived the preemption
defense, because Rule 12(h) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits the defense of a failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted to be raised as late as trial.614
On the facts of this case, the district court found that the ac-
tion is "unquestionably a claim for death of a passenger.., on
board an aircraft within the scope of Article 17 of the Montreal
Convention. ' 615 Accordingly, "assuming the Montreal Conven-
tion is applicable under the facts of this case, a cause of action
pursuant to the Convention is the exclusive remedy available for
Plaintiffs' claims.16 16 The court thus denied Plaintiffs' remand
motion, without prejudice to renew it "if subsequent discovery
and briefing demonstrate that [Defendant] is not entitled to the
benefits of the Montreal Convention under the facts of this
case."
617
3. Muoneke v. Compagnie Nationale Air France
In Muoneke v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,618 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an action seeking re-
covery for the alleged theft of a digital camera and approxi-
mately $900 from Plaintiff's checked baggage.61 9 Plaintiff
traveled from Houston, Texas, to Lagos, Nigeria, changing air-
craft in France.62 ° Plaintiff alleged that after arriving in Lagos
and leaving the airport, she discovered that the items were miss-
ing and therefore returned to the airport the next day where
she filed a written claim with Defendant's baggage services de-
partment.6 21 However, Defendant alleged that it had not re-
ceived such written notice of the claim, and that because its
613 Id.
614 Id. at 914.
615 Id. at 913.
616 Id.
617 Id. at 913-14.
618 No. 06-20433, 2007 WL 2710468 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2007).
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contract of carriage required written notice to be given within
seven days (as does Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention), that it
had properly denied Plaintiffs claim as untimely.622
Plaintiff thereafter filed suit in Texas small claims court for,
inter alia, breach of contract.6 23 Defendant removed the action
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and
Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to remand. 624 Cross-motions for
summary judgment were filed and the district court granted in
favor of Defendant.6 25 Plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit on
the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction over her
claim because the amount in controversy did not exceed
$75,000.626
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling with re-
spect to the motion to remand.627 The Fifth Circuit found that
because Plaintiffs claims involved "interpretation and applica-
tion of a treaty, the Warsaw Convention," the district court prop-
erly had federal question jurisdiction over such claims and thus
it was not necessary for the amount in controversy to exceed
$75,000.628 However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court's summary judgment ruling was improper because
Plaintiff had submitted evidence, in the form of two affidavits
and a receipt from the baggage services department, in support
of her allegation that she had timely filed a written complaint
with Defendant.629 The Fifth Circuit found that this evidence
was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact preclud-
ing summary judgment, and therefore vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the district court.3 0
B. INTERPRETING "INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE"
1. Gerard v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Gerard v. American Airlines, Inc.,631 the Connecticut Superior
Court addressed whether an action for the loss of baggage oc-








629 Id. at *2.
630 Id.
631 No. FSTCV064010485, 2007 WL 2205364 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 2007).
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ries of flights on another airline was governed by the Montreal
Convention.632 Plaintiff had flown from New York to Singapore,
from Singapore to Tokyo, and from Tokyo to Los Angeles
onboard flights contracted with Singapore Airlines.633 Thereaf-
ter, Plaintiff flew from Los Angeles to New York onboard the
subject flight, contracted with Defendant American Airlines.634
After this domestic leg, only one of Plaintiffs two pieces of bag-
gage was returned. 5
Defendant moved for partial summary judgment6 36 alleging
the applicability of damage limitations under the Convention
because the domestic leg qualified as "international" under Arti-
cle 1(3) .637 Article 1(3) provides:
Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers is
deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undi-
vided carriage if it has been regarded by the parties as a single opera-
tion, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a
single contract or of a series of contracts, and it does not lose its
international character merely because one contract or a series
of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory of the
same State.638
After examining Article 1(3), the Superior Court noted that
the
Convention contemplates that an entirely domestic leg of an in-
ternational itinerary will be covered by the Convention as part of
one undivided [international] transportation-even if it is per-
formed by a successive carrier and even if the various legs are
agreed upon under a series of contracts-as long as it has been
regarded by the parties as part of a single operation.639
In this respect, the Superior Court stated that "Article 1(3)
requires [the court] to consider the intent of both parties to the
contract" and that courts typically determine "objective intent"
based upon the contract of transportation (i.e., the passenger
ticket), as well as extrinsic evidence (e.g., relying on trade usage
to decipher a flight coupon code) to understand the "objective
632 Id. at *1, *3.
633 Id. at *3.
634 Id.
635 Id. at *1.
636 Id. Defendant also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which
the Superior Court denied as untimely. Id. at *1-*2.
637 Id. at *3.
638 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 1(3)).
639 Id. at *3 (quoting Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499, 502 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)).
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indicia" of the passenger ticket. 64 ° The Superior Court addition-
ally noted that courts also have considered the "objective facts"
relating to ticketing.641
The Superior Court noted that there often "must be a show-
ing that the air carrier had knowledge that the flight in question
was part of a longer, international voyage" before a court will
conclude that an air carrier considered a domestic leg part of
one undivided international transportation.642 Here, neither
party had submitted an authenticated copy of the contract of
transportation, nor was there alternative evidence in the record
sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant was aware of Plaintiffs
itinerary at the time the parties entered into their contract and,
thus, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Defen-
dant considered the domestic leg undivided international trans-
portation.64  Accordingly, the Superior Court denied
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.644
C. JURISDICTION
1. Baah v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Baah v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.645 in-
volved an action commenced by Plaintiff, on behalf of his infant
son, for injuries allegedly sustained when the infant was burned
by a hot beverage on Defendant airline's flight from London,
England, to New York, New York.646 Plaintiff alleged that the
airline was liable for his son's personal injuries under the terms
of the Montreal Convention.647
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or, alternatively, for summary judgment, argu-
ing that Plaintiffs complaint failed to establish jurisdiction
under Article 33 of the Montreal Convention.648 Under Article
640 Id. at *4 (quoting Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indon., 363 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir.
2004)).
641 Id. (citing Petrire v. Spantax, S.A., 756 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 846 (1985)).
642 Id. (citing Robertson, 401 F.3d at 503; Coyle, 363 F.3d at 990).
643 Id.
644 Id.
-5 473 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
646 Id. at 592.
-7 Id. at 593.
-8 Id. at 592-94.
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33, the court does not have jurisdiction under the Convention
unless the United States is: "(1) 'the domicile of the carrier;' (2)
the 'principal place of business' of the carrier; (3) the place
where the carrier has a 'place of business through which the
contract has been made;' (4) the 'place of destination;' or (5)
the 'principal and permanent residence' of the passenger.
649
In evaluating Defendant's motion, the district court agreed with
the parties that the Montreal Convention governed the action
and determined that four out of the five bases for jurisdiction
under Article 33 of the Convention did not apply because the
United Kingdom was the Defendant airline's domicile and prin-
cipal place of business, the passenger's ticket was purchased in
the United Kingdom, and Plaintiff was a United Kingdom
resident. °
Plaintiff argued that the district court had jurisdiction under
the Convention on the basis of the "place of destination. "651
The infant's airline ticket provided for round trip transportation
to and from London, England, with a stop in New York.652 How-
ever, Plaintiff argued that the "place of destination" was actually
New York because at the time of the accident it had not yet been
determined whether the infant would return to London.653
In evaluating Plaintiffs argument, the district court applied
the reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze,654 and interpreted "place of
destination" under the Montreal Convention to mean that the
ultimate destination specified by the contract of carriage was de-
terminative on this issue and not the passenger's subjective in-
tent.655 The Baah court thereby found that London was the
ultimate destination of the infant's passenger ticket.6 6 Accord-
ingly, because Plaintiff failed to establish jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 33 of the Montreal Convention, the district court granted





654 133 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he place of final destination for pur-
poses of jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention is the return city appearing
on a round-trip ticket").
655 Baah, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (citing Klos, 133 F.3d at 167-68). The Baah
court applied the Klos interpretation of the term "place of destination" contained
in the Warsaw Convention's Article 28 to the instant case under the Montreal
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Defendant's motion to dismiss, with prejudice, for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.65 7
D. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
1. Sanchez Morrabal v. Omni Air Services, Co.
In Sanchez Morrabal v. Omni Air Services, Co., 658 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico addressed whether a pas-
senger's state law personal injury claims were preempted and
time-barred by the Warsaw Convention.659 Plaintiff, a member
of the Puerto Rico National Guard, suffered multiple injuries as
a result of falling off the passenger loading ramp while boarding
Defendant Omni Air's plane in Honduras.66 ° Plaintiff com-
menced an action for damages pursuant to, inter alia, the War-
saw Convention and the Puerto Rico Civil Code.66'
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred by
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention because the action was not
commenced within two years of the accident.662 Before re-
sponding to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff Sanchez, along with
Co-Plaintiff, the U.S. Army, moved to amend the complaint, vol-
untarily dismiss all federal claims, and instead assert diversity ju-
risdiction and pursue only state law claims. 66" The district court
granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, and then ex-
amined Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.664
The parties agreed that the injury occurred in the course of
embarking, as defined by Article 17, and the district court found
that because Plaintiff was boarding an international flight be-
657 Id.
658 497 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D.P.R. 2007).
659 Id. at 282.
660 Id. at 281-82.
661 Id. at 282. Plaintiff also filed claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act. Id. The U.S. Army appeared as Co-Plaintiff and sought "to recover 'the
sum of money furnished and to be furnished to Co-Plaintiff Sanchez for care and
medical treatment"' under the Medical Recovery Act, which grants the Govern-
ment the right to recover the reasonable value of medical services rendered. Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (2000) and 10 U.S.C. § 1095 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
662 Sanchez, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 282, 285. Defendant also moved to dismiss the
claims brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act because Plaintiff
was not disabled at the time of the accident, and the Medical Recovery Act be-





tween two signatory countries under Article 1(2),665 Plaintiffs'
state law claims were preempted by Article 17 of the Conven-
tion.666 The district court noted that all personal injury claims
within the scope of Article 17 are subject to the conditions and
limits of the Convention, including the two-year time limit in
Article 29, and that this limit has been "consistently interpreted
by federal courts as a condition precedent to suit and thus not
subject to tolling. ' 667 Because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy this con-
dition precedent, the district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.66
2. Onyekuru v. Northwest Airlines
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in Onyekuru v. Northwest Airlines669 addressed
whether Plaintiffs action for pilfered baggage was barred by the
two year limitation of Article 35 of the Montreal Convention.670
In Onyekuru, Plaintiff was a passenger on a roundtrip flight from
Chicago to Lagos, Nigeria, and, although she returned to Chi-
cago on June 17, 2004, her baggage did not return until the
following day.6 7 1 Upon receiving her baggage, Plaintiff discov-
ered that some of its contents were missing.672
Plaintiff filed a complaint against airline partners KLM and
Northwest Airlines in state court more than two years after dis-
covering that the contents of her baggage had been pilfered.6 71
Defendant KLM removed the action and thereafter moved for
summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs claims were
barred by Article 35 of the Convention. 674 Article 35 provides:
665 Id. at 283-84. The court noted that, despite Plaintiffs' allegations, both
Honduras and the United States were a party to the Convention. Id. The court
also rejected Plaintiffs argument that the Convention did not apply because
Plaintiff had not been issued a passenger ticket, finding that the ticketing re-
quirement of Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention applies only to the limitation of
a carrier's liability, not the Convention's applicability. Id. at 284 n.9.
666 Id. at 284.
667 Id. at 285 (citing Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 1151,
1154 (8th Cir. 1999); Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.
1998)).
668 Id.
669 No. 06 C 5054, 2007 WL 2713892 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2007).
670 Id. at *1-*2.
671 Id. at *1.
672 Id.
673 Id. at *1-*2. Plaintiffs claim against Northwest was stayed due to North-
west's filing for bankruptcy. Id. at *1 n.1.
674 Id. at *1.
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"The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not
brought within a period of two years, reckoned from the date of
arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft
ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage
stopped. "675
Because Plaintiff did not file her claim until well after the lim-
itation period prescribed by Article 35, the district court held
that Defendant KLM was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and granted its motion.676
E. EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING
1. Bunis v. Israir GSA, Inc.
In Bunis v. Israir GSA, Inc.,6 77 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York addressed an action arising out of
injuries allegedly suffered due to Defendant's failure to provide
timely wheelchair services to Plaintiff after disembarking the air-
craft.67 8 Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from a serious, and
visible, physical handicap and a "serious heart condition," and
requested a wheelchair from an employee of Defendant airline
upon deplaning an international flight in New York.679 Plaintiff
waited for twenty minutes for a wheelchair and then began walk-
ing toward the baggage claim area; he began to experience
chest pains at some point-after leaving the gate area but before
arriving at the baggage claim area-during his walk through the
international terminal.68 ° Plaintiff did not reach the baggage
claim area until roughly an hour later, at which point the police
and medical personnel were called and Plaintiff was transported
by ambulance to the hospital.68 1
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant airline in state
court for alleged negligence.68 2 Defendant removed the action
to the district court, claiming federal question jurisdiction pur-
suant to the Warsaw Convention.6 3 Plaintiff moved to remand
on the ground that his injury did not occur in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking an interna-
675 Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 35(1).
676 Onyekuru, 2007 WL 2713892, at *2.
677 511 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
678 Id. at 320.
679 Id.
680 Id.
681 Id. at 320-21.
682 Id. at 321.
683 Id.
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tional flight under Article 17, and therefore the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not apply to his claims.684
Turning to the determinative question, the district court
noted that both parties had urged the court to apply the Second
Circuit's test set forth in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.68 to
determine whether Plaintiff was in the course of disembarking
when the injury was sustained.686 Under the Day test, a court
looks to "the passengers' activity ... to the restriction of their
movements, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their po-
sition adjacent to the terminal gate" at the time of the
accident. 68 7
Both parties had focused their arguments on the assumption
that the baggage claim area, where Plaintiff eventually received
medical attention, was the location of the "accident. '688 The dis-
trict court disagreed, finding that the place of the "accident" for
Warsaw purposes is the place where the injury-causing event oc-
curred under the Supreme Court's rulings in Air France v. Saks 89
and Olympic Airways v. Husain.69 °
In Saks, "the Supreme Court noted that the Warsaw Conven-
tion itself contains no definition of 'accident' and held 'that lia-
bility under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a
passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger."691 In Husain,
the Supreme Court further explained that "the 'accident' condi-
tion precedent to air carrier liability under Article 17 is satisfied
when the carrier's unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a
passenger is a link in a chain of causation resulting in a passen-
ger's pre-existing medical condition being aggravated. ' 692 The
Bunis court found that Defendant's failure to respond to Plain-
tiffs request for a wheelchair at the gate immediately after de-
planing constituted the relevant "event or happening" because
it forced Plaintiff to walk unassisted, resulting in his ultimate in-
jury.693 The district court thus denied Plaintiffs motion to re-
mand, holding that Plaintiffs incident occurred during the
684 Id.
685 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
686 Bunis, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
687 Id.
688 Id.
689 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).
690 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004); Bunis, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
69, Bunis, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 399).
692 Id. at 323 (citing Husain, 540 U.S. at 646).
693 Id.
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course of disembarking an international flight and, accordingly,
the Warsaw Convention provided Plaintiffs exclusive remedy,
preempting his state law claims and conferring federal question
jurisdiction.69 4
2. Maduro v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Maduro v. American Airlines, Inc.,695 the Virgin Islands Supe-
rior Court analyzed whether the Warsaw Convention governed
Plaintiffs causes of action relating to the conduct of airline per-
sonnel during a two-hour layover at the airport terminal.
9 6
Plaintiff commenced an action seeking relief under territorial
law for negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of an
implied contractual duty to ensure that employees conduct
themselves in a professional manner, and discrimination. 9 7
Plaintiff did not claim that she had sustained any physical injury
related to the alleged incident. 6 8
Plaintiff alleged that she approached Defendant airline's ser-
vice counter to verify information relating to her connecting
flight.69 9 The ticket agent took her ticket, telling her that she
would be called to retrieve it.7 00 While waiting, Plaintiffs con-
necting flight was cancelled and she was placed on standby.7 °1
Plaintiff claimed that she "pleaded" with the ticket agent to al-
low her to board the flight, but was told to "shut up and take a
seat," and that she might not be scheduled on any flight that
day.70 2
Defendant airline moved for summary judgment, arguing, in-
ter alia, that the Warsaw Convention preempted Plaintiffs terri-
torial law claims and that the provisions of the Convention
barred claims for purely emotional or psychological injuries.70 3
In analyzing Defendant's motion, the Superior Court found that
it initially needed to determine whether the Convention applied
to Plaintiffs claims, specifically whether Plaintiff was in the pro-
cess of "embarking" or "disembarking" within the meaning of
694 Id.
695 No. SC-98-CV-580, 2007 WL 906234 (V.I. Feb. 26, 2007).









Article 17 at the time of the alleged incident. 70 4 Article 17
provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 70 5
The Superior Court then looked to the "totality of the circum-
stances '' 70 6 and applied the three-part test from Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,70 7 considering: "1) location of acci-
dent; 2) activity in which injured person was engaged and; 3)
control by defendant of such injured person at location and
during the activity taking place at the time of the accident. 70 8
In applying these factors, the Superior Court found the facts
of the case to be similar to those in Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian
Airlines,70 9 where it was determined that Plaintiffs injury on a
"moving sidewalk" on her way to a connecting flight was not suf-
ficiently proximate to be considered embarking or disembark-
ing. 710 The court found that, like the plaintiff in Rabinowitz,
Plaintiff had already disembarked from one flight and was pre-
paring to embark on another.711 The Superior Court deter-
mined that Plaintiff was even farther removed from the
processes of embarking or disembarking than the Rabinowitz
plaintiff because, inter alia, Plaintiff was on standby and, thus,
boarding was not imminent.712
The Superior Court thus held that Plaintiff was neither em-
barking nor disembarking under Article 17 and that therefore
the Warsaw Convention did not apply, denying Defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment on this issue. 713  The Superior
Court, however, granted Defendant's motion as to Plaintiffs
704 Id. at *3.
705 Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 17.
706 Maduro, 2007 WL 906234, at *3 (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
707 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
708 Maduro, 2007 WL 906234, at *3 (citing Evangelinos, 550 F.2d 152).
7- 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
710 Maduro, 2007 WL 906234, at *4 (citing Rabinowitz, 741 F. Supp. 441 (Plain-
tiff was not "embarking or disembarking" even though she was "within 100 feet of
the arriving gate, was within five minutes of embarking and was directed toward
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claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent
breach of implied contractual duties, and discrimination under
local law.714
3. Dick v. American Airlines, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts in Dick v. American Airlines, Inc.715 involved an action
for personal injuries allegedly sustained by a passenger on an
escalator while traveling between boarding gates at Miami Inter-
national Airport.716 Plaintiff, who was traveling from Trinidad
to Canada via Miami, Florida, was allegedly injured when her
elderly mother fell on her while they were using the escalator.717
Plaintiff commenced an action alleging that Defendants Ameri-
can Airlines and Worldwide Flight Services, Inc.71 8 were negli-
gent under state law.719  Defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs claims were preempted by the
Warsaw Convention and therefore were barred because the
claim was not brought within the two-year period prescribed by
Article 29.720
To determine whether the accident had occurred "in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking"
under Article 17, the district court applied the three-part test
established in McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.72 1 Under Mc-
Carthy, the court must consider "(1) the passenger's activity at
the time of injury, (2) his or her whereabouts when injured, and
(3) the extent to which the carrier was exercising control. 722
The district court noted that to be considered to have occurred
during the process of "embarking or disembarking," an "acci-
dent" should be "closely tied to the physical activity of getting
714 Id. at *5-*6.
715 476 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2007).
716 Id. at 62.
717 Id.
718 Id. World Wide Flight Services, Inc. was contracted by American Airlines to
provide wheelchair services to American's passengers. Id.
719 Id.
720 Id. The right to damages is "extinguished" under the Warsaw Convention if
an action is not filed within the two-year period of limitation in Article 29, which
is a strict condition precedent and bars any claim not brought within the two-year
period. See Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that Article 29 is a strict condition precedent to a claim for damages).
721 Dick, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63; McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313
(1st Cir. 1995).
722 Id. (quoting McCarthy, 56 F.3d at 317).
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'on board the aircraft.' ,7 23 The district court found that Plain-
tiffs activity at the escalator traveling from the arrival gate to the
departure gate was not "sufficiently close" to the act of boarding
the aircraft and, therefore, it was not part of the "operations of
embarking or disembarking" under the Convention.12 ' Accord-
ingly, the district court denied Defendants' motions, finding
that the Convention did not preempt Plaintiff's state law claims
and, therefore, Article 29 of the Convention did not apply and
her claims were not time-barred.
21
F. ARTICLE 17 ACCIDENTS AND BODILY INJURY
1. Wipranik v. Air Canada
In Wipranik v. Air Canada,726 the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California addressed whether the Defendant
airline was liable for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of
tea spilled on Plaintiff during an international flight.72 7 Plaintiff
specifically alleged that she suffered second and third degree
burns from tea that spilled on her lap onboard a flight from
Toronto, Canada to Tel Aviv, Israel when a passenger shifted
causing a cup of hot tea to slide off a tray and onto her lap.728
Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that the inci-
dent did not qualify as an "accident" under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.729 In addition to opposing the motion,
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary adjudication "as to the
meaning of accident but also as to Defendant's liability for her
injuries. "730
In denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that the events giving rise to Plaintiffs injury
did qualify as an "accident" because she satisfied the definition
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in AirFrance v. Saks.3  Saks
defined an "accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or
723 Id. at 64.
724 Id.
725 Id.
726 No. CV 06-3763 AHM (AJWx), 2007 WL 2441066 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2007).
727 Id. at *1.
728 Id.
729 Id.
730 Id. at *1, *5.
731 Id. at *3-*5 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)). Since the
parties only addressed the resolution of claims under the Warsaw Convention in
their moving papers, the court did not address the potential applicability of the
Montreal Convention. Id.
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happening that is external to the passenger. '7 32 Applying this
definition, the Wipranik court found that: (1) the spilling of the
tea was "external" to Plaintiff; (2) it was "unusual and unex-
pected" that the tea would fall off the tray table due to the move-
ment of another passenger; and (3) it took place during the
operation of the aircraft.733
The district court then granted Plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary adjudication on the "accident" issue, and turned its
attention to address Defendant's liability for her injuries and
whether her own negligence contributed to the cause. 734 The
district court granted Plaintiffs motion on this issue, finding
that Defendant was liable for her injuries, at least in part, be-
cause it "ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to create a gen-
uine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was wholly
responsible for her injury. '735 However, the district court found
that granting Plaintiff "complete summary judgment" as to De-
fendant's liability was inappropriate and the determination of
how much, if any, of Plaintiffs negligence had contributed to
her injury was a question for the jury.736
2. Watts v. American Airlines, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Indiana in Watts v. American Airlines, Inc. 7 3 7 addressed
whether Defendant airline's failure to recognize or respond to a
heart attack suffered by a decedent passenger could constitute
an "accident" under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. 738
The decedent was a passenger on a roundtrip flight from Indi-
anapolis, Indiana to Tokyo, Japan via Chicago, Illinois.739 Dur-
ing the return flight from Tokyo to Chicago, the decedent left
his seat to use the lavatory on the aircraft, and while inside suf-
fered a heart attack. 740 He later was discovered by cleaning per-
sonnel after the flight had landed and all passengers and crew
had exited, and was pronounced dead.74'
732 Id. at *3 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
733 Id. at *5.
734 Id.
735 Id. at *6.
736 Id.
737 No. 1:07-cv-0434-RLY-TAB, 2007 WL 3019344 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2007).
738 Id. at *1-*2.





Plaintiff, the wife of the decedent and the personal represen-
tative of his estate, commenced an action against the airline al-
leging that it did not comply with "industry standards of care
and [its] own policies and procedures" for, inter alia, failing to
respond to alleged "visible or verbal indications" that decedent
was having a heart attack onboard the aircraft. 42 Defendant
moved to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint, the dispositive issue
before the court being whether the alleged incident was an Arti-
cle 17 "accident. ' 743 In analyzing Defendant's motion, the dis-
trict court looked to existing precedent relating to the Warsaw
Convention because there were no reported cases dealing with
this specific issue under the Montreal Convention.744
The district court then examined several cases stating that an
Article 17 "accident" results from an "unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger, and not to
the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of an aircraft. '745 The Watts court, however,
found the facts and reasoning of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Air-
lines,7 46 where it was determined that there was a question of fact
whether the airline's alleged noncompliance with procedures
could be an "accident" under the Convention, particularly appli-
cable.74 7 In Fulop, the court denied Defendant airline's motion
for summary judgment even though Plaintiffs heart attack was
caused by his own internal reaction because the relevant injury
was the "subsequent aggravated harms" caused by the flight
crews' alleged failure to adhere "to established operational stan-
dards, rules or policies" for medical emergencies. 748 Applying
this reasoning to the present case, the district court denied De-
fendant's motion to dismiss.749
742 Id. Plaintiff apparently did not identify the specific industry standards or
internal policies with which the airline allegedly had failed to comply. Id.
743 Id. at *1-*2.
744 Id. at *2.
745 Id. at *3 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985) (Plaintiffs
permanent loss of hearing was not an "accident" because it was caused by her
body's internal reaction to the normal pressurization of the aircraft cabin.)).
746 175 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
747 Watts, 2007 WL 3019344, at *3-*4.
748 Id. at *4 (citing Fulop, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 663-64). After a bench trial, the
Fulop court determined that the conduct of Defendant airline's employees did
not constitute an "accident" under Article 17 and entered judgment in favor of
the airline. Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 244 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219-20, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
749 Watts, 2007 WL 3019344, at *4.
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3. Montanez-Baez v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
Montanez-Baez v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority7 50  addressed
whether a husband's claim for emotional pain and mental
anguish resulting from witnessing his wife fall on an escalator
was compensable under the Warsaw Convention.5 Plaintiffs,
husband and wife, traveled from the Dominican Republic to
Carolina, Puerto Rico where the wife fell on an escalator while
on her way to the airport's immigration area.752 Plaintiff wife
brought claims against Defendant airline for damages relating
to physical and emotional injuries allegedly sustained as a result
of her fall.755 Plaintiff husband alleged that he had experienced
"'great emotional pain and mental anguish from seeing his wife
suffer,'" but did not allege any physical injury.15 1
Defendant American Airlines moved, inter alia, to dismiss
Plaintiff husband's claims because they were not recognized
under the Warsaw Convention as he had not suffered any physi-
cal injury under Article 17. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico determined that the Convention applied
to Plaintiffs' claims because the damages allegedly resulted from
"an event that took place in the course of disembarking from an
international flight" as defined under Article 17.756 In analyzing
whether Plaintiff husband's claim was recognized under the
Convention, the district court followed the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,75 7 in which it was
found that "an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17
when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death,
physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury. ' 758 There-
fore, the district court held that his claim was not cognizable
under Article 17, and because the Convention preempted state
law claims in this area as well, dismissed Plaintiff husband's
claims altogether.759
750 509 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.P.R. 2007).
751 Id. at 153, 155.
752 Id. at 153.
753 Id.
754 Id. at 156.
755 Id. The court did not address the validity of Plaintiff wife's complaints. Id.
756 Id. at 155 (citing Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana S.A.,
449 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The Convention's applicability rests on a determi-
nation of whether the passenger's injury occurred 'on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.'")).
757 Id. at 156 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)).
758 Montanez-Baez, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (quoting F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 552).
759 Id. (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)).
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4. Kruger v. United Airlines, Inc.
In Kruger v. United Airlines, Inc., 60 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California addressed an action arising
from injuries allegedly sustained when Plaintiff was struck by a
passenger's backpack, and later fell as a result of the trauma
while assisted by cabin crew.76 ' Plaintiffs were husband and wife,
whose suit alleged "various tort causes of action" for damages
resulting from Plaintiff wife's injuries, including, inter alia, that
she experienced "excruciating pain, terror, emotional trauma,
anxiety, and fear" during the flight, and that Plaintiff husband
suffered a loss of consortium.76 2 In the complaint, Plaintiff wife
alleged that the Warsaw or Montreal Convention should apply
because the subject flight was "part of an 'undivided interna-
tional carriage. '"76" Defendant airline moved to dismiss on the
grounds that Plaintiffs could not assert their claims under both
the Warsaw Convention and common law. 6
The parties subsequently agreed that the Montreal Conven-
tion, not the Warsaw Convention, applied to the claims.765 De-
fendant argued that Plaintiffs' complaint failed to properly
allege a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention, and the
district court agreed, ordering Plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaint accordingly. 766 However, the district court continued its
substantive analysis and found that Plaintiff wife's state law negli-
gence and emotional distress claims were preempted by the
Montreal Convention.7 6 7 The district court further found that
Plaintiff wife's allegations of bodily injuries arising during the
course of embarking and while onboard the aircraft satisfied the
elements required to set forth a personal injury claim under Ar-
ticle 17 of the Convention.7 68 Specifically, the district court
stated that it is "unusual" to be struck by a fellow passenger's
backpack during boarding and this could be found to be an "ac-
760 481 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
761 Id. at 1007.
762 Id. at 1006-07.
763 Id. at 1007.
764 Id.
765 Id. at 1008.
766 Id.
767 Id. at 1009.
7M Id. at 1009-10. Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides that the
carrier is liable for bodily injuries sustained by a passenger only if the "accident"
that caused the injury occurred "on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking." Montreal Convention, supra note
562, art. 17.
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cident" within the meaning of Article 17.769 The court, however,
limited any potential recovery for emotional injuries to those di-
rectly relating to Plaintiff wife's alleged physical injuries.77 °
The district court also found Plaintiff husband's claim for loss
of consortium was cognizable under the Convention, as Article
29 of the Convention provides a pass-through mechanism al-
lowing application of California tort law, which permits compen-
satory damages for loss of consortium.77 ' The parties agreed
that punitive damages were not recognized by the Conven-
tion.772 Accordingly, the district court granted Defendant air-
line's motion to dismiss with respect to the state law tort claims,
claims for punitive damages, and emotional distress claims not
arising from Plaintiff wife's alleged injuries, and denied Defen-
dant's motion regarding failure to state a claim under the
Convention.77 3
5. Zarlin v. Air France
In Zarlin v. AirFrance,774 the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York addressed whether an air carrier could
be liable under the Warsaw Convention for a passenger injury
allegedly sustained as a result of another passenger reclining his
seat.775 Plaintiff, who was traveling with her husband on a flight
from New York to Paris, France, alleged that she was involved in
a dispute with the passenger seated in front of her after he
reclined his seat, which "touched her. ' 776 Plaintiff thereafter
was reseated with the assistance of a flight attendant, but later
returned to her original seat, at which time she allegedly was
struck and injured when the same passenger reclined his seat
again.777
769Kruger, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405
(1985) ("accident" under the Convention means "an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger")).
770 Id. at 1009 (citing Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654, 658 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)).
771 Id. (citing Carlson v. Wald, 199 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1984) ("holding that the
diminution of a spouse's rights of consortium is compensable where her spouse
has been assaulted")).
772 Id. (citing Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 663).
773 Id. at 1010.
774 No. 04-CV-07408 (KMK), 2007 WL 2585061 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007).
775 Id. at *1-*3.




Defendant airline moved for summary judgment arguing, in-
ter alia, that this did not constitute an Article 17 "accident"
under the Warsaw Convention.778 In analyzing the motion, the
district court expressed doubt whether a passenger forcibly re-
clining a seat could be an "accident" under Article 17 because it
probably was not "unusual or unexpected. ' 779 The district court
found that, even assuming that this event could be deemed an
"accident," Plaintiffs decision to return to her seat after having
been struck by the reclining chair and subsequently relocated by
airline personnel was the proximate cause of her injuries, not
Defendant's action.7 ° Thus, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Air France.8
6. Agravante v. Japan Airlines International Co.
In Agravante v. Japan Airlines International Co., 7 8 2 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Guam addressed whether passen-
ger injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a "standing
takeoff' (i.e., a common maneuver by which the brakes of the
aircraft are engaged at the takeoff location, the engine is
brought to a pre-determined power setting, and the brakes are
released), could be an "accident" under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.78 3 Plaintiff, a passenger on a flight from Japan to Guam,
alleged that he sustained back injuries when the aircraft acceler-
ated and pushed him back against his seat. Plaintiff claimed
to have experienced pain within twenty-four hours, but did not
seek medical care until two years later.785 In addition, Plaintiffs
wife asserted a loss of consortium claim resulting from her hus-
band's alleged injuries.786
Defendant airline moved for summary judgment arguing that
Plaintiffs injuries were not caused by an "accident" under Arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention and that there was no causal
778 Id. at *4. Plaintiffs claims were governed by the Warsaw Convention since
the Montreal Convention had not yet entered into force when Plaintiff was in-
jured on September 6, 2003. Id. at *3.
779 Id. at *4. Plaintiff alleged that "the unexpected event was not the reclining
of the seat but, rather, [the other passenger's] weapon[i]zing of it by employing
it violently to injure her." Id.
780 Id. at *5.
781 Id. at *6.
782 No. 04-00036, 2007 WL 2026494 (D. Guam July 9, 2007).
783 Id. at *1, *4.
784 Id. at *1.
785 Id. at *2.
786 Id. at *1.
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connection between the alleged accident and Plaintiffs inju-
ries.7 87 In support of its motion, Defendant submitted the opin-
ion of an expert retained to perform a biomedical analysis of
Plaintiff's claims.788 The expert stated that the force from accel-
eration during the standing takeoff was less than normal daily
activities such as sneezing.7 9 Furthermore, Defendant retained
a medical expert who opined that Plaintiffs alleged back injury
related to degenerative changes rather than a single, traumatic
event.
790
In analyzing the motion, the district court found that there
was no evidence in the record to support that the standing take-
off was "unexpected or unusual," to qualify it as an "accident"
under Article 17.79 Plaintiffs stated that at trial they would pre-
sent testimony from an airline Captain that "a [standing] takeoff
is not allowed at Narita Airport, and to do so would be a pilot
error of judgment," but submitted no affidavit or declaration to
support this assertion. 792 Defendant, however, did submit a dec-
laration from a Captain with twenty-eight years of commercial
flight experience stating that, "standing takeoffs are permitted
[at Narita Airport], and... are routinely done. 793 As such, the
court found that even if it were to give Plaintiff "the benefit of
the doubt on this issue and construe the standing takeoff as an
accident," it would "still have great difficulty in ruling against
[Defendant]," but shifted its analysis to focus on the proximate
cause element of Plaintiffs claim.794 The district court found
that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal connec-
tion between the takeoff and Plaintiffs injuries and thereby
granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plain-
tiff s claims.795 The district court also granted Defendant's mo-
tion as to Plaintiffs wife's derivative loss of consortium claim as
no underlying cause of action remained to support it.796
787 Id. at *4.
788 Id. at *1.
789 Id.
790 Id. at *3.
791 Id. at *4 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
792 Id.
793 Id.
794 Id. at *4-*5.
795 Id. at *5-*6.




1. In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litigation
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York in In re Nigeria Charter Fights Contract Litigation797
involved a class action certified in 2006 of Plaintiffs who had
purchased tickets prior to January 31, 2004, for travel between
Nigeria and the United States, but were not transported because
Defendant World Airways, Inc. ("World") had discontinued
flight operations. 79 Plaintiffs alleged that World was liable
under either the Warsaw or Montreal Convention for its failure
to transport them and that it also was liable for breach of con-
tract, negligence, and fraud.799
Defendant World moved for summary judgment arguing, inter
alia, that the Montreal Convention preempted Plaintiffs' state
law claims, that to the extent Plaintiffs' claims under the Mon-
treal Convention were dismissed, the court should decline to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims, and that
Plaintiffs' contract claims, if not preempted, should be dis-
missed because they were not in privity with Defendant. 800
Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on their
state law claims or, alternatively, on their claims under the Mon-
treal Convention.801
In analyzing the motions, the district court agreed with Defen-
dant's observation that "several courts, when presented with
claims based on airlines' refusal to fly passengers, have con-
strued those claims as sounding in delay within the scope of Arti-
cle 19 of the Warsaw Convention. °80 2 However, the district court
found that "in each of these cases . . . circumstances existed
which militated in favor of a finding of delay, and [those circum-
797 520 F. Supp. 2d 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
798 Id. at 449.
799 Id.
800 Id. at 451.
801 Id.
802 Id. at 453 (citing, inter alia, Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d
106, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Minhas v. Biman Bangl. Airlines, No. 97 CIV.
4920(BSJ), 1999 WL 447445, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999); Alam v. Pak. Int'l
Airlines Corp., No. 1:92-CV-04356, 1995 WL 17201349, at *2 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. July 27,
1995); Malik v. Butta, No. 92 CIV. 8703(SS), 1993 WL 410168, at *3 n.l
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1993)). Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides that
"[t] he carrier [is] liable for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation by
air of passengers, baggage, or cargo." Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art.
19.
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stances] are absent here. '10 3 In other cases, plaintiffs had "se-
cured alternate transportation without waiting to find out
whether the defendant airlines would transport them, '8 4 or "re-
fused an offer of a later flight."805 In other cases, plaintiffs had
not alleged nonperformance, or had explicitly alleged (or had
conceded that they were alleging) delay.80 6
The district court stated that "[h]ere, by contrast, [P]laintiffs
have shown that World simply refused to fly them, without offer-
ing alternate transportation."80' 7 The district court noted that
Defendant had flown 318 stranded passengers from Lagos to
New York, and later returned twenty others from the United
States to Lagos.80 8 However, Defendant had undertaken these
flights only after "disavowing any obligation to do so . .. [and]
after 'considerable discussion' with the enforcement division of
the United States Department of Transportation.!809 The dis-
trict court noted that "many other stranded passengers were
simply abandoned."810 The district court further noted that De-
fendant's transportation of the first leg of Plaintiffs' flights did
not alter its conclusion."'
In light of these facts, the district court stated that this case
was analogous to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision in Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines. 12 In Wolgel, plaintiffs
were bumped from their international flight, and never placed
803 Nigeria, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 453. The district court did not specify the spe-
cific "circumstances" that were absent. Id.
804 Id. (citing Oparaji v. Virgin At. Airways, No. 04-CV-1554 (FB), 2006 WL
2708034, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2006); Paradis, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 112).
805 Id. (citing Igwe v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. H-05-1423, 2007 WL 43811, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2007)).
806 Id. (citing Minhas, 1999 WL 447445, at *3 n.4; Alam, 1995 WL 17201349, at
*2-*3; Malik, 1993 WL 410168, at *3).
807 Id.
808 Id. at 451, 454. Defendant World, under a consent order issued by the De-
partment of Transportation ("DOT"), flew 318 passengers stranded in Lagos, Ni-
geria back to New York; it also claimed to have paid for twenty passengers
stranded in the United States to return to Lagos. The DOT also had fined Defen-
dant $350,000 for stranding passengers in violation of numerous federal statutes
and regulations. Id. at 451.
809 Id. at 454.
810 Id.
81, Id. (citing Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) ("[Tlhat the airline provided one flight according to contract does not
necessarily render the failure to provide carriage on another flight a mere delay
rather than a total failure to perform.")).
812 Id. (citing Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987)).
224
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
on another.8" 3 The Wolgel court, noting that plaintiffs "never left
the airport," found that the claim sounded in nonperformance,
rather than delay.814 In order to determine whether the claims
were preempted by the Warsaw Convention, the Wolgel court
looked to the Convention's drafting history, and found that the
delegates to the Convention had concluded that "there was no
need for [a] remedy in the Convention for total nonperform-
ance of the contract, because in such a case the injured party has
a remedy under the law of his or her home country. "815
The Wolgel court noted that the Convention delegates had
thereby, "agreed that the Convention should not apply to a case
of nonperformance of a contract." 16 The Nigeria court, relying
on Wolgel, determined that, to the extent that Plaintiffs could be
seen to be suing for delay under Article 19 of the Montreal Con-
vention,"" it would grant Defendant World's motion for sum-
mary judgment on these claims because Plaintiffs had failed to
allege delay."18 By the same reasoning, the district court deter-
mined that Plaintiffs' allegations for nonperformance (breach
of contract) were not preempted by the Montreal Conven-
tion,8 19 nor were their claims for fraud and negligence, and
turned its attention to analyze these theories of recovery.8 2 °
In addressing the parties' motions on the state law claims, the
district court declined to grant Plaintiffs' summary judgment
motion as to the issue of breach of contract, having determined
that the evidence did not clearly demonstrate that Plaintiffs pur-
chased their airline tickets from World, instead of from Defend-
ants Ritetime Aviation and Travel Services, Inc. 21 Similarly,
evidence as to Ritetime's agency status also was in dispute which
precluded the court from granting summary judgment to either
813 Id. (citing Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 445).
814 Id.
815 Id. (quoting Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 444).
816 Id.
817 In applying previous courts' analysis of Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention
to Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, the district court noted that the "differ-
ence between the two conventions is not significant for present purposes." Id. at
452 n.6. Article 19 of the Montreal Convention provides that the carrier is liable
for "damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or
cargo." Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 19.
818 Nigeria, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
819 The court relied on the holding of Paradis that the Montreal and Warsaw
Conventions have "substantially the same preemptive effect." Id. at 453 (citing
Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
820 Id. at 455.
821 See id. at 456.
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party on Plaintiffs' state law tort claims.8 22 The district court fur-
ther held that although Plaintiffs' federal claims were dismissed,
it would retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims.8 23
2. Igwe v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in
Igwe v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.8 24 addressed whether the bumping
of passengers from an international flight qualified as a "delay"
under Article 19 of the Montreal Convention.8 25 In Igwe, Plain-
tiffs, a father and his then four-year-old daughter, had been
scheduled to travel on a flight from Houston to Nigeria.82 6
Plaintiffs arrived at the Houston airport approximately two
hours before the flight and proceeded to the check-in point,
where the processing of their seven pieces of luggage took over
an hour.8
27
During processing, Defendant airline's computer transferred
Plaintiffs to a "waiting list" as per standard procedure, and Plain-
tiffs were issued "passenger verification cards" instead of board-
ing passes.8 28 The passenger verification cards allowed Plaintiffs
through the security checkpoint, but did not guarantee them a
seat on their flight, so they were instructed to hurry through
security and proceed to the check-in counter at the boarding
gate to ensure that they would be assigned seats on the flight.8 29
Plaintiffs arrived at the boarding gate without first presenting
themselves at the check-in counter as instructed, and therefore
were denied boarding by the KLM station manager.83 ° The sta-
tion manager had paged Plaintiffs several times without re-
sponse and, thereby, cancelled their seats and re-assigned them
to wait-listed passengers."' Plaintiff father then refused the sta-
822 See id. at 456-69. The court discussed Plaintiffs' alternative theories of De-
fendant's potential liability at length, which included the relationship of princi-
pal to agent, apparent authority, and ratification, finding that there was
insufficient evidence under any of these theories to warrant granting either par-
ties' summary judgment motions regarding Plaintiffs' state law claims on these
issues.
823 Id. at 469, 470.
824 No. H-05-1423, 2007 WL 43811 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2007).
825 See id. at *1,*3.








tion manager's offer of two $500 credit vouchers and a free
transfer of his tickets for a flight the following day, and instead
purchased tickets, out-of-pocket, for a flight departing two days
later.8 12
Plaintiffs commenced an action in state court against KLM
and its partner, Northwest Airlines alleging, inter alia, breach of
contract and negligence .833 Defendant Northwest subsequently
filed for bankruptcy, and the court issued an automatic stay.834
Defendant KLM filed a motion for summary judgment arguing,
inter alia, that Plaintiffs' claims were "preempted and not recog-
nized by the Montreal Convention." '35 Because Plaintiffs did
not file a response to KLM's motion, the district court accepted
as true the facts as set forth by Defendant KLM.836
In addressing KLM's motion, the district court determined
that Plaintiffs' state tort and contract law claims all resulted from
their alleged "bumping" from the flight.8 3 v The district court
additionally noted that "the Montreal Convention provides their
exclusive remedy to the extent to which their claims fall within
the Convention's scope. '8 38 The district court then addressed
whether Plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of Article 19.39
Under Article 19 of the Convention, if bumping is classified as
delay, it would enable a carrier to avoid liability for damages if it
could prove that "it and its servants and agents took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for it or them to take such measures."840
Although there was a split of authority on the issue of whether





836 Id. (citing Lewis v. Cont'l Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 686, 694 (S.D. Tex. 1999);
Taylor v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., 959 F. Supp. 373, 376 (N.D. Tex. 1996)).
837 Id. at *3.
838 Id. (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1999)).
Prior to applying the Tseng holding on this issue to the instant case, the district
court noted that "case law interpreting the Warsaw Convention, as amended by
Montreal Protocol No. 4, has equal applicability to the interpretation of the Mon-
treal Convention for purposes of preemption." Id. (citing Paradis v. Ghana Air-
ways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
839 Id.
840 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 19).
841 Id. (comparing Paradis, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14 (bumping classified as
"delay" and covered under the Montreal Convention) with Weiss v. El Al Isr. Air-
lines, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (bumping classified as "contrac-
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the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd.,4 2 which determined that bumping
constituted a delay if an airline had offered substitute transpor-
tation and the passenger refused this in order to later claim
non-performance by the airline. 4 The Igwe court further deter-
mined that Defendant KLM "was not obligated to offer the
[Plaintiffs] any compensation at all for their inability to get to
the terminal in a timely fashion" '44 and held that, because Plain-
tiffs' claims were within the scope of Article 19, that their state
law claims were preempted and subject to dismissal with
prejudice.845 Accordingly, the district court granted Defendant
KLM's motion for summary judgment and ordered the case ad-
ministratively closed until Northwest's bankruptcy stay of actions
was lifted.846
3. Onwuteaka v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas in Onwuteaka v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.8 47 involved
an action alleging that Plaintiffs were "not seated together" dur-
ing a "family trip" to Nigeria.848 Plaintiffs further alleged that
after the flight departed Amsterdam for Nigeria, the aircraft re-
turned to Amsterdam where they were forced to remain on the
aircraft for three hours before departing again for Nigeria.849
Defendants, partners KLM and Northwest Airlines, removed
the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.850 The district court found that Plaintiffs' claims
were preempted by the Montreal Convention8 5 1 because they
tual non-performance" and not preempted by the Montreal Convention) and
Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987) (same)).
842 Paradis, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 114.
843 Igwve, 2007 WL 43811, at *3 (citing Paradis, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14).
844 Id. at *4, n.14.
845 Id.
846 Id.
847 No. H-07-0363, 2007 WL 1406419 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2007).
848 Id. at *1.
849 Id.
850 Id. The district court indicated that the standard for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) "is the same as that for dismissal for failure to state a
claim." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F. 3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)).
851 Id. The district court noted that "courts interpreting the Montreal Conven-
tion rely on cases interpreting similar provisions of the Warsaw Convention." Id.
at *1 n.2 (citing Baah v. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd., 2007 WL 424993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.




"all occurred" onboard the international flight.852 Plaintiffs did
not allege any claims under the Convention, but mentioned Ar-
ticle 19853 relating to claims for delay in their response to De-
fendants' motion.154 However, the district court noted that
Plaintiffs had failed to allege any damages that would be recov-
erable under Article 19.855 Therefore, because Plaintiffs had
failed to assert a claim for relief under the Convention, the dis-
trict court granted Defendant airlines' motion. 56
H. BAGGAGE
1. Booker v. BWIA West Indies Airways Ltd.
In Booker v. BWIA West Indies Airways Ltd., 57 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York addressed Defendant
airline's motion for partial summary judgment that Plaintiff pas-
senger's state law claims arising from the alleged damage to, and
theft of items from, Plaintiffs checked baggage were preempted
by the Montreal Convention, that any potential liability was sub-
ject to the Convention's limitations, and that Plaintiff could not
recover for alleged emotional injuries under the Convention. 5 8
Plaintiff and her three-year-old daughter were the last passen-
gers to board Defendant's flight from New York's JFK Airport to
Georgetown, Guyana via Port of Spain, Trinidad. 59 Plaintiff
claimed that after boarding the aircraft she was forced to surren-
der her two carry-on items against her will in exchange for two
baggage claim checks.8 6 ° The bags did not arrive at the Guyana
Airport until four days later.8 6 ' After arriving at the Guyana Air-
port and realizing that the bags were missing, Plaintiff com-
pleted a Baggage Claim Report listing cash and jewelry among
the contents.8 62 When Plaintiff finally received the delayed lug-
gage, four days after her arrival, she allegedly discovered that
several items were missing, including cash and jewelry amount-
852 Id. (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1999);
Mbaba v. Societe Air Fr., 457 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2006)).
853 Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 19.
854 Onwuteaka, 2007 WL 1406419, at *1.
855 Id.
856 Id. at *2.
857 No. 06-CV-2146 (RER), 2007 WL 1351927 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007)
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ing to $11,790.63 Plaintiff also claimed that she suffered "great
emotional stress" as a result of the delay in delivering the two
bags, and that she suffered an asthma attack and swelling of her
hands and feet upon discovering that the items were missing.864
Plaintiff filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings
County, alleging causes of action for emotional distress, decep-
tive business practices, conversion, and negligence, and sought
to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the stolen
and damaged baggage . 65 Defendant removed the case to the
district court, and moved for partial summary judgment on the
issue that Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by the
Montreal Convention.866 In response, Plaintiff argued that the
Convention did not preempt her state law claims because it does
not apply to wilful misconduct; and, in addition, that the liability
limitation under the Convention did not apply because: "(1)
[she] was not allowed to declare a higher value for her baggage;
(2) defendant's acts amounted to wilful misconduct; and (3) the
loss occurred outside the scope of the Montreal Convention." '67
In considering the motion, the district court found that the
Montreal Convention exclusively governed and preempted
Plaintiffs state law claims.868 The district court relied upon the
language of Article 29 of the Convention, which provides: "In
the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for
damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or
in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this
Convention." 86 9
The district court then rejected Plaintiffs argument that the
Montreal Convention did not apply because of Defendant's al-
leged wilful misconduct. 870 The district court noted that Plain-
863 Id.
864 Id. at *1, *4.
865 Id. at *1, *5.
866 Id. at *1-*2. Defendant also argued that under the Convention, Plaintiff
could only recover damages for stolen and damaged baggage subject to the Con-
vention's corresponding limitations of liability. Id. at *3.
867 Id. at *2.
868 Id. at *3.
869 Id. at *2 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 29).
870 Id. at *3. In applying cases interpreting the preemption provision of the
Warsaw Convention to the subject claims under the Montreal Convention, the
court noted the holding of Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., that the "preemptive
effect of [the] Montreal Convention is 'substantially the same' as that of [the]
Warsaw Convention." Id. at *2 (citing Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp.
2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
230
RECEANT DEVELOPMENTS
tiff had not offered any case law supporting the proposition that
"wilful misconduct creates an exception to the applicability of
the Montreal Convention,"871 nor was it persuaded by Plaintiff's
reliance on Justice Stevens' Tseng dissent 87 2 and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Koirala v. Thai Airways International, Ltd.873
The district court noted that it was not bound to follow a dis-
senting opinion, and distinguished Plaintiffs interpretation of
Koirala from the actual holding, in which the Ninth Circuit
"held that a finding of wilful misconduct lifted the Warsaw Con-
vention's cap on damages, not that it created an exception to the
Convention's applicability." ' 4 The Booker court further noted
that Article 22 of the Montreal Convention makes clear that
only the provisions limiting a carrier's liability to specified
amounts do not apply in cases involving wilful misconduct, not
that the Convention itself would not apply.875 Because Plaintiffs
claims for damages resulted from the seizure of her baggage on
the aircraft and the damage to and delayed arrival of her bag-
gage, and the Convention provides the exclusive remedy for
such claims, the district court found Plaintiffs claims were
within the scope of the Convention, and therefore all state law
claims were preempted. 76
With respect to Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress, the dis-
trict court noted that the Montreal Convention sets forth "three
situations in which a carrier is liable: (1) death or bodily injury
of passengers; (2) damage to baggage; and (3) delay of passen-
gers, baggage and cargo. "77 Further, under Article 17 (1) of the
Convention, a carrier is liable for the "death or bodily injury of a
passenger caused by an accident either on board the aircraft, or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking."8 7
8
After noting that emotional injuries "are not recoverable
under the Montreal Convention unless they were caused by
871 Id. at *3.
872 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 177-81 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). In his dissent in Tseng, Justice Stevens argued that "the Warsaw
Convention was not intended to shield carriers from liability for acts involving
wilful misconduct." Id. at *3 n.4 (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 177-81).
873 Id. at *3 (citing Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir.
1997)).
874 Id. (citing Koirala, 126 F.3d at 1209).
875 Id.
876 Id.
877 Id. at *4 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 29).
878 Id. (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 17(1)).
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physical injuries," '879 the district court found that Plaintiff's al-
leged asthma attack, and resulting swelling of her hands and
feet, was caused by the alleged theft of the contents of her bag-
gage and not the seizure of her baggage." 0 Therefore, the dis-
trict court found that even if Plaintiff's complaint was read to
state a cause of action for bodily injury, it was "not caused by an
accident on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking," and that Plaintiff had "failed to establish liability
under Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention. '"881
With respect to Defendant's motion regarding the Conven-
tion's limit of liability for the alleged stolen and damaged bag-
gage, the district court noted that under Article 17(2) of the
Convention, "a carrier is liable for damage sustained in the case
of 'destruction or loss of, or damage to checked baggage' if the
loss or damage occurred on board the aircraft or 'during any
period within which the checked baggage was in the charge of
the carrier.' 8 81 2 The district court found that the alleged dam-
age occurred while the checked baggage was in the "charge of'
Defendant, and therefore Plaintiffs claim was within the scope
of the Convention. 8 3
Defendant did not contest that it could be liable for damage
to Plaintiffs baggage, but rather, that if it were found liable, its
liability was limited to 1,000 Special Drawing Rights pursuant to
Article 22(2) of the Convention. 8 4 Under Article 22(2), "a car-
rier is only liable for 1,000 Special Drawings Rights, unless the
passenger made a special declaration of interest at the time the
baggage was handed over to the carrier." ' 5 Furthermore, Arti-
cle 22 (5) provides, inter alia, that Article 22 (2) "does not apply if
the 'damage resulted from an act or omission of a servant or
agent . . . done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and
with knowledge that damage will probably result . . . provided
879 Id. (citing Ehrlich v. Am Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 369-400 (2d Cir.
2004) ("a carrier is liable for mental injuries only to the extent that they were
caused by bodily injuries"); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)
("carriers are not liable for purely mental injuries")).
880 Id.
881 Id. The district court further found that Plaintiff could not recover for
emotional injuries allegedly caused by the delay of baggage. Id. at *4 n.6.
882 Id. at *4 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 17(2)).
883 Id.
884 Id.
885 Id. (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 22(2)).
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that such servant or agent was acting within the scope of its
employment.' "886
The district court was not aware of any case law addressing
Article 22(5) of the Montreal Convention, and therefore relied
on case law interpreting the Warsaw Convention in which the
corresponding provision is "substantively the same,"88 7 in find-
ing that theft by an employee is outside the scope of employ-
ment and did not remove the liability limitation.888 As a result,
the Booker court found that Defendant's liability for damage to
and theft from Plaintiffs baggage was limited to 1,000 Special
Drawing Rights.88 ' Furthermore, the district court stated that
Plaintiff could not recover punitive damages under the Mon-
treal Convention.8 10 Accordingly, the district court granted De-
fendant's motion for partial summary judgment.""
I. DELIVERY OF CARGO
In 2007, the International Air Transport Association ("IATA")
approved Resolution 600b.892 Resolution 600b sets forth new
Conditions of Contract to be incorporated in air waybills that
took effect on March 17, 2008.89" The Resolution provides no-
tice that either the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Conven-
tion may govern international transportation, and requires that
carriers provide notice of the applicable liability limitations for
the "loss of, damage or delay to cargo" in their Conditions of
Contract.894 When defining such limits, carriers are permitted
886 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 22(5)).
ss7 Id. at *5 (citing Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
888 Id. (citing Brink's Ltd. v. S. African Airways, 94 CIV. 1902 (HB), 1995 WL
225602, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir.
1996)).
889 Id.
890 Id. Article 29 of the Convention provides that "punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable." Id. (quoting Mon-
treal Convention, supra note 562, art. 29). The district court did not address
Plaintiff's claim "that she was not permitted to declare a higher value for her
baggage," as it found Defendant's liability limited on other grounds, but noted
that she had failed to allege any facts to support this claim. Id. at *5 n.7.
891 Id. at *5. Plaintiff has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and a decision is expected in 2008.
892 IATA, New IATA Air Waybill Conditions of Contract, http://www.iata.org/
whatwedo/cargo/resolution600b.htm (last visited June 15, 2008).
893 Id.
894 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, Air Waybill-Conditions of Contract, Res. 600b (Mar.
17, 2008), available at http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/9B4A04A3-2383-4D62-
84B5-B632DD42D2BB/0/Resolution_600b.pdf.
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to treat the limit of 250 French gold francs per kilogram under
the Warsaw Convention as the conversion equivalent of seven-
teen Special Drawing Rights89 5 from the Montreal Convention,
which should then be converted to the applicable national
currency. 896
1. Wea Farms v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Wea Farms v. American Airlines, Inc.,897 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida addressed whether
Defendant airline's alleged failure to promptly notify the con-
signee 898 upon arrival of the goods was the proximate cause of
spoilage of a shipment of asparagus.899 Plaintiff, a grower and
shipper of asparagus, had contracted with a freight forwarder9"'
to transport a shipment of asparagus (the "consignment") from
Lima, Peru to Miami, Florida on Defendant American Airlines'
flight.90 1 Defendant allegedly failed to notify the customs bro-
ker9 °2 for the consignment until over eighteen hours after its
arrival, and did not store the cargo in refrigerated facilities. 9 3
Later, the condition of the asparagus was brought to Defen-
dant's attention, and the consignment then was moved to a re-
frigerated storage facility.90 4  A surveyor subsequently
determined that the asparagus "had suffered severe heat dam-
age," and it was deemed a "total loss. 90 5
Plaintiff commenced an action for damages in state court al-
leging causes of action for "bailment . . . negligence . . . and
895 Id. A Special Drawing Right ("SDR") is an international reserve asset cur-
rently equal to approximately $1.59 USD. See International Monetary Fund, Fact-
sheet-Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), (Apr. 2008), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.
896 Air Waybill-Conditions of Contract, supra note 894.
897 No. 05-22587-CIV, 2007 WL 1173077 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2007).
898 The consignee is the party to receive the consigned shipment, and the con-
signor is the party transferring the consigned shipment. See BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 307 (8th ed. 2004).
899 See Wea Farms, 2007 WL 1173077, at *3-*4.
900 A freight forwarder is a party whose business is to arrange the documenta-
tion and transportation for the shipment of goods from the consignee to the
consignor. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARv 666 (8th ed. 2004).
901 Wea Farms, 2007 WL 1173077, at *1.
902 A customs broker is the party who facilitates the "clearing" of shipments of
goods through customs barriers for importers and exporters. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 386 (8th ed. 2004).
903 Wea Farms, 2007 WArL 1173077, at *2.
904 Id.
905 Id. at *2-*3.
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breach of contract.19 6 Defendant removed the case to federal
court and the parties consented to a non-jury trial.90 7 Both par-
ties agreed that the Montreal Convention governed the interna-
tional transport of the consignment. 08 Under Article 18 of the
Convention, the carrier is liable for damage to the cargo sus-
tained during carriage by air.909 Following a bench trial,910 the
district court relied on the authority of Offshore Aviation v. Trans-
con Lines, Inc.9" in stating that "a prima facie case of absolute
liability under the Convention is established upon a showing
that the goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition,
were delivered to the consignee at destination in damaged con-
dition, and resulted in a specified amount of damage. 9 12 The
district court concluded that the evidence clearly indicated that
the goods were delivered to Defendant in "good condition" and
thereafter to Plaintiff in "bad condition," but there was still a
need to determine whether Defendant's failure to notify Plain-
tiff was the proximate cause of the damage. 913 The district court
noted that Article 13 of the Montreal Convention obligates the
carrier to notify the consignee "as soon as the cargo arrives,"
and thereby held that Defendant's failure to notify Plaintiff of
the consignment's arrival was the proximate cause of the dam-
age.914 The district court rejected Defendant's argument that
Plaintiffs failure to properly package the asparagus caused its
spoilage, and thereby awarded Plaintiff its full damages and pre-
judgment interest.9" 5
906 Id. at *1.
907 [d.
908 Id. at *3.
909 Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 18. Article 18 provides that "the
carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of or
damage to, cargo upon condition only that the event which caused the damage
so sustained took place during the carriage by air [or while] in the charge of the
carrier." Id.
910 Wea Farms, 2007 WL 1173077, at *1.
91" 831 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1987).
912 Wea Farms, 2007 WL 1173077, at *3. In Offshore Aviation, the court inter-
preted the cargo provisions of the Warsaw Convention, but the Wea Farms court
applied this interpretation to the substantially similar provisions of the Montreal
Convention. Id.
M See id. at *4.
914 Id. Article 13 of the Montreal Convention provides that "unless it is other-
wise agreed, it is the duty of the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as
the cargo arrives." Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 13.
915 Wea Farms, 2007 WL 1173077, at *4-*5.
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2. O'Gray Import & Export v. British Airways PLC
In O'Gray Import & Export v. British Airways PLC,9 16 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland addressed whether
Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements for cargo
shipments under the Warsaw Convention." 7 Plaintiff was an im-
port/export company that contracted with Defendant airline to
transport smoked fish from Accra, Ghana to Baltimore, Mary-
land via London, England.918 The cargo arrived in Baltimore
five days late, and then was mistakenly delivered to another ship-
per by airline employees causing a delay in inspection by the
Food & Drug Administration ("FDA").9 9 The FDA released the
cargo to Plaintiff, but placed a "hold" on it due to evidence of
mold, and two weeks later determined that the fish could not be
sold to the public, denied entry of the shipment, and ultimately
had the cargo destroyed.92 °
Plaintiff submitted a written claim to Defendant airline over
one month after it had received the damaged cargo, seeking the
value of the destroyed fish and shipping costs.9 2' Defendant re-
fused to pay the claim because Plaintiff did not comply with the
notice requirements contained in the air waybill.922
Plaintiff thereafter commenced an action against Defendant
alleging that it "breached its duty of care and responsibilities
and was negligent in delivering the goods to the wrong ship-
per.''92  Defendant moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice require-
ments of Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention. 2 1 In evaluating
Defendant's motion, the district court found that although it
was not clear when the mold developed on the cargo, because
the cargo was within the "charge" of Defendant until it was re-
916 No. RDB-06-1020, 2007 WL 1378391 (D. Md. May 4, 2007).





922 Id. The air waybill required that notice be given within twenty-one days of
the cargo being "placed at his disposal." Id. at *1 n.2.
923 Id. at *2.
924 Id. at *3. The Montreal Convention was not applicable in this case because
Ghana was not a party to it. Id. at *3 n.4. Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention
provides different time frames for notice depending on whether the cargo was
lost, damaged, or destroyed and that "in the case of damage, the person entitled
to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the dam-
age, and, at the latest, within . . .fourteen days from the date of receipt in the
case of cargo." Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 26.
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leased to Plaintiff, any damage had occurred during its "carriage
by air," and, therefore, Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention ap-
plied.9 25 The district court then shifted its analysis to what the
applicable notice requirement was under Article 26, depending
on whether the cargo was deemed "lost, damaged, or de-
stroyed. '9 26 The district court determined that the cargo was
not "destroyed" as Plaintiff contended, or else the FDA would
have immediately denied its entry, and thus that the fourteen
day "damaged" notice requirement applied in this case.9 27 The
district court thereby granted Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Plaintiffs claims were barred for failure
to comply with the applicable notice requirements of the War-
saw Convention.9 28
3. Nipponkoa Insurance Co. v. Globeground Services, Inc.
Nipponkoa Insurance Co. v. Globeground Services, Inc.9 29 ad-
dressed whether the Warsaw Convention's limit of liability ap-
plied to Plaintiffs claims for the theft of a shipment of
computers."' Defendant Globeground North America, LLC
managed Nippon Cargo Airlines' warehouse at Chicago's
O'Hare International Airport, where a shipment of 240 laptop
computers was being stored after arriving on a Nippon flight
from the Philippines.9 3' The next morning, Defendant's em-
ployee released the laptops to an individual with paperwork pur-
porting to authorize him to take delivery.91 2 Later that day, it
was discovered that this individual had stolen the laptops when
the consignee appeared at the warehouse to accept delivery.
9 33
Plaintiff, as the insurer of the computers, brought a subro-
gated action in state court alleging claims for, inter alia, negli-
gence, breach of contract, and conversion. 34  Defendant
Globeground filed a third-party claim for contribution against
925 O'Gray, 2007 WL 1378391, at *3. Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention is, in
pertinent part, substantively identical to Article 18 of the Montreal Convention.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 562, art. 18; Warsaw Convention, supra note
564, art. 18.
926 O'Gray, 2007 WL 1378391, at *4.
927 Id.
928 Id. at *5.
929 No. 04 C 5648, 2007 WL 2410292 (N.D. Ill. Aug.17, 2007).
930 Id. at *1.
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Worldwide Flight Services, Inc., to which it subcontracted cer-
tain management services, including document handling, at the
Nippon warehouse . 5 Defendant Globeground removed the ac-
tion to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.3 6
Defendant Globeground subsequently moved for partial sum-
mary judgment arguing that its liability was limited to $20,000
under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.9"7 Third-party De-
fendant Worldwide moved for summary judgment to dismiss the
third party complaint "on the ground that [P] laintiff's claims
have no merit, or alternatively to impose the Warsaw Conven-
tion limits. 938
Plaintiff argued that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to
its claims because Defendant Globeground was not acting as an
"agent, servant, or representative of [Nippon]," which had is-
sued the air waybill.939 Plaintiff, relying on portions of the April
1998 International Air Transport Association ("IATA") Main
Agreement and Annex A of the Standard Ground Handling
Agreement, as memorialized and modified by Annex B2.0,
which Nippon and Globeground signed in June 2001 ("Stan-
dard Ground Handling Agreement"),94 ° claimed that
Globeground was an independent contractor.941 Specifically,
Plaintiff stated that a provision in the Standard Ground Han-
dling Agreement provided that: "Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained herein, the Carrier [Nippon] and Han-
dling Company [Globeground] are not joint employers but are
independent contractors and the Carrier shall in no way be con-
935 Id.
936 Id. Globeground had also removed on the basis of federal question juris-
diction but the court held that this would be improper because "the Warsaw Con-
vention did not completely preempt the field such that the state law claims were
actually federal claims." Id. (citing Nipponkoa Ins. Co. v. Globeground Serv.,
Inc., No. 04 C 5648, 2006 WL 2861126, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2006)).
937 Id. at *1, *3 n.3.
938 Id. at *1.
939 Id. at *3.
940 The Standard Ground Handling Agreement provided that Globeground
employees were to meet Nippon's "Service Standards" and Nippon determined
the staffing requirements and work schedules. See id. Nippon and Globeground
were to coordinate training requirements. Id. Globeground hired the employees
(subject to Nippon consent for supervisory personnel) and was responsible for
ensuring that its employees met required standards. Id. If, however, the
Globeground employees did not meet its standards, Nippon could request their
replacement. Id. The district court also noted that there was no allegation that
the actual practices of Nippon and Globeground were different than those set
forth in the Standard Ground Handling Agreement. Id.
941 Id. at *3-*4.
238
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
strued to mean the employer or co-employer of any and all per-
sons of the Handling Company assigned to the Services
hereunder. 942 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, in evaluating Plaintiffs claim, stated that this provi-
sion did not relate to whether Globeground was an independent
contractor, but rather whether employees retained by
Globeground should be considered employees of Nippon as
well.943 In this regard, the district court noted that "[a] person
may be another's agent without also being an employee (ser-
vant). Also agent and independent contractor are not mutually
exclusive categories. 944
In finding that Defendant Globeground was acting as an
agent of Nippon and, thus, the Warsaw Convention governed
Plaintiff's claims, the district court stated:
Under the terms of their contract, [Nippon] had general con-
trol over [Globeground]. [Nippon] established the number and
schedules for [Globeground] employees and required that the
employees have particular qualifications and perform up to spe-
cific standards. All [Globeground] supervisory employees had to
be specifically approved by [Nippon]. That is sufficient control
... for [Nippon] to be considered an agent in the broad sense of
that term, which is all that is required under the Warsaw
Convention.945
Third-party Defendant Worldwide argued that Plaintiffs state
law claims were preempted by the Warsaw Convention and
should be dismissed.946 The district court disagreed, ruling that
"[P]laintiff may still pursue its state law claims, but under the
strict or presumed liability approach of the Convention and sub-
ject to the liability limits of the Convention. 947 The district
court continued holding that Plaintiff's cause of action was "not
subject to dismissal simply because the claims are labeled as state
law claims."948
Plaintiff then argued that the Warsaw Convention's limitation
of liability should not apply because Globeground did not have





947 Id. at *5.
948 Id. at *6.
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adequate procedures or training, and this failure constituted
"wilful misconduct. '949 The district court noted, however, that:
The mere failure to follow applicable or appropriate proce-
dures is negligence, not wilful misconduct .... To be wilful mis-
conduct, any failure to perform such procedures must be
accompanied by an intent to cause harm or be reckless in that
the actor had knowledge that the conduct would probably result
in damage.
The district court noted that recklessness required "subjective
awareness that one is doing something wrong," and the poten-
tial risks must be "serious and likely to occur. '95' The district
court then rejected Plaintiff's argument because the evidence
presented did not support "anything beyond negligence. "952
Accordingly, the district court granted Defendant's and
Third-Party Defendant's motions for partial summary judgment
on the issue of limitation of liability and dismissed Plaintiffs
claims for breach of contract, gross negligence, and
conversion.9 53
IV. DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS
Courts continue to address claims by or on behalf of passen-
gers against air carriers relating to deep vein thrombosis
("DVT"). 9 54 DVT is a medical condition that occurs when a
thrombus (i.e., a blood clot) forms in a deep vein, usually in the
extremities of the leg.95 5 DVT can result in serious injury or
death if the thrombus breaks off and lodges in the brain, lungs,
or heart, which could cause a heart attack, stroke, or other
debilitating effects.9 56 Although plaintiffs generally have been
unsuccessful in persuading courts to find any liability on the
949 Id. Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the Article 22 limits
of liability "shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result; provided
that.., he was acting within the scope of his employment." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 564, art. 25.
950 Nipponkoa, 2007 WL 2410292, at *6.
951 Id.
952 Id. at *7.
953 Id. at *8.
954 See, e.g., In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-1606 VRW, 2007 WL
3010564 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).




part of air carriers relating to these claims, plaintiffs have
avoided dismissal of their claims in specific factual situations.
A. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
In 2004, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation central-
ized pre-trial proceedings for all cases brought in the United
States by Plaintiffs who allegedly suffered, or sued, on behalf of
an individual who allegedly suffered from a DVT related injury
during or after domestic or international travel onboard com-
mercial aircraft.95 7 All of the transferred cases were assigned to
Chief Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of Califor-
nia (San Francisco).9 58 To date, a majority of these DVT cases
have been dismissed. 59  In February 2005, Judge Walker
granted summary judgment in seventeen cases in favor of Boe-
ing, the manufacturer of the aircraft in question. 96 °
1. Domestic Flight
a. Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines
In Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines,96 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit addressed negligence claims against various
airlines alleging that they had failed to warn passengers about
the risk of developing DVT, and failed to inform passengers
about steps they could have taken during the flights to mitigate
any risk of DVT.962 Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged that the air-
lines provided an unsafe seating configuration by limiting each
passenger's legroom.963
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
had dismissed all claims against the Defendant airlines includ-
ing domestic flights (the "non-Warsaw cases") on the ground of
federal preemption.964 Fourteen plaintiffs appealed the district




960 Id. (citing In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1071
(N.D. Cal. 2005)).
961 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
962 Id. at 469.
963 Id.
964 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-1606 VRW, 2005 WL 591241, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005).
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preempted by the Federal Aviation Act, and the unsafe-seating-
configuration claims were expressly preempted by the ADA.965
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling with re-
spect to failure to warn, following the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,96 6 which found that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act preempted the field of aviation safety.9 67 The
Ninth Circuit began its preemption analysis by noting that Con-
gress may preempt state law expressly, or preemption may be
implied where: (1) "a state law actually conflicts with federal law
or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in
enacting the federal law" ("conflict preemption"); or (2) federal
regulation of a legislative field is so comprehensive that it indi-
cates Congress's intention that the States be precluded from leg-
islating in the same field ("field preemption").968
While the breadth of a statute alone is normally insufficient to
support a finding of field preemption, the Ninth Circuit noted
that it also may consider regulations passed pursuant to the stat-
ute in determining Congressional intent "unless it appears from
the underlying statute or its legislative history that Congress
would not have sanctioned the preemption." '96 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the legislative history and language of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act "illustrates Congress' intent to make the
Federal Aviation Administration the sole arbiter of air safety. 970
In turn, the Administration's regulations not only established a
general standard of care for aircraft operators, but also specifi-
cally addressed warnings and instructions that passengers must
be given in particular situations.9 71 Reading the regulations in
conjunction with the Federal Aviation Act itself led the court to
its holding that "federal law occupies the entire field of aviation
safety. '972 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that Plaintiffs'
failure-to-warn claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation
Act and affirmed the district court's holding that "because there
is no federal requirement that airlines warn passengers about
965 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 467-68.
966 Id. at 473 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir.
1999)).
967 Id.
968 Id. at 470.
969 Id. at 470-71.
970 Id. at 472.
971 Id.
972 Id. at 473.
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the risk of developing DVT, Plaintiffs' negligence claim fails as a
matter of law. 973
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court's finding that the unsafe seating configuration claims
were preempted by the ADA.974 The Ninth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's findings in Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,975 and American Airlines v. Wolens,97 6 "that only those state
laws that have a significant effect on prices are preempted by the
ADA. '9 77 Because Defendants had not produced any evidence
on the issue, nor had Plaintiffs conceded that the changes to the
seating configuration would materially affect the price of airline
tickets, the Ninth Circuit found that "[w] ithout more factual de-
velopment, we cannot determine whether the preemptive reach
of Morales extends as far as the seating configuration issue
presented in this case," and accordingly reversed and remanded
the case for further factual development of the record.7 8
2. International Flight
Many of the approximately fifty cases involving DVT related
injuries arising out of international flights (the "Warsaw cases")
have been dismissed.9 79 In August 2006, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California granted summary judg-
ment in thirty-seven Warsaw cases in which the Article 17 "acci-
dent" alleged was either "the onset of DVT or the absence or
insufficiency of a warning regarding DVT or policy level deci-
sions regarding the same."980 The following addresses several of
the cases that remained.
973 Id. at 474.
974 Id. at 476.
975 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
976 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
977 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 475.
978 Id. at 475-76.
979 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-1606 VRW, 2007 WL 3010564, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
980 Id. (quoting In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. MDL 04-1606 VRW,
2006 WL 2547459, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006)).
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a. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation: Halterman v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., Qantas Airways, Ltd. and Skywest,
Inc.
In Halterman v. Qantas Airways,981 the district court addressed
whether a DVT allegedly resulting from, inter alia, an unplanned
layover and "prolonged sitting" could constitute an Article 17
"accident" under the Warsaw Convention.98 2 Plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging causes of action for failure to warn983 and
personal injury under Article 1 7.84 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged
that the DVT was caused by several conditions on the aircraft,
including cramped seating, layover, dehydration, and being
"rendered immobile as the result of sleeping passengers, the
'fasten safety belt' sign and the flight attendants' service of in-
flight meals. 98 5
Defendant Qantas moved for summary judgment, arguing
that Plaintiff had failed to produce any support for his allega-
tion that he developed DVT as a result of an "accident" within
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 9 6 In op-
position, Plaintiff argued that three events were "unusual or un-
expected and external to him" and caused his DVT: (1) "delay
as the result of the stopover in Sydney;" (2) "atypical turbulence
which ... forced him to stay seated;" and (3) "inadequate pres-
surization or inadequate oxygen supply. '9 87 The district court
concluded that Plaintiffs allegation that there "might have been
inadequate pressurization or inadequate oxygen supply because
he felt that the air was stuff[y]" was insufficient to overcome
summary judgment. 8 ' The district court found that this allega-
tion was contrary to Plaintiffs deposition testimony where he
admitted he had "no reason to believe that there was irregular
altitude [or] inadequate air circulation . . .on the flight. '" 98 9
981 Id. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to Halterman reference the
court's Oct. 12, 2007 amended order, which clarified the court's previous opin-
ion on certain issues. Id. The court's original opinion in Halterman is located at:
In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig. (Halterman v. Qantas Airways), No. 04-3953,
2007 WL 2029326 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2007).
982 See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3010564, at *8, *10.
983 Plaintiff's failure to warn claim previously was rejected by the court. Id. at
*2.
984 See id.
985 See id. at *2, *4.
986 See id. at *1, *4.
987 Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
988 Id. at *10.
989 Id.
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The district court stated that an unplanned layover could be a
link in the chain of causation, but that there was no evidence
that the layover here actually caused Plaintiff's injury.99 ° Finally,
the district court noted that "the facts cast significant doubt" on
Plaintiff's allegation that atypical turbulence during the flight
caused his DVT because it forced him to remain seated.99'
Plaintiff testified that the turbulence "lasted only 20 to 30 min-
utes and that he did get up when he was able to do so. ''992 In its
initial opinion, issued on July 10, 2007, the Halterman court
granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment after apply-
ing the holding of the district court in Margrave v. British Air-
ways,993 and stated that "having to sit for long periods of times
[sic] does not qualify as a Warsaw 'accident.'- 994 However, on
October 12, 2007, the Halterman court issued an amended order
in which this language was deleted, but the overall conclusion
was not disturbed: Defendant Qantas' motion for summary judg-
ment was still granted.995
b. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation:
On October 12, 2007, Judge Walker issued a decision address-
ing the summary judgment motions of the air- carriers in the
following Warsaw cases: Dabulis v. Singapore Airlines, Inc., Braha v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., Rietschel v. U.S. Airways, Inc., and Bianchetti v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.."'
i. Dabulis v. Singapore Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff was on an international flight from Singapore to New
York, via Frankfurt, Germany. 997 Plaintiff was assigned to a "mid-
dle seat" on the flight, which she alleged had a metal bar di-
990 Id. at *8.
991 Id. at *9-*10.
992 Id. at *10.
-3 See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-3953, 2007 WL 2029326, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 2007) (quoting Margrave v. British Airways, 643 F. Supp.
510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[E]xtended sitting in an airplane, even in an uncom-
fortable position, cannot properly be characterized as the sort of 'accident' that
triggers an airline's liability under the Warsaw Convention.")).
994 Id.
995 Compare In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3010564, at *10, *12, with
In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 2029326, at *10, *13.
996 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-1606 VRW, 2007 WL 3027351, at
*1-*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
-7 Id. at *4.
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rectly in front of her feet that restricted her leg room."'
Plaintiff further alleged that she began experiencing pain in her
left leg during the flight, which she blamed on her inability to
adequately stretch her legs.999 She asked a member of the flight
crew to be moved to another seat, but was told that none were
available.'0 00 Later, another member of the flight crew in-
formed Plaintiff that there was another seat available but that it
did not recline, so Plaintiff chose to remain in her assigned
seat.100 In fact, however, it was learned during discovery that
other seats had been available on the flight?00 2 After the flight,
her symptoms continued and she went to the hospital where she
was diagnosed with DVT. °°8
Defendant Singapore Airlines moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that the alleged failure to reseat Plaintiff did not
qualify as an "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion or, alternatively, that Plaintiff's DVT was not caused by the
Defendant's failure to reseat her. 10 4 The district court relied
primarily on two cases, Husain v. Olympic Airways,10 0 5 and McCas-
key v. Continental Airlines, Inc., °°6 in analyzing Defendant's mo-
tion. 100 7 In Husain, the district court found that a flight
attendant's refusal to reseat a passenger away from the smoking
section, even though he was allergic to cigarette smoke, consti-
tuted an Article 17 "accident."' 00 8 In McCaskey, the district court
"denied an airlines' motion for summary judgment finding gen-
uine issues of material fact whether alleged rude behavior of air-
line staff, failure to divert the plane after a passenger suffered a
stroke or improper training of flight crew for handling medical
emergencies constituted an 'accident." ' 100 9 In Dabulis, the dis-
trict court denied Singapore's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that "a reasonable jury could find" that the flight
998 Id.
999 See id. at *4-*5.




1004 See id. at *2, *5.
1005 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
1006 159 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
1007 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3027351, at *6.
1008 Id. (citing Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1134 (N.D.
Cal. 2000)).
1009 Id. (citing McCaskey, 159 F. Supp. at 574).
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crew member's refusal to reseat Plaintiff constituted an Article
17 "accident" that caused her DVT. 01 0
ii. Braha v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff Gilberto Braha commenced an action on behalf of
himself and his deceased wife, who died several days after travel-
ing on an international flight from New York to Rome. °11
Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that his wife experienced an abnor-
mal degree of turbulence on the flight, irregular altitude, inade-
quate air circulation and oxygenation, cramped seating, and
that these conditions constituted an "accident" under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention. 10 12
Defendant Delta Airlines moved for summary judgment on
the ground that Plaintiff failed to submit virtually any evidence
that the alleged conditions constituted an "accident" under Arti-
cle 17, and the district court agreed." 3 Additionally, the dis-
trict court noted that even if Plaintiff had succeeded in
establishing that an "accident" had occurred, there was no evi-
dence that his wife's death was actually caused by DVT, or that
she suffered from DVT during or after the flight.01 4 The dis-
trict court thereby granted Delta's motion for summary judg-
ment finding that Plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to support his claims.'0 15
iii. Rietschel v. U.S. Airways, Inc.
In Rietschel v. U.S. Airways, Inc., the district court clarified its
ruling in Halterman v. Qantas Airways,' °16 where it stated that
"having to sit for long periods of times [sic] does not qualify as a
Warsaw 'accident.'"10 7 In Rietschel, Plaintiff traveled from San
Francisco to Frankfurt via Philadelphia, and developed DVT af-
ter arriving in Germany.' 0' 8 The flight from Philadelphia to
Frankfurt was grounded for two hours before take-off due to
bad weather, during which the passengers allegedly were told to
1010 Id. at *8.
1011 Id.
1012 Id. at *10.
1013 Id.
1014 Id. at *12.
1015 Id. at *13.
1016 See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-3953, 2007 WL 2029326
(N.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 2007).
1017 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3027351, at *16 (quoting In re
Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig, 2007 WL 2029326, at *10).
1018 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3027351, at *13.
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stay seated without being offered drinks.1 1 9 While the district
court concluded that bad weather conditions or prolonged sit-
ting alone should not be considered "an unusual or unexpected
event," it stated that a reasonable jury could find that the events
surrounding the delay and sitting, specifically the alleged two-
hour confinement without the service of drinks, were unusual
and unexpected constituting an "accident.
1 20
The district court noted that there are differences between:
(1) "prolonged sitting that includes periods of mobility;" (2)
"prolonged sitting that precludes any mobility due to safety risks
such as turbulence or bomb threats;" and (3) "prolonged sitting
... for no apparent reason."'10 2' The district court stated that
while the first two are not "unusual and unexpected" and, thus,
would not be considered an Article 17 "accident:" "[w]holesale
preclusion of recovery for injuries arising from cases in the third
category would give airlines carte blanche to force passengers to
remain seated without reason. This is untenable, and the court
does not read those cases that address prolonged sitting to go so
far." 10 2 2
In so ruling, the district court indicated that it would amend
its opinion in Halterman,10 23 where it stated that prolonged sit-
ting "does not qualify" as an Article 17 "accident." 1024 Instead,
the district court offered the following clarification: "Forced
prolonged sitting may qualify as an accident depending on the
surrounding circumstances. But prolonged sitting does not be-
come an accident simply because it is a 'link in the chain' of
causation. This impermissibly conflates the accident inquiry
with the causation inquiry. ' 10 25 The district court thereby de-
nied Defendant's motion for summary judgment.10 26
1019 Id.
1020 See id. at *15-*16.
1021 Id. at *16.
1022 Id. (citing Margrave v. British Airways, 643 F. Supp. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Scherer v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 387 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (App. Div.
1976); Toteja v. British Airways, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17374 (D. Md. 1999)).
1023 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-3953, 2007 WL 2029326 (N.D.
Cal. Jul. 10, 2007).
1024 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2007 WL 3027351, at *16.
1025 Id.
1026 Id. at *17.
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iv. Bianchetti v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
In Bianchetti v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,'10 27 Plaintiffs brought an ac-
tion on behalf of a passenger who died after falling ill while fly-
ing from London to Atlanta. 10 28 During the flight, the decedent
experienced abnormal breathing, and one of the assisting pas-
sengers thought the decedent had a blood clot in her legs. 1129
The Captain of the aircraft received an emergency clearing to
land in Atlanta.0 30 After the plane reached the gate, emergency
paramedics boarded and attempted to treat Ms. Bianchetti. 10 3 1
Plaintiffs alleged three potential Article 17 "accidents": Delta
Airlines' "alleged failures to (1) divert the plane [to the Cincin-
nati airport], (2) expedite care to [the decedent] upon landing
in Atlanta, and (3) ensure that appropriate personnel able to
provide the correct care met the flight.' 0 3 2 The district court
rejected Plaintiffs' claim relating to the alleged failure to divert,
finding that all the evidence indicated that continuing the flight
to Atlanta created the shortest possible flight time. 10 33
The district court, however, found that the alleged failure to
adequately respond to the decedent's illness could constitute an
Article 17 "accident."' 10 34 The district court noted that there
were several factual disputes regarding (1) whether the airline's
failure to warn the paramedics that the decedent was suffering
from DVT was an Article 17 "accident," or a causal factor in her
death; (2) whether there was a delay by the airline in facilitating
the paramedics' entry onboard following the landing; and (3)
when the paramedics boarded the plane. 10 35 Thus, the district
court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the air-
line's response to the decedent's condition constituted an Arti-
cle 17 "accident" that contributed to her death and denied
Defendant's motion for summary judgment."3 6




1030 Id. at *18.
1031 Id. at *19.
1032 Id.
1033 Id. at *20.
1034 Id. at *20-*22.
1035 Id. at *20-*21.
1036 Id. at *22-*23.
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c. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation: Vincent v.
American Airlines, Inc.
In Vincent v. American Airlines. Inc., °3 7 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California addressed Plaintiff's
claim that she developed DVT while traveling on Defendant
American Airlines' flights from Madrid, Spain to Freeport, Ba-
hamas, via Miami, Florida.10 38 Although Plaintiff's failure to
warn claims previously had been dismissed, her allegation that
an event or accident onboard her flight caused her to develop
DVT remained. 0 39 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that
after beginning to suffer pain and a swollen calf on her left leg
during the first part of her flight, she was provided a seat on the
second part of her flight that did not permit movement of her
injured left leg, and that her request to change seats was denied
by Defendant's flight attendant. 1040
Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that there
was no unusual or unexpected event external to Plaintiff on her
flights and, therefore, no Article 17 "accident."' 4' Plaintiff did
not make any substantive arguments in her opposition to Defen-
dant's motion, but rather, merely stated that she needed addi-
tional discovery in order to respond.1 0 42 In analyzing whether a
denial of reseating for medical reasons could constitute an "acci-
dent," the district court cited to Husain v. Olympic Airways,'0 4 3
where the district court held that a flight attendant's refusal to
re-seat an allergic passenger away from the smoking section con-
stituted an "accident" because it was in "'blatant disregard of in-
dustry standards and airline policies,' and therefore
'unexpected or unusual.' '"1044 Relying on Husain, the Vincent
court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, find-
ing that there were facts in dispute relating to the denial of
Plaintiffs reseating request. 10 4 5 However, the district court's de-
nial was without prejudice as it further found that additional fac-
1037 No. 04-1606 VRW, 2007 WL 3273553 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2007).
1038 Id. at *4.
1039 Id.
1040 Id. at *6.
1041 Id. at *2, *4.
1042 Id. at *5.
1043 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
1044 Vincent, 2007 WL 3273553, at *7 (citing Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F.




tual development was warranted, and therefore permitted
Plaintiff to pursue further discovery." 46
V. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA") 1047 protects foreign governments, as well as their agen-
cies, instrumentalities, and entities qualifying as an organ of a
state, from suit in the United States. 10 48 However, foreign gov-
ernments can be sued if an exception applies.10 4 9 The excep-
tions all relate to the nature of the conduct for which the
sovereign is being sued. 1050 A foreign government can be sued
for its commercial acts, such as the buying or selling of products
or services in the United States, or use in connection with mili-
tary activity. 0 51 The FSIA also excludes acts of terrorism and
torture from immunity if committed by "an official, employee,
or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency.' 0 52 A foreign govern-
ment may also waive its sovereign immunity to suit in the United
States "either explicitly or by implication.' 1 53
A. VIVAs V. BOEING Co.
In Vivas v. Boeing Co.,' 0 54 the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois addressed whether Transporte Aereos Na-
cional de Selva, S.A. ("TANS"), a Peruvian airline, could be
subject to lawsuit in the United States. 10 55 Vivas involved tort
cases arising out of the crash of an aircraft in Peru that was oper-
ated by TANS. 1 56 Plaintiffs filed seven different complaints in
the Circuit Court of Cook County against Defendants Boeing,
United Technology Corporation, and TANS. 1 7
TANS filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it was immune
from jurisdiction in the courts of the United States under the
1046 Id.
1047 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
1048 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 (2000).
1049 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
1050 Id.
1051 Id.
1052 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for
FiscalYear 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(b) (1) (A) (iii), 122 Stat. 341 (2008).
1053 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1).
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FSIA."°58 The FSIA protects foreign governments, as well as
their agencies, instrumentalities, and entities qualifying as an or-
gan of a state, from suit in the United States.1°5' However, for-
eign governments can be sued if the plaintiff proves that an
exception applies." 60
FSIA § 1603 defines "foreign state" as including "a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state. 10
61
"[A] gency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.0 6
2
The district court noted that TANS was created as the state
carrier of Peru pursuant to a Peruvian Supreme decree in
1963.1063 TANS provided access to remote areas of Peru, served
as the presidential aircraft fleet, and transported Peruvian
troops as needed. 10 64 All TANS' pilots also were required to be
active duty Peruvian Air Force personnel.10 65 In 1999, the Peru-
vian government ordered all government entities holding shares
in any companies on behalf of the Peruvian government to
transfer them to an entity called FONAFE, which was charged
with owning and managing all state owned enterprises. 10 66
FONAFE, therefore, owned 100% of the shares of TANS.'067
FONAFE appointed the TANS General Manager, and received
all of TANS profits which it, in turn, transferred to the Peruvian
Treasury. 6" If TANS failed to generate sufficient revenue to
operate, funds were provided by the state.
10 61
1058 Id. The district court previously had granted Plaintiffs' motion to remand
for lack of federal question and diversity jurisdiction in the actions where TANS
was not a Defendant. Id. The district court retained the actions where TANS was
a Defendant to consider TANS' motion to dismiss. Id.
1059 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 (2000).
1060 Id.
1061 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
1062 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).









It was undisputed that TANS was neither a foreign state nor a
political subdivision of Peru. 1 70 Therefore, TANS could qualify
as a "foreign state" only if it was deemed an "agency or instru-
mentality" of a foreign state under § 1603(b).10 71
In addressing TANS' motion, the district court examined the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dole Food Co. v. Patrick-
son.10 72 In Dole, the Supreme Court found that a "corporation is
an instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA only if the
foreign state itself owns a majority of the corporation's
shares."'1 73 However, where the issue is whether the company
could nevertheless qualify as an "agency or instrumentality"
under the "organ-prong" of § 1603(b), there is no clear test and
a court may therefore consider a number of factors relating to
the creation, structure, and operation of the entity. 1074
The Vivas court then addressed whether TANS was an organ
of the State of Peru. 0 75 The circumstances of TANS' creation
and termination a0 7 6 weighed heavily in favor of TANS being con-
sidered an organ of the State of Peru.10 7  The district court
noted that TANS' role was similar to that of Air Force One of
the United States. 1°0 7  Additionally, TANS served the govern-
ment's public purpose of transporting military personnel
around the country, had little or no operational or financial au-
tonomy, took orders directly from the Peruvian Government
through FONAFE, and was financially inseparable from the Pe-
ruvian Government. 10 79
Although the district court also noted that TANS could con-
tract in its own name, had agreed to be subject to all applicable
laws with respect to its contractual obligations, and had agreed
that it would not assert governmental immunity as a defense to
its contractual obligations, the district court concluded that
TANS had made a prima facie showing that it was an "organ" of
the Peruvian state for purposes of the FSIA, and thereby an
1070 Id. at *3.
1071 Id.
1072 Id. (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003)).
1073 Id. (quoting Dole, 538 U.S. at 477).
1074 Id. at *4.
1075 Id. at *5.
1076 TANS was liquidated by means of a supreme decree on July 15, 2006. Id. at
*2,
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"agency or instrumentality" for the purposes of § 1603(b).1 08 0
Because TANS had satisfied the requirements of § 1603(b) and
Plaintiffs failed to prove that TANS was not entitled to immu-
nity, the court held that TANS was immune from its jurisdiction,
as well as from the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and terminated the case.10""
B. COLELLA V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
In Colella v. Republic of Argentina,a10 2 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted Defendant Argen-
tina's motion for declaratory relief, finding that a foreign na-
tion's presidential aircraft was immune from execution of a
judgment that had been entered against the nation. 10 83 Defen-
dant Argentina had sought a ruling on whether bringing the
aircraft to the United States for service and maintenance fit
within the "used for commercial activity" exception under the
FSIA.1084 The district court found that the aircraft was employed
strictly for transporting the nation's president in his official,
rather than personal capacity, which it determined was a non-
commercial purpose.108 5 The district court stated that "[iit is
plain that servicing and maintenance must be performed on the
airplane for it to execute its sovereign functions safely. But such
acts do not transform the 'use' of the plane into a commercial
one."1 086 Moreover, because the aircraft carried the nation's
commander-in-chief and was maintained and operated by mili-
tary personnel, the aircraft was immune from execution of the
judgment because it fell within FSIA's definition of "military
property."'18 The court thereby granted Defendant Argentina's
motion, holding that the subject aircraft was immune from
execution. 1088
1080 Id. The Court cited Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d
989 (D. Minn. 2004), in which it was found that CSA, which had been continu-
ously owned and operated by the Government of the Czech Republic, and which
was 91% indirectly owned by the Government, qualified as an "organ" of the
state. Id.
1081 Id. at *6-*7.
1082 No. C 07-80084 WHA, 2007 WL 1545204 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
1088 Id. at *1.
1084 Id. at *4.
1085 Id. at *6
1086 Id. at *7.
1087 Id.
1088 Id. at *8.
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C. GUPTA v. THAI AIRWAYS INTERNATIONAL, LTD.
In Gupta v. Thai Airways International, Ltd.,18 9 Thai Airways ap-
pealed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 90 Plaintiff had filed a complaint in California
Superior Court, alleging that Thai Airways' employees improp-
erly refused to allow him to board an aircraft for a flight from
Bangkok to Los Angeles, and "subjected him to unwarranted ac-
cusations of fraud."109  He claimed that, because he was unable
to fly to Los Angeles, he missed a "lucrative business meet-
ing. ''1 °0 2 The airline successfully moved to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction with the court finding that
Thai Airways was a "foreign state" under the FSIA and that Plain-
tiff had failed to allege that any exception applied. 1°93
Thereafter, rather than appealing the state court order, Plain-
tiff filed a complaint in federal district court alleging the same
causes of action.0 94 Defendant Thai Airways moved to dismiss
under, inter alia, Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure arguing that "the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and
immunity under the FSIA was res judicata by virtue of the state
court's prior determination of these issues." 10 95 The district
court denied Defendant's motion and Defendant thereafter ap-
pealed.109 6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the California state court order of dismissal was final
and because it had not been appealed, the decision had a
preclusive effect in federal court.109 7 The Ninth Circuit noted
that Plaintiff had had a "full and fair opportunity" to establish
jurisdiction, and having failed to do so, " [h] e does not now get a
do-over."1098 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, reversed the district
court judgment and remanded the case with instructions to va-
cate the order and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 0 99
1089 487 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2007).
1090 Id. at 760.
1091 Id. at 761.
1092 Id.
1093 Id. at 767.
1-4 Id. at 762.
1095 Id.
1096 See id. at 763.
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D. BOEING Co. v. EGYPTAIR
In Boeing Co. v. EgyptAir,"1° the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit discussed whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion over an Egyptian government-owned insurance company
acting as subrogee for the carrier."" The appeal related to the
crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 near Nantucket Island, Massachu-
setts, on October 31, 1999.1102
Plaintiff Boeing commenced a declaratory judgment action
within the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York against Defendants EgyptAir and Misr Insurance,
EgyptAir's insurer, which was wholly owned by the government
of Egypt, and Misr's reinsurers. 1°3 Prior to the commencement
of Boeing's action, Misr had commenced a subrogation action
against Boeing in an Egyptian court." 4 In Nantucket Island,
Boeing sought a declaratory judgment that EgyptAir, Misr, and
Misr's reinsurers were barred by contract from recovering dam-
ages from Boeing relating to the crash of the subject flight or,
alternatively, that EgyptAir was liable to Boeing for the subroga-
tion damages. 105 Defendant Misr moved to dismiss Boeing's ac-
tion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and
for lack of "minimum contacts" necessary for the district court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over Misr." 6 Defendant Misr
also later moved to dismiss under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.' 107
The district court denied Misr's motions to dismiss.' 108 Defen-
dant Misr pursued an interlocutory appeal of the district court's
denial of its motions to dismiss."" The Second Circuit ad-
dressed Misr's arguments relating to the FSIA and lack of per-
1100 No. 05-5986-CV, 2007 WL 1315716 (2d Cir. May 7, 2007).
1101 See id. at *1-'2.
1102 The appellate court indicated that they assumed "the parties' familiarity
with the facts and procedural history of the case," and cited to the district court
opinion rather than reciting the facts and procedural history. Id. at *1 (citing In
reAir Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., on Oct. 31, 1999, 392 F. Supp. 2d 461
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Nantucket Island]).
1103 Nantucket Island, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65.









sonal jurisdiction, but declined to review the district court's
decision regarding the Declaratory Judgment Act.1'1
With respect to Plaintiff's argument relating to the FSIA, the
Second Circuit noted that Misr had named Boeing as an addi-
tional insured under EgyptAir's hull and liability insurance pol-
icy, which was central to Boeing's claim for declaratory relief
because Boeing asserted that its status as a named insured pre-
cluded Misr from recovering from Boeing the damages it had
paid relating to the Flight 990 crash."" Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit found that there was a "'significant nexus' between Boe-
ing's claims and Misr's commercial activity" and, as such, the
district court had properly relied upon the commercial activity
exception under the FSIA.11 12
Further, because Misr had no rights against Boeing that were
not based on its subrogee-subrogor relationship with EgyptAir, a
relationship that was created by the subject insurance policy and
was limited by EgyptAir's contracts with Boeing, Boeing's claims
against Misr were determined to be "'based upon' the insurance
policy."'" Accordingly, the district court properly denied
Misr's motion with respect to its claim of sovereign
immunity.' 114
The Second Circuit then rejected Plaintiff's argument that
there were insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal
jurisdiction.1 1 5 The Second Circuit found that there were suffi-
cient minimum contacts because: (1) "Boeing's claims [arose]
out of Misr's contact with the United States;" (2) Misr purpose-
fully conducted commercial activity within the United States by
naming Boeing as an additional insured on EgyptAir's policies
1110 Id. at *1-*2. The Second Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review
the appeal relating to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
based upon the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Id. at *1.
It also exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction relating to the issue of lack of
personal jurisdiction because the issues relating to minimum contacts for per-
sonal jurisdiction purposes and commercial contacts for FSIA purposes were "in-
extricably intertwined." Id. at *2. However, the Second Circuit declined to
review the district court's decision as it related to the Declaratory Judgment Act
because the issues relating to jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act
and FSIA immunity were not sufficiently "intertwined." Id. Accordingly, the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed the appeal of the FSIA and personal jurisdiction issues, but
dismissed the appeal relating to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at *3.
1111 Id. at *1.
1112 Id.
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and insuring its flights to and from the United States; and (3)
Boeing is a U.S. corporation and, thus, the "United States [had]
a substantial interest in adjudicating this dispute ... and two of
the agreements central to Boeing's claims are governed by, and
. . . require[d] application of, U.S. law."1116 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant
Misr's motion to dismiss relating to lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction. 1117
VI. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION
ACT OF 1994
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 ("GARA")1118
established a "statute of repose to protect general aviation man-
ufacturers from long-term liability in those instances where a
particular aircraft has been in operation for a considerable
number of years."'1119 Subject to certain exceptions set forth be-
low, GARA protects manufacturers of general aviation aircraft,
and manufacturers of any new component, system, subassembly,
or other part of the aircraft.' 120 The statute of repose period is
eighteen years beginning on the date of delivery of the aircraft
or component part to its first purchaser, lessee, or to a person
engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft.1 1 2 1
GARA also provides for a "rolling" statute of repose that begins
to run from the date of completion of replacement or addition
of a component that causes an accident. 1 22 The new eighteen-
year time period is triggered by the replacement of a compo-
nent and applies "only to the entity that manufactured the re-
placement part," not to the manufacturer of the aircraft, "for a
part installed subsequent to delivery in the event of a crash at-
tributable to a structural defect or similar flaw in a new compo-
nent part."' 23
There are limited exceptions to the application of GARA.
Those exceptions are: (1) where "the claimant pleads with speci-
1116 Id.
1117 Id. at *3.
1118 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
1119 Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Cal.
1996).
1120 See 49 U.S.C § 40101(2) (a).
1121 Id. at §§ 40101 (2)(a), (3)(3).
1122 Id. at § 40101 (2) (a) (2).
1123 Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 209 (Ct. App.




ficity the facts necessary to prove.., that the manufacturer...
knowingly misrepresented . . . or concealed or withheld from
the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), required informa-
tion that is material and relevant" to the maintenance or opera-
tion of the aircraft or component part, and that such
misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding caused the ac-
cident; (2) where the claim is being made for a person who was
a passenger for the "purposes of receiving treatment for a medi-
cal or other emergency" (e.g., a medical evacuation by helicop-
ter from the scene of an automobile accident); (3) where the
injured person "was not onboard the aircraft at the time of the
accident" (e.g., an individual on the ground who was hit by the
aircraft or debris); and (4) where the action is "brought under a
written warranty enforceable under law but for the operation of
[GARA] ."1124
A. PRIDGEN V. PARKER HANNIFIN CORP.
The language of the GARA statute does not provide a defini-
tion of "manufacturer." However, courts have recently ad-
dressed whether the definition of "manufacturer" extends
beyond the entity that manufactured the aircraft or component
part to other successor entities that take over manufacturing du-
ties for the original manufacturer by obtaining an FAA type
certificate.1 125
In Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,1126 Plaintiffs brought prod-
uct liability claims against the original aircraft engine manufac-
turer where more than eighteen years had elapsed between the
date of engine installation and the date of the accident. 1127 To
avoid GARA's statute of repose, Plaintiffs argued that the period
of exposure had begun anew for Textron Inc., the engine manu-
facturer, when defective replacement parts were added to the
engine within eighteen years of the accident, despite the fact
that these parts were not actually supplied by Textron.11 2
1124 49 U.S.C § 40101(2) (b).
1125 A Type Certificate represents FAA approval of a basic aircraft design and is
issued to a manufacturer who intends to produce a new type of aircraft. See gener-
ally 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11-21.55 (2006). A Type Certificate indicates that the aircraft
design comports with minimum safety standards. Id. To obtain a Type Certifi-
cate, the applicant must submit designs, drawings, test reports, and computations
necessary to show that the aircraft meets FAA regulations. Id.
1126 905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006).
1127 Id. at 425.
1128 Id.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed whether GARA's
rolling provision removed a manufacturer from the protection
of the statute of repose merely due to its status as the original
manufacturer of the aircraft engine. 129 The Court of Common
Pleas drew a distinction between liability asserted against a man-
ufacturer "in its capacity as manufacturer," which would be pro-
tected by GARA's repose period, and liability asserted in its
capacity as a designer or type certificate holder, which the Court
of Common Pleas believed would not be subject to GARA. 1" 30
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that a
type certificate holder qualified as a "manufacturer" for pur-
poses of GARA because the duties and responsibilities arising
out of the type certification process should logically be consid-
ered to be asserted against the manufacturer "in its capacity as a
manufacturer" under GARA. 13'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further found, however,
that status as a type certificate holder in and of itself would not
be sufficient to implicate GARA's rolling provision where a de-
fendant did not actually manufacture the relevant replacement
part."13 2 The Supreme Court explained that GARA's rolling
provision only applies to the entity that manufactured or sup-
plied the replacement part, and that GARA's rolling provision is
not triggered by the status of original aircraft manufacturer,
type certificate holder, or designer alone."" Therefore, the
original engine manufacturer was protected by the original
eighteen-year period of repose from the initial sale date, and the
replacement part manufacturer was subject to the rolling provi-
sion that began the eighteen-year period anew when the new
component was installed.' 1 34
B. HASLER AvIATION, L.L.C. v. AIRCENTER, INC.
In Hasler Aviation, L.L.C. v. Aircenter, Inc.," 5 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee addressed whether a
type certificate holder is a "manufacturer" for purposes of
GARA. In this case, Plaintiff Hasler Aviation purchased a 1962
Aero Commander Model 500A from Aircenter, Inc. which in-
1129 Id. at 434-35.
1130 Id. at 434.
1131 Id. at 435.
1132 Id. at 436.
1133 Id.
1134 Id. at 437.
1135 No. 1:06-CV-180, 2007 WL 2263171 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2007).
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cluded an upgrade package quoted by Aircenter and its proprie-
tor, Gary Gadberry.' 136 After the aircraft was delivered in
December 2004, "Plaintiff noticed, and Gadberry admitted, the
aircraft was defective and was not airworthy."'1 37 One of the
chief defects related to wing spar corrosion. 1138 Though Plain-
tiff suffered no personal injury or property damage, it paid over
$250,000 for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly."139 Plaintiff sued
Aircenter, Gadberry, and their related entities for alleged
breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud and negligent mis-
representation, and violation of the state consumer protection
law. 1140
Plaintiff also sued Twin Commander, the airplane manufac-
turer, as the "type certificate holder" for the aircraft. 1 41 Plain-
tiff claimed that "Twin Commander knew its Model 500A
aircraft had issues with wing spar corrosion and Twin Com-
mander was negligent per se in failing to notify the FAA or issue a
'Service Bulletin' '11 42 relating to the corrosion problems.'1 43
Twin Commander filed a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, arguing that the economic loss doctrine precluded Plain-
tiffs' product liability claim because it suffered no personal
injury or damage to property. 1144
In deciding Twin Commander's motion, the district court ad-
dressed whether a type certificate holder also must be a manu-
facturer.1 145 Plaintiff asserted that Twin Commander had a duty
to inform it that the aircraft was not airworthy based on its status
as the aircraft's type certificate holder, rather than its duty as a
manufacturer.1 46 In considering this assertion, the district
court reviewed the GARA cases that had addressed the question
of when a successor corporation is defined as an aircraft's manu-
facturer, including Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp.," 47 Burroughs






1142 A Service Bulletin contains a recommendation from a manufacturer which
it believes the aircraft owner should comply with and generally concerns a safety
of flight issue requiring inspection, component replacement, or maintenance.
1143 Hasler Aviation, 2007 WL 2263171, at *1.
1144 Id. at *2.
1145 Id. at *3.
1146 Id.
1147 905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006).
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v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,"148 Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp.,a 149
and Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 150 The district court noted that
those courts had concluded that the holder of a type certificate
is deemed to be the manufacturer as well. 115 1 It agreed with this
conclusion, stating:
Therefore, this Court agrees with the reasoning of the above
cases: the FAA grants a type certificate to the manufacturer, and
any action against a type certificate holder is really against the
manufacturer. The existence of supplemental type certificates,
which may be obtained by those who are not the original manu-
facturers/type certificate holders in order to build upon a prior
design, and the fact a type certificate may be licensed to another
producer, support this and other courts' interpretation of the
FAA regulations.1 52
The district court ultimately granted Twin Commander's mo-
tion on the ground that, because Plaintiff's complaint was
brought against Twin Commander as a manufacturer, the eco-
nomic loss doctrine barred any recovery since the Plaintiff suf-
fered neither injury nor property damage."15
C. ZAiHORA V. PRECISION AIRMOTIVE CORP.
In Zahora v. Precision Airmotive Corp.," 5 4 the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania discussed GARA in the
context of federal question jurisdiction." 55 Defendants, an air-
craft engine maker and an aircraft repair company, removed the
suit to federal court when Plaintiffs filed state law claims in
Pennsylvania state court." 56 In determining whether the case
was properly before it, the district court considered whether fed-
eral regulation of aviation safety preempts state law in such a
way that it creates a federal question to confer federal jurisdic-
tion as set forth by the Supreme Court in Grable & Sons Metal
Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing."57
In Grable, the Supreme Court held that a state law claim could
contain a federal question of sufficient importance to conferju-
1148 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Ct. App. 2000).
1149 653 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa 2002).
1150 No. Civ. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
1151 Hasler Aviation, 2007 WL 2263171, at *3-*4.
1152 Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
1153 Id. at *7.
1154 No. 06-CV-3520, 2007 WL 765024 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2007).
1155 Id. at *1.
1156 Id.
1157 545 U.S. 308 (2005); Zahora, 2007 WL 765024, at *1.
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risdiction on a district court. 1158 Relying on Grable, Defendants
argued that federal jurisdiction was appropriate because Plain-
tiffs' claim that fuel injector defects rendered the aircraft en-
gines not airworthy implicated a significant federal interest.' 5 9
Specifically, Defendants argued that federal jurisdiction existed
because they would assert their compliance with FAA regula-
tions and GARA, a federal statute, as a defense."l 6 0
The district court, however, rejected Defendants' argument,
finding that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, which pro-
vides that jurisdiction conferring elements must exist in the
complaint, rather than the answer, Plaintiffs' claims did not pre-
sent a federal question.' 6 1 The district court noted that the
facts of Grable presented a "special and small category" of cases
involving a nearly pure issue of law, in sharp contrast to the fact-
bound inquiry that exists in aviation litigation."1 62 The district
court concluded that exercising jurisdiction over this matter
would risk a flood of state claims to federal court simply because
they contain embedded federal issues. 1163 Accordingly, the dis-
trict court remanded the case to state court." 64
D. ROBINSON V. HARTZELL PROPELLER INC.
Plaintiffs in recent years have been attempting to skirt GARA
by invoking the "knowing misrepresentation, or concealment,
or withholding" exception.'1 6' To take advantage of this excep-
tion, a plaintiff must demonstrate a "(1) knowing misrepresenta-
tion, or concealment, or withholding; (2) of required
information that is material and relevant; (3) that is causally re-
lated to the harm they suffered."' 1 66 Those defendant manufac-
turers moving for summary judgment will often face an uphill
battle in establishing that no issues of fact exist as to each of
these elements. Courts often will let these issues go to trial, even
where the defendant has developed considerable evidence in an
attempt to refute the plaintiffs allegations on these issues. For





1162 Id. at *2.
1163 Id.
1164 Id.
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Hartzell
Propeller Inc.'s motion for summary judgment where Plaintiffs
asserted GARA's "knowing misrepresentation or concealment or
withholding" exception. 167 The case arose out of a crash of a
Mooney M20E aircraft in which Plaintiffs were physically in-
jured. 168 Plaintiffs alleged that a blade of the aluminum propel-
ler on their aircraft fractured during the flight, causing the
crash. 1 169
The district court denied Hartzell's initial motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that there were genuine issues of mate-
rial fact as to several instances of "knowing misrepresentation or
concealment or withholding" by Hartzell." 7 ° According to the
district court, there were two instances of "knowing misrepresen-
tation" involving engineering reports that Hartzell submitted to
the FAA in its application for a type certificate for the accident
propeller. 7 ' Additionally, the district court found that Plain-
tiffs raised genuine issues of material fact on the issue of
whether Hartzell misrepresented results of vibration tests con-
ducted on the accident propeller, and whether it had knowingly
misrepresented the actual cause of propeller failures after
certification.1 1 72
After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
missed Hartzell's interlocutory appeal of the district court's
opinion,' 17' Hartzell renewed its motion for summary judg-
ment. 117  Hartzell presented additional evidence obtained in
subsequent discovery and argued that no issue of material fact
remained whether Hartzell misrepresented, concealed, or with-
held material information that caused the accident. 175 The ad-
ditional evidence presented by Hartzell included letters from
the FAA, affidavits from experts, and internal manufacturing
documents relating to tests performed on the accident propeller
and certification issues.' 176 In denying Hartzell's renewed mo-
tion, the district court reviewed the additional discovery and
1167 Id. at 635.
llS Id. at 636.
1169 Id.
1170 See id. at 631.
1171 See id. at 649-51.
1172 Id. at 649-50, 653-58.
1173 Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc., 454 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2006).
1174 Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc., No. 01-5240, 2007 WL 2007969, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 2007).
1175 Id. at *4.
116 See id. at *4-*7.
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concluded that the new evidence did not resolve any of the is-
sues it had previously identified, but rather raised additional
questions of fact." 77
E. COLGAN AIR, INC. V. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
Plaintiffs sometimes argue that manuals-often flight manu-
als-could be considered "part of the aircraft," thereby re-
starting GARA's rolling statute of repose if the manual itself was
replaced within eighteen years of an accident.' 178 While the de-
cision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. 1 79 does not address
GARA, it includes an important discussion about whether a
maintenance manual can be considered "part of the aircraft."
In Colgan, Plaintiff Colgan Air, Inc. sued Raytheon Aircraft Co.
after the aircraft that it leased from Raytheon's parent company
crashed, resulting in the death of the pilot and co-pilot. 180 Col-
gan claimed negligence, strict liability, and breach of express
and implied warranties.1 8 1 It alleged that several errors in the
maintenance manual for the aircraft caused the crash. 182
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had
found that all claims by Colgan against Raytheon were barred by
the Used Airliner Airplane Warranty executed by Colgan as part
of its lease of the aircraft.' 3 The district court proceeded on
the notion that defects in the maintenance manual existed and
concluded that the manual was "part of the Aircraft" and there-
fore was governed by the terms of the warranty agreement."8 4
Consequently, the district court found that, "Colgan had no war-
ranty rights against Raytheon except the ninety-day limited war-
1177 See id. at *7-*10.
1178 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155, 1156-57
(9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs alleged that helicopter flight manual was part of air-
craft for purposes of GARA and that manual, replaced within eighteen years of
accident, caused the accident); Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
2d 631, 662 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that overhaul manual
should be considered a "new part" for purposes of GARA); Carolina Indus.
Prods., Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1170 (D. Kan. 2001) (rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that maintenance and flight manual should restart GARA
because plaintiffs argued they were defective).
1179 507 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2007).
1180 Id. at 271.
1181 Id.
1182 See id. at 273-74.
1183 Id. at 274.
1184 Id.
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ranty, which had expired by the time of the crash."'118 5 In an
alternative ruling, the district court rejected Colgan's argument
that the manual's language constituted an express warranty, also
concluding that Massachusetts law did not permit Colgan's
claim for strict liability.'
186
The district court ruled that the maintenance manual was
"part of the Aircraft" for several reasons."187 First, the district
court relied on several cases that found that a flight manual is
not a separate product from the aircraft, including Alexander v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.' 188 and Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp. 189
In Alexander, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found that a replacement flight manual was not a separate prod-
uct for purposes of the Indiana Products Liability Act and the
statute of repose." 9" In Caldwell, the Ninth Circuit held that a
flight manual is "part" of a helicopter that does not restart the
applicable statute of repose for purposes of GARA. 191
Second, the district court concluded that the Federal Aviation
Regulations ("FARs") support treating a maintenance manual
and the aircraft as a single, integrated product because, under
the court's interpretation of the FARs, "an aircraft's mainte-
nance manual is essential to maintaining an aircraft's airworthi-
ness" under the FARs. 119 2 Finally, the district court concluded
that the fact that Colgan may have purchased the maintenance
manual in a separate transaction was immaterial to its determi-
nation that a maintenance manual and an aircraft are a single
product. 19"
Colgan appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that it
erred in concluding that the maintenance manual was "part of
the Aircraft." 194 The Fourth Circuit agreed.11 95 The Fourth
Circuit distinguished the cases cited by the lower court because
nearly all of those cases considered whether a supplement to a
flight manual, which failed to include a warning relating to de-




1188 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991).
1189 230 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000).
1190 Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1220-21.
1191 Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1157.
1192 Colgan, 507 F.3d at 277.
1193 Id. at 275.
1194 Id.
1195 Id. at 278.
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could restart the statute of repose for limitations purposes.' 196
As the Fourth Circuit noted, "[n]one of the cases relied on by
the district court presented facts where the defect existed in the
flight manual alone."' 119 7 In this case, Colgan had made no alle-
gation that the aircraft itself was defective, nor did it allege that
Raytheon had a duty to warn in order to restart a statute of
repose.1 198
Moreover, the cases cited by the district court, including Alex-
ander and Caldwell, involved flight manuals, whereas this case in-
volved a maintenance manual.1 9 9 The Fourth Circuit opined
that flight manuals were not sufficiently similar to maintenance
manuals because, "[a] flight manual is used by the pilot and is
'necessary to operate the aircraft,' whereas a maintenance man-
ual 'outline [s] procedures for the troubleshooting and repair of
the aircraft' for the mechanic.1120 1 Moreover, the FARs require
flight manuals to be onboard the aircraft at all times, whereas
no federal regulations exist requiring a maintenance manual to
be onboard the aircraft.' 20 ' The Fourth Circuit therefore con-
cluded that the district court's reliance on the case authority in-
volving flight manuals was misplaced.
12 2
The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's con-
clusion that under the FARs a maintenance manual and the air-
craft are a single, integrated product.12 3 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that a maintenance manual was not "essential" to
maintaining an aircraft's airworthiness under the FARs because
the regulations allow for other means of compliance. 120 4 In ad-
dition, the Fourth Circuit found that genuine issues of material
fact existed, including whether Colgan obtained the mainte-
nance manual from Raytheon in connection with the lease
1196 Id. at 276 (citing Schamel v. Textron-Lycoming, 1 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir.
1993) (affirming district court's dismissal of action for failure to warn of defective
condition in engine of aircraft as being barred by the statute of repose); Alexan-
der v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting plain-
tiffs' argument that operator manual/handbook was replacement part for
purposes of statute of repose; holding the instruction page was not a separate




1200 Id. (citing Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
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agreement, and other documents related to the Used Airliner
Warranty. 120 5 This fact was relevant to the Fourth Circuit be-
cause it bore directly on whether the parties actually intended
and considered the maintenance manual to be "part of the Air-
craft" instead of an individual product to be acquired via a sepa-
rate transaction. 120 6 Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court with respect to the maintenance manual was vacated and
the case was remanded. 20 7
VII. 9/11 LITIGATION
Litigation relating to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
continues to assess potential liabilities flowing from the events of
that day. Several of the opinions addressed below illustrate the
complexity of the legal issues involved in the 9/11 litigation, and
the reasons why this litigation will not be resolved any time
soon. 1208
A. IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER SITE LITIGATION
Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress en-
acted the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
("ATSSSA"),12°9 which, inter alia, conferred "original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction" for all September 1 1-related actions upon the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. 1210
The extent to which the ATSSSA preempts state law claims for
injuries arising out of the events of September 11 has been the
topic of much dispute. 121 1 In dictum, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit indicated that the ATSSSA "made the
claims of workers alleging respiratory injuries exclusively fed-
eral.' 1212 In In re WTC Disaster Site Litigation I, the district court
1205 Id.
1206 Id. at 278.
1207 Id. at 280-81.
1208 See United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2007); In re
Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97(AKH), 2007 WL 1965559, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 5,
2007).
1209 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (2008).
1210 Id. at §§ 40101 (48)(a), (b)(3).
1211 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 372, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter WrC Disaster Site Litig. 1] ("The scope of this Court's
jurisdiction under the ATSSSA has been an issue of contention in a variety of
cases where plaintiffs suffered injuries at the WTC site after September 11,
2001.").
1212 Id. at 373 (citing In reWTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 371 (2d Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter WTC Disaster Site Litig. I]).
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adopted this dictum and held that the ATSSSA's preemptive ef-
fect "applies equally to other types of injuries allegedly suffered
in the clean-up of the World Trade Center site, including inju-
ries suffered at the Fresh Kills Landfill site on Staten Island."'
' 213
The district court's decision in In re WFC Disaster Site Litigation
I addressed several Plaintiffs' motions to remand to state court
certain claims filed by workers involved in the WTC Disaster Site
clean-up for non-respiratory personal injuries pursuant to state
law.1214 Initially filed in New York State Supreme Court, the
cases were removed to the Southern District as related to cases
already pending before the court. 12 11 In the related litigation,
workers who had participated in the clean-up of the World
Trade Center site had filed actions seeking to recover damages
for respiratory injuries, claiming that the defendants in the ac-
tions had failed to provide adequate safety measures for the
workers engaged in the clean-up operations.1 216 In In re WTC
Disaster Site Litigation I, the district court held that it had original
and exclusive jurisdiction over both the respiratory and non-re-
spiratory personal injury claims under the ATSSSA, because:
Plaintiffs alleging non-respiratory injuries, like those suffering
respiratory injuries, raise common issues of law or fact concern-
ing the events of September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs name common
defendants in their claims, on common theories of negligence
and recovery that require each plaintiff to establish the same or
similar facts. In particular, like the respiratory-injury plaintiffs,
non-respiratory-injury plaintiffs allege that parties responsible for
maintaining a safe workplace negligently failed to do so ...
Since some of these elements may be susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations and varying adjudications if litigated in different
courts, they present a risk that Congress sought to avoid by enact-
ing the ATSSSA. 1 217
1213 Id.
1214 Id. at 372-73.
1215 Id. at 373.
1216 Id. at 374. Certain defendants in the respiratory actions already before the
court had previously moved to dismiss the claims against them on the grounds of
statutory immunity. Id. at 373. The Southern District deferred ruling on Plain-
tiffs' motions to remand the non-respiratory personal injury claims until after
deciding the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Id. After ruling on the
motion to dismiss, the Southern District found that Plaintiffs' motions to remand
the non-respiratory personal injury claims were ripe for decision. Id.
1217 Id. at 374.
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Accordingly, because the Southern District found that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over the claims under the ATSSSA, Plain-
tiffs' motions to remand were denied. 1218
B. IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER SITE LITIGATION
There has been considerable debate about the proper scope
of jurisdiction under the ATSSSA, especially over claims for re-
spiratory and other personal injuries brought by workers in-
volved in the clean-up of the World Trade Center. In October
2006, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the motions of Defendants in the respiratory cases
for judgment on the pleadings and dismissal on immunity
grounds. 1219 Defendants requested that the district court certify
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).1 220 The
next day, Defendants filed a notice of appeal and claimed the
order was immediately appealable as of right pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, and that the
appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction. 1221
The district court thereafter denied Defendants' motion for
certification, disagreed that the notice of appeal effectively
divested it of jurisdiction, and rejected Defendants' attempt to
invoke the collateral order doctrine.1222 In examining the col-
lateral order doctrine, the district court explained that, as con-
trolling precedent made clear, "the denial of a qualified-
immunity-based motion for summary judgment is immediately
appealable to the extent that the district court has denied the
motion as a matter of law, although not to the extent that the
defense turns solely on questions of fact.'1 22 3 In this case, the
district court had held that the issues of immunity could not be
decided without further factual development of the record. 224
The district court rejected Defendants' argument that "if they
are denied an immediate appeal, national security will inexora-
bly be weakened," concluding that "[t]he events of 9/11, how-
1218 Id.
1219 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) [hereinafter WTC Disaster Site Litig. II1].
1220 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter WTC Disaster Site Litig IV].
1221 Id. at 138. See also In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167,
169 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter WTC Disaster Site Litig. V.
1222 WTC Disaster Site Litig. X, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 140, 145.
1223 Id. at 138-39 (quoting Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir.
2006)).
1224 See WTC Disaster Site Litig. III, 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 575.
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ever tragic, [did] not furnish Defendants with a proper basis to
invoke the collateral order doctrine." 1225 The district court fur-
ther noted that because the collateral order doctrine applies to
issues wholly separate from the merits of the action, it generally
does not divest the court of jurisdiction over other issues not
appealed. 1226 In sum, the district court found Defendants' argu-
ment was without merit.122
7
In denying Defendants' motion for certification, the district
court noted that the decision to certify orders for interlocutory
appeal is left to the "unfettered discretion" of the district
judge. 1228 The district court also noted that whether Defendants
were entitled to immunity could not be determined without a
developed record. 1229 The district court therefore found that an
interlocutory appeal would not "materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.' 23 ° Moreover, the district court
commented that an interlocutory appeal would likely lead to an
"unconscionable" delay considering the "intense public interest"
in the case.1 23
Defendants petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit for a writ of mandamus to halt the proceedings in
the district court and moved for a stay of the proceedings.
123 2
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal.1 233 An applications judge
of the Second Circuit subsequently granted a temporary stay
pending panel consideration of the stay motion and, thereafter,
a motions panel granted a stay of the trial and pretrial proceed-
ings, denied the petition for mandamus as moot, referred the
motion to dismiss to the merits panel, and expedited the ap-
1225 WTC Disaster Site Litig. IV, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
1226 Id. (citing City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 234 F.R.D. 46, 50
(E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
1227 WTC Disaster Site Litig IV, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 140. The district court re-
jected Defendants' arguments that immediate appeal was necessary regarding im-
munity under the New York State Defense Emergency Act, the New York State
Disaster Act, New York common law, the doctrine of derivative federal immunity,
and the Stafford Act. Id. at 141-44. Having already found that facts were dis-
puted and the issues could not be decided on the record, the district court found
that this was not a proper basis to invoke the collateral order doctrine. Id.
1228 Id. at 144 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 234
F. Supp. 2d 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
1229 Id. at 145.
1230 Id.
1231 Id.
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peal. 1234 However, after the Second Circuit heard the interlocu-
tory appeal after "full briefing," it vacated the stay order, finding
that the four factors relevant to issuing a stay pending appeal
weighed against granting a stay.123 5 The Second Circuit ad-
dressed the relevant factors, i.e., (1) a strong showing of likeli-
hood to succeed by the stay applicant on the merits of the
appeal; (2) the likelihood of irreparable injury if the stay is not
issued; (3) the likelihood of substantial injury to other parties
interested in the proceeding if the stay were to be issued; and
(4) the public interest. 1236
With respect to the first factor, the Second Circuit found that:
Although we are not prepared at this time to resolve all of the
many issues arising on the merits of the appeal, we can conclude
that there is now a lesser probability than might have previously
appeared that the Appellants will succeed in preventing at least
some of the Plaintiffs' claims to proceed into at least the discov-
ery stage of the litigation.1 23
7
The Second Circuit found that, with respect to the second fac-
tor, any proceedings would "irreparably impair," to some de-
gree, Defendants' alleged claim to immunity from suit.1238 It
noted that the third factor had "increased in significance with
the passage of time since among the Plaintiffs are many people
with life-threatening injuries, some of whom have died since the
litigation began. '12 9 The Second Circuit found that considera-
1234 See id. at 169. Several parties not directly involved in the appeal subse-
quently moved the district court for a determination whether the Second Cir-
cuit's stay order applied to the claims asserted against them, and several
appealing Defendants moved for a determination of the scope of the stay order.
In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 514 F. Supp. 2d 556, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) [hereinafter WTC Disaster Site Litig. VI]. In deciding this motion, the dis-
trict court held that the Second Circuit's stay order did not extend to those De-
fendants that had not put forward arguable claims of immunity, but only to those
parties that sought immunity and had appealed to the Court of the Appeals on
those grounds. Id. at 558. The district court noted, however, that "[t]he non-
appealing defendants may move to be included in the stay by agreeing to be
bound by the outcome of the appeal, or taking prompt steps to join the appeal,
or otherwise show good cause, within 20 calendar days of the date of this Order."
Id. The district court also held that, as to the Defendant-Appellants, with respect
to the scope of the stay order, the stay applied to all claims arising out of that
geographic area the district court had previously defined as the "World Trade
Center Site." Id. at 564.
1235 WTC Disaster Site Litig. V, 503 F.3d at 170-71.






tion of the public interest could weigh either in favor of or
against a stay of the proceedings, as it was important that Plain-
tiffs receive compensation, if due, during their lifetime, but
there also was an important interest in protecting the immunity
of those Defendants that might be entitled to it. 124 ° While it was
not clear what impact a decision on immunity grounds would
have on Plaintiffs' potential recovery, the Second Circuit found
that the balance weighed in favor of resuming proceedings. 124 '
Accordingly, it vacated the stay order "and, while retaining juris-
diction to decide the pending appeal including the motion to
dismiss, remand [ed] the litigation to the District Court, thereby
restoring its jurisdiction to proceed with pretrial proceedings
and a trial."' 124 2
C. UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOuI
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Moussaoui 243 addressed whether Plaintiffs
in the civil actions pending before the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York 1244 should be granted access to
non-public information used in the prosecution of Zacarias
Moussaoui. 245 At the conclusion of Moussaoui's criminal trial
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on
charges of conspiracy relating to the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks, Plaintiffs moved the Virginia district court "to Intervene
for the Limited Purpose of Being Heard in Connection with Ac-
cess to Certain Portions of the Record.' 1 246 Plaintiffs then
"quickly" filed a subsequent motion requesting much broader
access, arguing that under the Crime Victims Rights Act
("CVRA") 124 7 and the ATSSSA, Plaintiffs were entitled to access
to "all of the [G]overnment's information they turned over to
the defense counsel in the . . . various discovery procedures
ongoing over time.' 1 248 The Government opposed the motion,
arguing that access could only be granted, if at all, through the
1240 Id. at 170-71.
1241 Id.
1242 Id. at 171.
1243 483 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2007).
1244 The actions were In re Sept. 11 Litig., 21 MC 97; In re Sept. 11 Prop. Dam-
age & Bus. Loss Litig., 21 MC 101; and Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 03
Civ. 9849. Id. at 224.
1245 Id.
1246 Id.
1247 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2008).
1248 Moussaoui, 483 F.3d at 224-25 (quotingJ.A. at 261).
2008] 273
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
civil discovery process underway in the Southern District of New
York.1 2
49
The Virginia district court granted Plaintiffs' motion to inter-
vene, but restricted Plaintiffs' access to "non-classified and non-
SSI 12 15 evidence. ' 1251 The district court was persuaded that the
CVRA and the ATSSSA set forth Congress' "unique interest" in
providing Plaintiffs access to such information. 121 2 In its deci-
sion, the Virginia district court commented "that it had 'always
been troubled by the degree to which our government keeps
things secret from the American people.' ,,1253 Following the de-
cision, Plaintiffs submitted expansive discovery requests, beyond
the scope of the Virginia district court's order, and Defendants
from the same civil actions requested access to any information
provided to Plaintiffs. 1254 The Government also filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order on the grounds that there was
no legal basis for it.125 5 The Virginia district court denied the
motion, noting that while it was "'disappointed' by the breadth
of the discovery requests," it would not reconsider the order,
stating that "whether a particular discovery request is relevant or
appropriate to the litigation to which it is connected is far more
properly left to the judge who is responsible for the overall
case." 1256 The Virginia district court ordered that particular dis-
covery requests to the Government were to be decided by the
New York district court, and "also purported to grant the South-
ern District of New York the authority to alter the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia court's 'protective orders to allow for disclosure
to additional qualified attorneys.' "1257
The Government appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that
the Virginia district court had no authority to allow Plaintiffs to
intervene for discovery purposes, and that the order was imme-
diately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.125
The Fourth Circuit found that "this case represents one of the
exceedingly rare instances in which the collateral order doctrine
1249 Id. at 225.
1250 The acronym SSI stands for "Sensitive Security Information" concerning
civil aviation security. Id. at 224.
1251 Id. at 225.
1252 Id. (citingJ.A. at 274).
1253 Id. (quoting J.A. at 273).
1254 Id. at 225-26.
1255 Id. at 226.
1256 Id. (quotingJ.A. at 320-21).
1257 Id. (citingJ.A. at 333).
1258 Id. at 226, 233-34.
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should apply in the criminal context."'1259 It found this case to
be unique because, inter alia, "[t] he collateral order doctrine is
used almost exclusively as a means of resolving a disputed issue
between adverse parties," whereas here Moussaoui, a criminal de-
fendant, was not a party to the appeal and the dispute involved
Plaintiffs in the civil litigation in New York-litigation in which
the Government was not a Defendant. 260 Its review of this or-
der would in no way affect the outcome of Moussaoui's criminal
case on the merits, "and accepting jurisdiction over the appeal
in no way prolongs the Government's prosecution of Moussaoui,
who has already been sentenced and has his direct criminal ap-
peal pending in this court.1 261 The Fourth Circuit also noted
that, if it did not accept the appeal in this instance, the Govern-
ment would likely be left without any way to "review the [Vir-
ginia] district court's authority to enter the order."1262
Having found jurisdiction proper, the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed the merits of the Government's appeal, i.e., whether a
district court hearing a criminal case has the authority to com-
pel "the Government to provide non-public criminal discovery
materials to victims for their use in civil litigation against third
parties in a different jurisdiction.' 1 263 The Fourth Circuit held
1259 Id. at 226. Under the "final order rule," contained in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291,
federal courts of appeal only have jurisdiction over appeals of "final decisions,"
i.e., those that put an end to the litigation. Id. at 227. The collateral order doc-
trine provides an exception that "entitles a party to immediately appeal 'from a
narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the
interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final' within
the meaning of § 1291." Id. at 227-28 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). However, as the Fourth Circuit ex-
plained, the collateral order exception is "narrow," and "stringent" standards
mandate that "[t]o come within the parameters of the collateral order doctrine,
the order from which the appeal is taken must '[1] conclusively determine the
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment."' Id. at 228 (quoting Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868; Will v. Hallock,
546 U.S. 345 (2006)).
1260 Id. at 229.
1261 Id. at 231.
1262 Id. at 232 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 816 (1988)). In the event the New York district court sanctioned the Gov-
ernment for refusal to comply with discovery orders, "the Government would
have to appeal any sanction order to the Second Circuit, and that Circuit would
be forced to interpret an order from the Eastern District of Virginia, without any
power to vacate that order." Id. (citing SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206
F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001)).
1263 Id. at 233.
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that the Virginia district court had "no authority, inherent or
otherwise, for [its] orders in this instance."'1264
Although the Plaintiffs' arguments before the Virginia district
court were primarily focused on statutory authority, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the "Plaintiffs have abandoned the argument
that the CVRA and ATSSSA granted the district court the au-
thority to act in this instance," a strategy the Fourth Circuit
found to be "wise ... as nothing in those two statutes supports
the district court's exercise of power.' ' 2 65 While the CVRA was
designed to "guarantee [crime victims] some involvement in the
criminal justice process," the Fourth Circuit found that those
rights were limited to criminal proceedings and did not relate to
proceedings relating to "civil claims against their assailants.' ' 266
Likewise, the ATSSSA was similarly unhelpful as it provided ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the Southern District of New York and did
not authorize the Eastern District of Virginia to issue the order
in question. 267
The Fourth Circuit rejected the "thrust" of Plaintiffs' argu-
ment "that the district court had the inherent authority to do
what it did, and that the limits of that inherent authority should
be defined by the same limits placed on district courts" by the
rules governing disclosure of grand jury minutes.1 26  The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the Virginia district court's orders
"were unprecedented and entirely unnecessary," and there was
no case law "suggest[ing] that courts have an inherent authority
to issue orders that facilitate the judicial process taking place in
another case in another jurisdiction.' 1 269
The Fourth Circuit thus reversed and vacated the Virginia dis-
trict court's order allowing the Plaintiffs to intervene, noting
that:
We, like the district court, have great sympathy for the victims
of September 11 and their families. They have endured the most
abhorrent of acts. But regardless of how much respect and com-
passion this court has, we must ensure that the federal courts in
1264 Id. at 239.
1265 Id. at 234.
1266 See id. at 234-35 (quoting Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016
(9th Cir. 2006); In re Kenna, 453 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006)).
1267 Moussaoui, 483 F.3d at 235.
1268 Id. at 236 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw.,
441 U.S. 211 (1979)).
1269 Id. at 237.
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our jurisdiction-no matter how well intentioned-do not exceed
their legal power. 1270
D. IN RE SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION
In In re September 11 Litigation,'27' the personal representatives
of two passengers of American Airlines Flight 771272 commenced
an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York against several airlines, airports, and private security
companies pursuant to the ATSSSA. 1273 The decedents were
traveling pursuant to passenger tickets that included continuing
travel from Los Angeles (the destination of Flight 77) to Sydney,
Australia. 1274 Plaintiffs asserted multiple claims against the vari-
ous defendants, including, inter alia, liability under the Warsaw
Convention against Defendant American Airlines. 1275 Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on the Warsaw Convention
claims, arguing that Defendant was strictly liable under Article
17, and that on the basis of undisputed facts, "Defendant cannot
sustain an affirmative defense under Article 20 of the Warsaw
Convention that the carrier and its agents had 'taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
them to take such measures.' 1276
In opposing the motion, Defendant conceded that a terrorist
hijacking was an Article 17 "accident."' 1277 As such, Defendant
was presumptively liable for the "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention, 1278 but contested the extent of Defendant's liabil-
ity. 1279 In its decision, the district court noted that Defendant's
tariff (i.e., "the terms and conditions of carriage between passen-
ger and carrier") included provisions that "[b]y contract . ..
waived the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability; waived the
1270 Id. at 238-39.
1271 500 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Sept. 11 Litig. 1].
1272 American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Vir-
ginia, on September 11, 2001. See id. at 357.
1273 Id. at 357-58. Defendants other than American Airlines included AMR
Corp.; Airtran Airways, Inc.; Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc.; Continental Airlines,
Inc.; Delta Airlines, Inc.; National Airlines, Inc.; Northwest Airlines Corp.; United
Airlines, Inc.; U.S. Airways, Inc.; Argenbright Security, Inc.; Securicor, PLC; Met-
ropolitan Washington Airports Authority; and the Boeing Co. Id. at 358 n.2.
1274 Id. at 357.
1275 Id. at 358 n.2.
1276 Id. at 358 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 17, 20).
1277 Id. at 359 (citing Pflug v. Egyptair Corp., 961 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1992)).
1278 Id. at 358-59 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 17; Magan v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2003)).
1279 See id. at 360-61.
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Article 20 defense below 100,000 Special Drawing Rights; and
reserved the Article 20 defense above 100,000 Special Drawing
Rights."128 Accordingly, the district court granted partial sum-
mary judgment "in the amount 6f the equivalent in United
States dollars of 100,000 [SDRs]."1281
In considering Plaintiffs' claims that Defendant could not sus-
tain the Article 20 affirmative defense relating to the portion of
their claims in excess of 100,000 SDRs, the district court noted
that Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, and in the case of
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage of cargo, the carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that he and his servants have taken
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossi-
ble for them to take such measures. 128 2
The district court then adopted the interpretation of most
courts that have construed the "all necessary measures" lan-
guage as meaning "all reasonable measures" and noted that De-
fendant's burden to demonstrate this affirmative defense was
"high."12 83
With respect to this portion of Plaintiffs' claims, Defendant
argued that "summary judgment [was] premature because: 1)
the relevant standard of care is undefined; 2) the admissibility of
passages of the 9/11 Commission Report is undetermined; and
3) discovery is incomplete."'128 4 Defendant also argued that gen-
uine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.1285 In
addressing Defendant's arguments, the district court first re-
jected the assertion that the standard of care was, as of yet, un-
defined, finding that "the standard of care that Defendant must
satisfy in order to sustain its affirmative defense is set forth in
the Warsaw Convention treaty itself: Defendant must prove that
it took 'all [reasonable] measures to avoid damages.'1 286 The
district court found that it was unnecessary to rule on the admis-
sibility of the 9/11 Commission Report to decide the summary
1280 Id. at 361.
1281 Id. The Southern District did not rule on the issue of interest, noting that
the parties could address the issue when the remainder of the issues were
presented for decision. Id.
1282 Id. at 359 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 20).
1283 Id. at 359-60.
1284 Id. at 362.
1285 Id.
1286 Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 564, art. 20).
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judgment motion and declined to make "abstract and hypotheti-
cal rulings" relating to its admissibility. 128 7
However, the district court found that Plaintiffs motion relat-
ing to Defendant's Article 20 "all necessary measures" defense
was premature, and that Defendant was entitled to additional
discovery in order to provide it with an opportunity to demon-
strate that it had established the defense. 1288 The district court
stated:
Defendant has the burden to show the risks of which it was or
reasonably should have been aware, the measures it took to avoid
or mitigate the risk, the nature and scope of government regula-
tions and whether such regulations were guides to its conduct or
imposed limitations on actions that it otherwise would have
taken, and how all of these measures, and others that might be
relevant, relate to the damage suffered by Plaintiffs.
1211
The district court further noted that whether Defendant took
"all reasonable measures" is judged not only against those mea-
sures required by federal law, but also may include considera-
tion of measures outside the scope of federal regulation
because:
Even if Congress has regulated the field of aviation security so
pervasively that no room is left for concurrent state regulation-
an open question of law in this Circuit-a duly ratified treaty re-
tains its force as co-equal federal law under the Supremacy
Clause. Thus ajury may find that an air carrier complied with all
of its regulatory obligations, but nevertheless failed to take all
reasonable measures to avoid the damage caused by the
accident. 1 290
Accordingly, the district court denied the motion without
prejudice with respect to claims exceeding 100,000 SDRs, find-
ing Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion premature on the re-
cord before it. 12
9
'
1287 Id. at 362-63.
1288 Id. at 363.
1289 Id.
1-0 Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
1291 Id. at 365. The district court also rejected Plaintiffs' claim that they had
the right to recover litigation expenses and attorneys' fees under the Warsaw
Convention liability regime, finding that the liability regime did not create a right
of reimbursement of attorneys' fees, and U.S. law, both federal and state, did not
support Plaintiffs' claims either. Id. at 364-65.
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E. IN RE SEPTEMBER 1 1TH LITIGATION
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
ordered "reverse" bifurcated trials on the issues of damages in
certain In re September 11th Litigation1292 cases.1293 The district
court noted that its decision was motivated by growing frustra-
tion with the slow pace of the litigation, especially among the
families of the forty-two victims, whose forty-one cases remained
pending before it nearly six years after September 11.1294 The
district court noted that the families had chosen to bring suit
pursuant to the ATSSSA rather than receive compensation from
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and shared
their concerns about the prolonged pre-trial process, noting
that:
Time heals, but time also works against us. Elderly parents
who brought actions on behalf of their deceased children will
not live forever. Grieving widows and friends waiting for these
proceedings to bring them closure may wait too long. And the
public, in measures both large and small, share the families' con-
cerns. Many would like to see Plaintiffs' assertions tested in a
trial and either found or rejected in a jury verdict. For such per-
sons, long delays are a frustration and denial of the justice
sought.1291
The district court noted that the decision to order bifurcated
trials is within its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 42 (b), 296 which permits separate trials if "conducive to ex-
pedition and economy."1297 The district court explained that
bifurcated trials are appropriate only if "the issue contemplated
for separate trial, i.e. liability and damages, is sufficiently 'dis-
tinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may
be had without injustice.' 1 298  In this case, the district court
found:
[T]hat [the] issues of damages are distinct and separable from
issues of liability, and thus a separate trial of each may be had
1292 No. 21 MC 97(AKH), 2007 WL 1965559 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Sept. 11th Litig. III].
1293 Id. at *1.
1294 Id. at *1-*2.
1-5 Id. at *1.
1296 Id. at *2 (citing In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir.
1975)).
1297 Id. (quoting FED. R. Ctv. P. 42(b)).




without prejudice to either side. The allegedly negligent acts
committed by the airlines and their security contractors have no
relation to the amount of compensatory damages that Plaintiffs
would recover. Because Plaintiffs sue for wrongful death, and
their deaths were sudden and final, caused, they allege, by dis-
crete acts over a limited period of time, the jury does not need to
consider the extent to which Defendants' allegedly negligent acts
caused decedents' deaths. If liable, Defendants caused all of the
victims' wrongful deaths or personal injuries, if not liable, De-
fendants caused no part of the victims' deaths or injuries.1299
The district court explained that its decision was intended to
facilitate settlements by scheduling damages-only trials to pre-
cede liability trials, as ongoing settlement discussions had ap-
peared to reach "an impasse." '13 ° The district court noted that,
while some Plaintiffs were unlikely to settle on any terms, certain
other Plaintiffs appeared willing to settle, but were unable to
"because of disparity in perceived values between plaintiffs and
defendants."" 0 ' The district court found that, with further pas-
sage of time, "the prospects for settlement are likely to dim, as
positions harden and disparity of perception becomes en-
trenched," and concluded that trying the issue of damages first
would likely encourage settlement by presenting a "range of val-
ues that ajury is likely to award in similar cases. ' 130 2 The district
court also reasoned that ordering damages trials to precede trial
on the issue of liability would be "economical" because only lim-
ited discovery would be needed, and "most plaintiffs ha[d] al-
ready obtained experts' reports on economic and other issues of
damages." 1303
Accordingly, the district court ordered six cases, based upon
the recommendation of liaison counsel, to prepare for damages
trials in an attempt to "hasten the resolution of these and many
other cases and thus be a significant step in mending the
wounds left open by the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.111304 All six of the cases settled before trial.
12-0 Id. at *3.
1300 Id. at *2.
1301 Id.
1302 Id.
1303 Id. at *3.
1304 Id. The district court subsequently issued several orders related to the
pending damages trials. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97(AKH), 2007 WL
3036439, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007) (granting in substantial part Defend-
ants' motion in limine to exclude certain evidence, including: evidence regarding
decedent's prospective income where it was merely speculative that Plaintiffs, de-
20081
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F. IN RE SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION
In In re September 11 Litigation,315 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York addressed whether: (1) Plain-
tiffs could recover punitive damages with respect to personal in-
jury and wrongful death claims from Defendant airlines, airport
operators, airport security companies, and aircraft manufactur-
ers; and (2) whether Pennsylvania law governed claims for com-
pensatory damages commenced by eight Plaintiffs who died
onboard United Airlines Flight 93 when it crashed in Penn-
sylvania. 130 6 Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs' punitive dam-
ages claims, and Plaintiffs had moved the district court for a
declaration that Pennsylvania law governed claims for compen-
satory damages for the claims arising from Flight 93.1317
In opposition to Defendants' motion to strike the punitive
damages claims, Plaintiffs argued that because the phrase "puni-
tive damages" was mentioned twice in the text of the ATSSSA, it
was clear that Congress had intended that "punitive damages
must . . . be recoverable, as a matter of federal law and regard-
less of whether the relevant state law would allow such recov-
cedent's parents, had any reasonable expectation of receiving future financial
contributions from decedent; and extrinsic evidence of the events of 9/11 and
Flight 77, including, inter alia, the Flight 93 cockpit voice recorder ("CVR") re-
cording and facts from the Moussaoui trial). The district court found that Plain-
tiffs were "free to testify about the matters they viewed or learned from whatever
source, including their reactions," but held that the "items of extrinsic evidence
themselves and the testimony of others are inadmissible" pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 403 because any "slight relevance" to Plaintiffs' claimed mental anguish was
outweighed by "its high likelihood of prejudicing, confusing and misleading the
jury." Id. at *5. See also Sept. 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97(AKH), 2007 WL 2668608, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007) (applying New Jersey law, as the law of decedent's
domicile, and granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs motion in limine to
introduce the recording from the CVR from Flight 93 in the damages-only trial as
evidence of decedent's pre-death pain, suffering, and emotional distress). The
district court found that most portions of the CVR recording, as evidence of what
occurred in the cockpit, were inadmissible as "either not relevant, because [dece-
dent] could not hear or otherwise perceive that which was recorded or depicted,
or [because it would] invade unnecessarily the privacy of other passengers and
crew members and their families." Id. However, the district court held that two
specific portions of the recording and related computer animations "relevant to
the passengers' awareness" of the situation were admissible, if proven authentic
and capable of being heard from decedent's seat. Id.
1305 494 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Sept. 11 Litig. II]. As of
the date of this decision, forty-one wrongful death and injury cases (on behalf of
forty-two victims), out of the initial ninety-five (on behalf of ninety-six victims)
remained before the court. Id. at 236.
1306 Id.
1307 Id. at 236-37.
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eries."1 8 The district court disagreed, finding that the ATSSSA
neither expressly "bars nor provides" for a federal punitive dam-
age remedy.3 °9 The district court noted that the ATSSSA was
enacted "to benefit the aviation defendants, not those who sue
the aviation defendants," and to protect the airlines "against the
possibility of ruinous liability" by limiting the extent of certain
Defendants' liability to the extent of their insurance cover-
age. 31 0 The district court explained:
In the context of the airlines' exposure to potentially ruinous lia-
bility, and the equity of providing sufficient funds so that all
claimants would have equal right to the fullest compensation to
which they might be entitled under law, the argument against
punitive damage recoveries is strong. Punitive damages are re-
covered unevenly, in large and small amounts and by different
plaintiffs and, in the context of a limited fund, endanger the ca-
pacity of the fund to compensate all plaintiffs in accordance with
their provable injuries. 13 11
The district court then ruled that, under the ATSSSA, the is-
sue of punitive damages was to be determined by the substantive
law of the state where the crash occurred, including its choice of
law principles. 13 12
With respect to claims relating to the crashes at the World
Trade Center, the district court determined that New York law
applied.131 3 New York's choice of law principles require a court
to conduct an "'interest analysis[,]' [which] entails finding 'the
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation,' where
the jurisdiction's interest is measured in terms of the 'purpose
of the particular law in conflict.' ,131 The district court noted
that punitive damages are designed to "regulate standards of
conduct," and when a conflict is presented by conduct regulat-
ing laws, the law of the place of the tort usually has the most
significant interest, and "[t]herefore lex loci delicti-the law of
the place of the tort-applie [d] to Plaintiffs' claims for punitive




1312 Id. at 238-39. The district court noted that Plaintiffs could pursue punitive
damages against Defendant Argenbright Security because the ATSSSA limits of
liability did not apply to it and, thus, a punitive damages recovery could be paid
without insurance proceeds. Id. at 242.
1313 Id. at 239.
1314 Id. (quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y.
1985)).
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damages."1 315 The district court further noted that " [w] here the
defendant's misconduct and the plaintiffs injury occur in differ-
ent jurisdictions, the place of the tort is the jurisdiction where
the 'last event necessary' to make the defendant liable oc-
curred."1316  However, in this case, as the district court
explained:
[T] he place of the tort could plausibly be Massachusetts, because
defendants screened [the flights] at Logan Airport in Boston, or
New York, where the crash, the last event necessary to give rise to
wrongful death liability, occurred. For claims arising out of a
"disaster befalling a plane aloft," however, "the place of the crash
is often random or, as here, fixed by a warped mind," and thus
legitimate reasons to deviate from the lex loci delicti rule may
exist. 317
The district court noted that "punitive damages are not per-
missible if the source of recovery would come from insurance
funds" under either New York or Massachusetts law and, there-
fore, a true conflict was not presented, and then ruled that New
York had the greatest interest in having its law relating to the
recovery of punitive damages applied because of the "special ef-
fect" that the events of September 11 th had there, including the
deaths of several thousand New Yorkers and the destruction of
billions of dollars of New York property. 1318  Because the
ATSSSA restricts Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, to the extent of De-
fendants' insurance funds, and New York law does not permit an
insurer to indemnify an insured for punitive damages under any
circumstances, the district court held that "[p] unitive damages
are therefore unavailable as a matter of law" with respect to
claims relating to American Airlines Flight 11 and United Air-
lines Flight 175.'3'9
1315 Id. (citing Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 685).
1316 Id.
1317 Id. (quoting Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d
Cir. 1996) and citing In reAir Crash at Belle Harbor, N.Y. on Nov. 12, 2001, No.
1448(RWS), 2006 WL 1236688 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006) ("applying admiralty law to
passengers' punitive damages claims arising out of aircraft disaster in New
York")).
1318 Id. at 239-40.
1319 Id. at 240 (citing Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810,
814-15 (N.Y. 1981)). The parties agreed that, assuming the ATSSSA did not con-
trol, Virginia law applied to American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed in Vir-
ginia, and, thus, injured and wrongful death Plaintiffs could recover a "statutory




With respect to claims relating to Flight 93, the district court
ruled that Plaintiffs were similarly not allowed to recover puni-
tive damages against all Defendants, with the exception of a de-
fendant transportation security company, under Pennsylvania
law. 12' Because Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, Penn-
sylvania's choice of law principles were applicable, which re-
quired an "interest analysis" considering the policies of all states
potentially interested in the litigation. 1321 The district court
found that Pennsylvania and New Jersey had the strongest inter-
ests in regulating Defendants' conduct via the imposition of pu-
nitive damages because United Airlines Flight 93 had crashed in
Pennsylvania, and the hijackers had been "ticketed and
screened" at Newark Airport in New Jersey. 1 22 The district
court also found that Illinois, United Airlines' principal place of
business, and Washington, Boeing's principal place of business,
also would have an interest in regulating Defendants' con-
duct. 13 23 However, because the laws of all four states, like New
York, uniformly prohibited an insurer from indemnifying an in-
sured for punitive damages awards, the district court ruled that
punitive damages were not available in connection with claims
relating to United Airlines Flight 93.1324
With respect to Plaintiffs' motion to apply Pennsylvania law to
all compensatory damages on claims arising from Flight 93, the
district court rejected Plaintiffs' claim that Pennsylvania law
should be applied to "ensure uniformity of result and adequacy
of compensation. ' 1325 The district court explained that, under
an "interest analysis" approach to choice of law, a decedent's
domicile usually has the greatest interest in having its law ap-
plied on the issue of compensation, and that here, Penn-
sylvania's interest was minimal as "[t]he terrorist hijackers did
not intend to strike Pennsylvania and, alas, the passengers did
not select the place of their heroic sacrifice. 111 26 In short,
"Pennsylvania's governmental interest in having its law applied
is considerably less than the governmental interest of the par-
ties' domicile states with respect to compensatory damages. "1327
1320 Id. at 241.
1321 Id. at 240-41 (citing Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166
(3d Cir. 2005)).
1322 Id. at 241.
1323 Id.
1324 Id. at 241-42 (collecting cases).
1325 Id. at 242-43.
1326 Id. at 243.
1327 Id. at 242.
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The district court then held that "the law governing the com-
pensatory damages to which each plaintiff is entitled, should he
prove his case, shall be the law of the plaintiffs state of domicile.
The interest of a plaintiff's domicile state in protecting the well-
being of surviving dependents will be fully vindicated by applica-
tion of its own law.' '1 328
G. IN RE SEPTEMBER 11TH LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE CASES
In In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases,13 29 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York im-
posed sanctions totaling $1.25 million on Defendant Zurich
American Insurance Company and the two law firms it had re-
tained as outside counsel in the litigation, for violations of Rules
11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1330 Rule 11
prohibits an attorney from making false or unsupported repre-
sentations to the court, and Rule 37 permits the imposition of
sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with discovery obliga-
tions by failing to disclose by, inter alia, destroying or delaying
production of requested information. 3 31
The underlying litigation arose out of a dispute concerning
whether the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("the
Port Authority"), owner and operator of the World Trade
Center, and Westfield Corporation, Inc., lessee of retail space in
the concourse and street-level space in Towers One and Two,
were covered under a primary Commercial General Liability
Policy, issued pursuant to an insurance binder to World Trade
Center Properties LLC ("WTCP"), a Larry A. Silverstein holding
company that controlled both the "Silverstein Net Lessees '1332
1328 Id.
1329 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). One of the defendants in In re World Trade
Ctr Disaster Litig., World Trade Center Properties LLP, "brought a third-party ac-
tion against Zurich for declaratory relief regarding Zurich's obligations to WTCP
and to other parties." Id. at 117. Zurich responded with "a fourth-party action
and an original complaint against WTCP, the Port Authority, and Westfield,
among others." Id. The Southern District court consolidated the third- and
fourth-party actions for pre-trial purposes as the Liability Insurance Coverage Cases.
Id.
1330 See id. at 116-17, 132.
1331 Id. at 123-25.
1332 Id. at 116. Larry Silverstein formed four Delaware limited liability compa-
nies (the "Silverstein Net Lessees") to hold the leases to the World Trade Center
towers. Id. at 119 n.3. The Silverstein Net Lessees are 1 World Trade Center




and the "Net Lessees' Association.' 3 3  Defendant Zurich
claimed that neither Westfield nor the Port Authority was enti-
tled to insurance coverage following the destruction of certain
buildings within the World Trade Center. 1334 During the litiga-
tion, Zurich, through its counsel, alleged that neither the Port
Authority nor Westfield was insured under the policy, and that
there was "an absence of evidence that the parties intended to
name the Port Authority as an Additional Insured.' 1 335
Subsequently, it became clear through the deposition testi-
mony of underwriters for the subject liability policy, and the un-
timely production of a sixty-two page internal "primary policy"
document from September 11, 2001 (the "9/11 Document")
which, as the district court noted, was "clearly important"'336
and "not the type of document that inadvertently becomes lost
without a trace,"' 337 that there was evidence indicating that both
the Port Authority and Westfield were indeed insured under the
terms of Defendant's binder. 3 " The Port Authority and West-
field subsequently moved for sanctions against Zurich, and its
counsel, based on Rules 11 and 37.1339 The Port Authority and
Westfield argued that Zurich and its counsel had asserted posi-
tions that were "objectively unreasonable," and breached their
discovery obligations by failing to produce responsive evidence,
unnecessarily delaying production, and destroying the elec-
tronic version of the 9/11 Document.3 40 In this regard, the dis-
trict court noted:
1333 Id. at 116. The Silverstein Net Lessees and Westfield WTC LLC, the West-
field Lessee of the retail space within the towers and concourse levels, created a
"Net Lessees' Association" that had the obligation to obtain liability insurance for
its member lessees, including the Westfield net lessee. Id. at 119.
1334 Id. at 117.
1335 Id. at 126.
1336 The 9/11 Document contained a "Broad Form Named Insured" endorse-
ment that "listed as named insureds: World Trade Center Properties, LLC c/o
Silverstein Properties, Inc. and any subsidiary company as now formed or consti-
tuted, and any company over which the named insured has active control so long as the
named insured or any subsidiary company has an ownership interest of more
than 50% of such company." Id. at 119-20. The district court noted that this
endorsement "would confer 'Additional Insured' status on the Port Authority"
and "likely conferred 'Additional Insured' status on Westfield." Id. at 120.
1337 Zurich's attorneys took possession of the 9/11 Document in March 2003,
but it was not produced until February 2005, "after depositions had been com-
pleted and following pointed inquiries by opposing counsel, following up trace
references in other of Zurich's productions." Id.
1338 Id. at 123.
1339 Id.
134 See id. at 117. 130.
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The issues regarding the Port Authority's and Westfield's in-
surance status were vigorously litigated in motions and discovery
proceedings and at conferences. Ultimately, Zurich abandoned
its contentions as to the insured status of the Port Authority and
Westfield, but not until its contentions prevented the Port Au-
thority from prevailing on a Rule 12(c) motion, requiring exten-
sive discovery proceedings to explore the issues of fact raised by
Zurich's denials and defenses.134'
With respect to the Port Authority's Rule 11 motion, the dis-
trict court noted that although evidence later produced clearly
established that Zurich was aware of the Port Authority's status
under the policy, even without this evidence, "[s] imply put, Zu-
rich's position made no sense, because the parties would not
have agreed to insure a holding company with no operations
and no direct holdings, without an understanding and intent to
insure the subsidiary entities that would actually be exposed to
premises liability."1342 The district court thus granted the Port
Authority's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the insurer,
finding its factual assertions in this respect "objectively without
rational basis."'"" Accordingly, the Southern District imposed a
sanction of $750,000 for the Rule 11 violations, half of which was
allotted to reimburse the Port Authority for extra attorneys' ex-
penses incurred as a result of Zurich's actions.1 344
Although large, the district court reasoned that the sanction
imposed was "not so large as to be disproportionate to the
strong public interest, the waste caused to judicial and attorney
resources, and the amounts at stake in the litigation.' 345 The
district court further noted that, with respect to Rule 11, "Zu-
rich's decision to assert and maintain its denials and defenses
regarding the Port Authority's status as Additional Insured mul-
tiplied proceedings, caused substantial expense to the parties,
caused substantial waste of court time, and insulted public and
judicial expectations of the standard of conduct expected of at-
torneys and insurance carriers. 1 4 6
However, the district court denied Westfield's Rule 11 mo-
tion, finding that although it was established that Zurich in-
tended to provide liability insurance coverage to Westfield,
1341 Id. at 117.
1342 Id. at 128.
1343 Id.
134 Id. at 131.
1-5 Id. at 131-32.
1346 Id. at 131.
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Zurich's allegations were not "utterly lacking in support" be-
cause, inter alia, "Westfield is not mentioned by name in the [ap-
plicable insurance] binder, and the references in the parties'
communications about Westfield were not always consistent or
clear."1347
With respect to the Rule 37 motions, the district court noted
that, under the applicable three-part test for sanctions under
this Rule, both the Port Authority and Westfield had to estab-
lish: "(1) that Zurich had control over the documents and had
an obligation to produce them; (2) that Zurich failed timely to
produce the evidence with 'a culpable state of mind'; and (3)
that the untimely produced documents were 'relevant' to their
claims or defenses.' ' 3 48 The district court found that both the
Port Authority and Westfield had satisfied this burden, and that
it was clear that "Zurich's and its attorneys' delays and destruc-
tions multiplied proceedings and caused undue time and ex-
pense.' 1 49 The district court found that "Zurich's 'culpable
state of mind' [was] established by evidence that it intended to
delete, and deleted, the electronic version of the 9/11 Docu-
ment, and by evidence that Zurich or its attorneys, or both, had
possession of the printed version of the 9/11 Document, but
failed to produce it."'' 350
In addressing the amount of the Rule 37 sanctions, although
the district court noted that sanctions are intended to "restore
the parties to the position they would have occupied but for the
breach of discovery obligations," the district court found that it
was impossible to determine how much additional and unneces-
sary time the parties had expended on this issue specifically and
granted only $500,000 in sanctions, substantially less than
requested. 13 51
1347 Id. at 128-29.
1348 Id. at 129 (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306
F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002)).
1349 Id. at 130, 132.
1350 Id. at 130.
151 Id. at 131-32 (citing Estate of Calloway ex rel. LMN Prods. v. Marvel Entm't
Group, 9 F.3d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1993); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir, 1987)).
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VIII. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. GLOBAL AEROSPACE, INC. V. ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & Co.
INSURANCE BROKERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC.
In Global Aerospace, Inc. v. ArthurJ Gallagher & Co. Insurance
Brokers of California, Inc.,135 2 Plaintiff insurer sued Defendant in-
surance broker, ArthurJ. Gallagher & Co., which had procured
insurance on behalf of the insured charter company, Regent
Air, to recover monies paid on behalf of the insured following
the crash of one of its aircraft on March 13, 2002, in Reno, Ne-
vada.13 53 The crash occurred when the aircraft, piloted solely by
Jesse Gallagher, left the runway and crashed into a commercial
building while attempting to land in snow and freezing fog.1354
The crash caused significant damage to the aircraft and build-
ing, as well as injuries to the pilot and five passengers. 1355
Global Aerospace paid claims associated with the crash, and
then sued Regent Air's broker, contending that there was no
coverage under its policy for the crash because of the policy's
pilot warranty requirement.1 316 As a result, Global Aerospace
sought to recover the payments made on behalf of the insured
from the Defendant broker Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.1 357
There was no dispute that the crash occurred after the expira-
ion of an initial insurance policy, but before the formal issu-
ance of the renewal policy.1 358 Coverage, however, had been
bound by issuance of a binder.135 9 There also was no dispute
that the pilot of the aircraft involved in the accident, Mr. Gal-
lagher, was approved only to fly as a co-pilot under the express
terms of the initial policy, which contained a pilot warranty, lim-
iting coverage to pilots in command with certain experience re-
quirements.1 360 Defendant broker's employee, unaware of the
1352 No. CIV. S-06-594 LKK/KJM, 2007 WL 1695102 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2007).
1353 Id. at *1.
1354 Id.
1355 Id.
1356 Id. at *1-'2.
1357 Id. at *1.
1358 Id. at *5.
1359 Id. at *2. A binder is a contract separate and distinct from the policy that
includes the "most important terms of the preliminary contract of insurance, in-
tended to give temporary protection pending the investigation of the risk by the
insurer or until the issuance of a formal policy." Id. at *2 n.5 (quoting Ahern v.
Dillenback, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 345 (Ct. App. 1991)).
1360 Id. at *2. Although not directly addressed by the district court, an insur-
ance policy typically will either "list by name the pilots during whose operation
the aircraft will be covered, or list the qualifications and experience to be pos-
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conditions of the applicable pilot warranty in the initial policy,
had mistakenly informed Regent Air prior to the crash, that it
had "as approved by" coverage. 1361 The court concluded that
there was "no evidence that defendant ever requested 'as ap-
proved by' coverage."1362
Although Plaintiff contended that there was no coverage for
the crash, it agreed to pay for claims arising out of the crash
pursuant to a Dispute Resolution Agreement entered into with
Defendant. 13 63 Under the Agreement, if a court later deter-
mined that the insurance policy did not apply to Regent Air's
claims or "would not so apply but for the representation, or
other actions or inactions of Broker," Defendant was to reim-
burse Plaintiff for all claims it had paid. 1364 Based on this Agree-
ment, Plaintiff commenced the subject action under theories of
breach of contract, negligence, equitable indemnity, and equita-
ble subrogation.13 65 Defendant countered that it had "impliedly
requested an expansion of coverage" to include Gallagher as a
pilot in command and that Plaintiffs "failure to respond to this
request obligated them to furnish the requested coverage. 18 66
Defendant also filed a counterclaim for reformation of the pol-
icy, alleging that it did not conform to the intent of the parties,
which was to provide coverage that included Jesse Gallagher as a
pilot in command. 367
Plaintiff originally issued a one-year policy to Regent Air for
the period 2001-2002 that contained a pilot warranty limiting
coverage for the aircraft to Regent owner Gerald Canavan, and
other pilots in command, that satisfied certain experience re-
sessed by pilots flying the insured aircraft. In certain instances, the schedule will
provide for the aircraft to be covered while it is being flown by pilots in the em-
ploy of, or pilots approved by, the insured." ROD D. MARGO, AViATION INSURANCE
121-22 (2d ed. 1989) (1980).
1361 Global Aerospace, 2007 WL 1695102, at *2.
1362 Id.
1363 Id. at *3. The Dispute Resolution Agreement provided, in relevant part:
"Broker agrees that, should it later be determined by a court of law . . . that the
Policy does not apply to the claims ... or that the policy would not so apply but
for the representation, or other actions or inactions of Broker... Broker shall
reimburse Insurer for all such claims paid by Insurer." Id.
1364 Id.
1365 Id. at *1.
1366 Id.
1367 Id. Defendant alleged that after receiving the written quote for the
2002-2003 policy that Plaintiffs underwriter informed Defendant's broker that
the new policy would provide "as approved by coverage." Id. at *2.
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quirements. 1368 Defendant broker's employee was not aware of
the conditions of the pilot warranty, and apparently believed
(until after the crash) that coverage applied to pilots in com-
mand "as approved by" Canavan. 369 As a result, the broker in-
correctly informed Regent Air that it had "as approved by"
coverage at least twice before the crash. 1370
Prior to the expiration of the 2001-2002 policy, Defendant
sent Regent Air's renewal information to Plaintiff, which in-
cluded a completed insurance application and pilot qualifica-
tion forms for each of Regent Air's pilots. 1371 The application,
which distinguished between "Captains" and "Co-pilots," listed
Canavan and Gallagher as Captains (and a third person as a Co-
pilot) 1372 Plaintiff's underwriter, however, did not read that sec-
tion of the application. 1373 Eventually, Regent Air agreed to re-
new its coverage for the 2002-2003 period based on essentially
the same terms and conditions as the expiring 2001-2002 pol-
icy, and a binder of coverage was issued, pending the issuance of
a formal policy. 1374 However, the subject crash occurred ap-
proximately ten days after the expiration date of the renewal
policy, and a formal policy for the 2002-2003 period had not yet
been issued.1375
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.1376
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
found that, as a matter of law, the parties had agreed to the key
terms of coverage for the renewal policy, despite the fact that a
formal policy had not been issued, and that the binder, a "tem-
porary, preliminary contract of insurance," was in effect on the









1375 Id. at *1-*2.
1376 Id. at *1.
1377 Id. at *5 (citing Parlier Fruit Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 311 P.2d 62,
70-71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)). The court noted that binders exist because the
beneficial effect of the insurance system would be "greatly impaired" if an "appli-
cant could not be made secure until all the formal documents were executed and
delivered." Id. (quoting Parlier, 311 P.2d at 70-71).
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Turning to the issue of the scope of the coverage provided by
the binder, Defendant argued that, because the Insured's appli-
cation requested an expansion of coverage, which Plaintiff
failed to respond to, Plaintiff should be required to provide the
expanded coverage. 1378 Plaintiff contended that its response set
forth the complete terms of the renewal coverage, and because
the renewal binder was bound on the same terms as the
2001-2002 policy ("pilot warranty," not "as approved by" cover-
age),' 1379 it had, in effect, responded to any request for a change
in coverage. 180 The district court found that whether the cover-
age requested was an expansion was immaterial because the
"real issue" was that the Insured wanted coverage for Captain
Jesse Gallagher, and Plaintiff Global had failed to act specifically
on that request. 13 8' The district court went on to find that Plain-
tiffs response (the issuance of a binder based on expiring
terms) would not have "alert[ed] a reasonable person that the
particular request for coverage had been denied."' 138 2 Based on
the above, the district court concluded that the binder's scope
of coverage was ambiguous and, thus, it was required to con-
strue the scope of coverage such that the "objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured" would be protected,3 83 and to re-
solve any ambiguities against the party that caused the uncer-
tainty to exist. 384 While the district court noted that the
uncertainty or ambiguity as to the scope of coverage was created
by both Plaintiff and Defendant, it concluded that it was neces-
sary that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of Defendant be-
cause insurers have a general duty to respond to requests for
insurance,1 38 5 and Plaintiff had drafted the "as per the expiring
policy" language in the binder, which incorporated the terms of
the previous policy (also drafted by Plaintiff) .1386 Accordingly,
even though the insurers had no general duty to investigate a
1378 Id. (citing Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 684
(Cal. 1969)).
1379 Id. at *1-'2.
1380 Id. at *6.
1381 Id. at *5.
1382 Id. at *6.
1383 Id. (quoting Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 115 P.3d 68, 71
(Cal. 2005)).
1384 Id. (citing County of San Diego v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 118 P.3d 607,
612-13 (Cal. 2005)).
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pilot's qualifications,1 3 7 the district court concluded that Plain-
tiff was "obligated under the terms of the binder to pay for
claims arising from the crash."'
388
The district court, however, denied the parties' cross-motions
for summary judgment, finding that, although coverage existed
under the binder for the subject incident, there remained ques-
tions of fact regarding the alleged negligence of both Plaintiff
and Defendant in regard to the handling of the renewal applica-
tion and policy. 1389 The district court thus left the issue of ap-
portionment of liability for the resulting ambiguity for a jury to
determine.1390 Finally, the court granted Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on Defendant's counterclaim for reforma-
tion because Defendant had failed to introduce any evidence to
support its claim that Plaintiff's underwriter had "orally in-
formed" Defendant's broker that the new policy would provide
"as approved by" coverage. 139'
B. PITT HELICOPTERS, INC. v. AIG AVIATION, INC.
Pitt Helicopters, Inc. v. AIG Aviation, Inc.13 92 involved an insur-
ance dispute arising out of a helicopter crash in California.'393
Plaintiff-Lessor, Pitt Helicopters, had leased a helicopter to
Mountain EMS. 1394 Under the lease agreement, Mountain EMS
was required to maintain $625,000 in hull coverage until the
lease expired and the helicopter was returned. 1395 Plaintiff was
an additional insured under the policy. 139 6 The lease agreement
provided that the amount of hull coverage could not be
changed without Plaintiff-Lessor's prior written consent.1 39 7 Af-
ter the helicopter was destroyed in a crash in California, Plaintiff
alleged that its demand for payment from insurers under the
policy revealed that Mountain EMS had reduced the required
1387 Id. at *6 n.7 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 142 Cal. Rptr.
249, 251-56 (Ct. App. 1977)).
1-8 Id. at *6.
1389 Id.
1390 Id.
1391 Id. at *8.
1392 No. 2:06-cv-2542-GEB-EFB, 2007 WL 707528 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007).







$625,000 hull value on the insurance policy to $500,000 with a
deductible of $50,000.1398
The hull insurers, Defendants AIG Aviation and National
Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh, initially filed a complaint in
interpleader to determine "who was owed how much under
[the] policy. 1399 Plaintiff Pitt Helicopters then filed a com-
plaint against Defendants for "breach of contract and the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."1400 Specifically,
Plaintiff alleged that because Defendants failed to provide it no-
tice that the policy limit had been reduced, the policy limit re-
mained $625,000 as to Plaintiff at the time of the crash. 401
Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants had breached the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they with-
held "benefits due under the policy unreasonably and without
proper cause.' 40 2 Plaintiff sought compensatory damages for
unpaid policy benefits totaling $175,000 and punitive
damages. 14o
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs breach of con-
tract, bad faith, and punitive damages claims. 40 4 With respect
to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim, Defendants argued that it
had been insufficiently pled because no copy of the contract
had been attached to the complaint which did not sufficiently
allege the contract's terms. 40 5 Therefore, according to Defend-
ants, Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action was defec-
tive. 140 6 Plaintiff countered that the only material term at issue
in the insurance policy was the policy limit, and that the com-
plaint contained adequate allegations relating to the lease and
the breach.140 7 Similarly, Defendants argued that the punitive
damages claim had been improperly pled.
40 8
In considering Defendants' motion, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California found that Plaintiff had ad-
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Plaintiff did not need to recite contract terms in the complaint
or attach a copy of the contract thereto, as Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs pleadings, simply re-
quires a "short and plain statement of the claim.""1410 However,
the district court found that Plaintiff was not entitled to punitive
damages because its bad faith claim had been commenced only
in contract. 1411
With respect to Plaintiffs claim that Defendants had
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Defendants argued that bad faith liability could not be imposed
"[w]here there is a genuine issue as to the insurer's liability
under the policy," and that "some additional showing of tortious
conduct by the insurer is required.114 12 While Plaintiff agreed
that the mere refusal to honor a contract claim was insufficient
to constitute bad faith, it asserted that "an unreasonable refusal
to pay a just claim is bad faith" and that Defendants' filing the
complaint in interpleader without first having investigated Plain-
tiff's claim was unreasonable. 41 3
In refusing to dismiss Plaintiffs bad faith claim at the initial
stage of litigation, the district court noted that a failure to inves-
tigate a claim may constitute bad faith.1414 In finding that Plain-
tiff had adequately pled its bad faith claim, the district court
rejected Defendants' argument that the filing of an interpleader
by an insurer "does not support a subsequent claim for 'bad
faith"' as a matter of law.1 415 The district court stated that De-
fendants had failed to demonstrate how their interpleader ac-
tion "negat[ed] Plaintiffs bad faith claim. ' 416 Accordingly, the
district court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
claims for breach of contract and of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but granted its motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs punitive damages claim. 417
1410 Id. (citing Securimetrics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. C 0500917CW,








1417 Id. at *2-*3.
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IX. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
The Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") 141s is a federal
statute that provides a statutory basis for the recovery of dam-
ages for wrongful death, including "loss of care, comfort and
companionship" of the deceased where the death occurs as the
result of, inter alia, a commercial aviation accident more than
twelve nautical miles from the shores of the United States. 1419
A. IN RE AIR CRASH NEAR NANTUCKET ISLAND,
MASSACHUSETJ'S, ON OCTOBER 31, 1999
In In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, on October
31, 1999,1420 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York addressed whether the parents, siblings, and cousin of
a decedent passenger on EgyptAir Flight 9901421 were entitled to
pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages pursuant to DOHSA. 14 22
Plaintiffs sister had commenced an action on behalf of the de-
cedent's estate. 423 Defendant did not contest liability. 1424
The district court conducted a bench trial on the issue of
damages. 425 The decedent, age twenty-eight on the date of the
crash, was survived by his parents, then fifty-nine and fifty-two
years old.14 26 In addition, he was survived by four sisters (age
twenty-six to thirty-four as of the date of the crash), a younger
brother (age twenty-four), and a cousin (age nineteen), who
had been raised since infancy by decedent's parents. 1427 The
district court noted that, in Egyptian culture, the decedent, as
the oldest of his parents' sons, was expected to care for his par-
ents in their old age. 4 28 After starting a business in Egypt in
1997, where he employed one of his sisters and his cousin, the
1418 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-767 (2000).
1419 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200,
202 (2d Cir. 2000); In reAir Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass. on Oct. 31, 1999,
462 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
1420 462 F. Supp. 2d 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
1421 Flight 990, which was scheduled to travel from New York to Cairo, Egypt,
crashed in the Atlantic Ocean approximately sixty miles off Nantucket Island on
October 31, 1999, after departing from New York. Id. at 362.
1422 Id. The court stated: "Since the crash occurred more than 12 nautical
miles from the United States' shore, DOHSA applies." Id. at 362 n.1 (citing 46
U.S.C. § 761(b)).
1423 Id. at 362.
1424 Id. at 362 n.2.
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decedent "began making varying cash contributions to his par-
ents, siblings and cousin, and continued to do so until his
death."'' 4 29 At the time of his death, the sister and cousin em-
ployed by him were still living in the parents' home, two other
sisters lived in separate homes with their husbands and children,
and the fourth sister was separated from her husband and living
with her children in the marital home in New Jersey. 1430 The
decedent was flying back to Egypt on EgyptAir Flight 990 to
close his business there. 143 1
The district court noted that in two prior decisions it had dis-
cussed the damages available under DOHSA.14 3 2 The court had
previously noted as well that, prior to April 2000, damages
under DOHSA were limited to pecuniary losses. 1433 In April
2000, the statute was amended, applying retroactively to deaths
occurring after July 16, 1996, to permit recovery for nonpecu-
niary damages.1 4 4 As amended, the statute defines nonpecu-
niary damages as "loss of care, comfort, and companionship.' ' 43 5
The district court stated that an action pursuant to DOHSA is
"for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, par-
ent, child, or dependent relative.' 14 36 The district court noted
that, as long as they met the required evidentiary standards, de-
cedent's parents were entitled to damages for loss of support or
society.1437 However, the district court also noted that "a relative
that is not a wife, husband, parent, or child of the decedent
must separately establish both dependency and pecuniary loss in
order to recover damages under DOHSA. '1 438 The district court
then stated that:
[A]lithough [the decedent] was not legally required to do so, he
regularly gave his siblings and cousin .. money to pay for food,
1429 Id. at 362-63.
1430 Id. at 363.
1431 Id.
1432 Id. at 364 (citing Freeman v. EgyptAir (In re Air Crash Near Nantucket
Island, Mass., on Oct. 31, 1999), No. 00-MD-1344, 2002 WL 32302598 (E.D.N.Y.
May 23, 2002); Kowalsky v. EgyptAir (In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island,
Mass., on Oct. 31, 1999), 307 F. Supp. 2d 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
1433 Id. (citing In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., on Oct. 31, 1999, 307
F. Supp. 2d at 468.)
1434 Id.
1435 Id.
1436 Id. at 365.
1437 Id. at 366.
1438 Id. at 365-66 (quoting Hollie v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83 Civ. 7899
(PNL) (NRB), 1994 WL 38785, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1994), vacated, Korean Air
Lines Co. v. Hollie, 516 U.S. 1088 (1996)).
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clothing, extraordinary medical treatment, private school tuition
or, [with respect to his two sisters], to supplement their house-
hold incomes during periods of financial strain. For over two
years, these contributions helped each maintain his or her stan-
dard of living.1439
In light of this, the district court found that the decedent's
siblings and cousin qualified as dependent relatives under
DOHSA.
1440
The district court stated that, under DOHSA, pecuniary dam-
ages are meant to provide "fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the [beneficiaries] and shall be ap-
portioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss
they may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the
person by whose representative the suit is brought. '1441 The dis-
trict court noted that these damages include loss of support, i.e.,
"all the financial contributions that the decedent would have
made to his dependants [sic] had he lived."' 4 42 The amount of
the pecuniary loss need not be proven to a "[m]athematical cer-
tainty," "but there must be some evidence from which the
[court] can estimate future support without engaging in conjec-
ture."'4 4 3 The district court stated that, in determining the ap-
propriate amount of pecuniary damages, among the "elements"
to consider are the decedent's age and health, the earning ca-
pacity and prospects for advancement, surviving beneficiaries,
the surviving beneficiaries' ages and the decedent's contribu-
tions to them. 444 Based upon this, the district court awarded
the decedent's parents, to whom he had contributed $2,000 per
month, $535,389.' The district court also awarded the dece-
dent's sisters and cousin pecuniary damages ranging from nomi-
nal damages of $100 to $8,000 based upon their individual
circumstances. 144
6
The district court then found that the decedent's parents, sib-
lings, and cousin were entitled to nonpecuniary damages for
1439 Id. at 366.
1440 Id.
1441 Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 762(a) (2000)).
1-2 Id. (quoting Freeman v. EgyptAir (In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island,
Mass., on Oct. 31, 1999), No. 00-MD-1344, 2002 WL 32302598 (E.D.N.Y. May 23,
2002)).
1443 Id. (quoting Hollie, 60 F.3d at 93).
1444 Id.
1445 Id. at 367.
1446 Id.
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loss of society.1 44 7 The district court noted that the decedent's
parents were very close to their son, which was heightened by
the fact that he was their eldest son, and commented that "no
parent ever wants to live to bury his or her child." 144 8 The dis-
trict court then found that the decedent's parents were entitled
to a total of $1.31 million in nonpecuniary damages. 449 Fur-
thermore, although the district court was "not aware of, nor do
the parties cite, any prior awards of nonpecuniary damages to a
decedent's dependent relatives," 1450 it awarded the siblings and
cousin $125,000 each based upon the "similarly important role
that [the decedent] played in each of their lives." 1451
X. OTHER AVIATION RELATED CASES
A. GUNTHER V. AIRTRAN HOLDINGS, INC.
In Gunther v. Airtran Holdings, Inc.,1 4 5 2 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York addressed a negligence
action brought by Plaintiff to "recover damages for personal in-
juries she sustained as a result of a fall that occurred while she
was in a motorized wheelchair traversing the jetway used for
boarding [Defendant airline's flight] at New York's LaGuardia
Airport."14 53
Plaintiff had filed a complaint in New York State Supreme
Court, but Defendant removed the action to the district court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 1454 Although the exact cir-
cumstances of the event were disputed, Plaintiff claimed that
Defendant's employees breached recommended safety proce-
dures and standards, and that there was an issue of fact whether
Defendant exercised reasonable care under the circumstances,
i.e., aiding a disabled passenger in boarding the aircraft.1455 She
alleged, inter alia, that Defendant's refusal to allow her home-
care attendant to assist her while boarding, failure to provide an
aisle wheelchair, and inadequate assistance in escorting her to
1447 Id. at 367-68.
1448 Id. at 368-69.
1449 Id. at 369.
1450 Id. at 370.
1451 Id.
1452 No. 05 Civ. 2134(MHD), 2007 WL 193592 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2007).
1453 Id. at *1.
1454 Id.
1455 Id. Plaintiff and Defendant disagreed on some of the facts at issue, includ-
ing, inter alia, the number of escorts accompanying Plaintiff at the time of the
incident; the slope of the jetway; and the speed at which Plaintiff was traveling
before the fall. Id. at *2-*4.
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the plane caused her to fall several feet "from the door of the
aircraft and near the location of the metal molding in the
jetway.' 1456 The left side of her body struck the floor of the
jetway due to the fall,1457 allegedly resulting "in severe physical
[injury] and emotional distress. 1458
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the negligence
claims, arguing that: (1) "premises liability is the only possible
theory of recovery on these facts and that, based on this theory,
the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff because
it [was] undisputed that [Defendant] did not own, and was not
responsible for the maintenance of, thejetway at the time of the
incident;" (2) Defendant's employees "followed all appropriate
practices and procedures for boarding passengers with disabili-
ties at the time of the incident;" and (3) the jetway was not de-
fective or dangerous at the time of the incident, and thus
Plaintiffs actions during the incident were the sole cause of her
injuries. 4 59
The district court rejected Defendant's argument that prem-
ises liability was the sole source of Plaintiffs right to recover
damages, and that Defendant owed no duty to the Plaintiff be-
cause it did not own, maintain, or control the jetway.'4 60 The
district court cited precedent from the Second Circuit explain-
ing that, under New York law, the
general rule [is] that [w]henever one person is by circumstances
placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he
did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with re-
gard to the circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care
and skill to avoid such danger.1461
The district court thus found that "[t] he question, then, is not
one of ownership exclusively. . . . The question, rather, is
whether the duty to use 'ordinary care and skill' arose indepen-
dently, given other circumstances surrounding the incident.'
4 62
Under New York law, common carriers, such as airlines, are not
1456 Id. at *4, *9-*11.
1457 Id. at *4.
1458 Id. at *1.
1459 Id. (citing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 9).
1460 Id. at *7.
1461 Id. (citing Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)).
1462 Id.
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held to a heightened standard of care, but rather must merely
exercise "reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the
particular case. 1 463 The district court noted that it is "well set-
tled that a common carrier 'is under a duty to provide prospec-
tive passengers with a reasonably safe, direct entrance onto the
vehicle, clear of any dangerous obstruction or defect which
would impede that entrance,"' regardless of ownership of the
property involved. 1464
The district court explained that whether it is appropriate to
legally impose a duty upon a tortfeasor is a not a purely factual
inquiry, but requires the court to consider a plaintiffs reasona-
ble expectations under the circumstances. 465 Finding that De-
fendant owed Plaintiff a "duty of reasonable care to ensure that
the sole path available to [Plaintiff] would allow her the oppor-
tunity to secure safe passage onto the aircraft,11 4 66 the district
court stated that:
Once a passenger has given her ticket to an airport gate agent
and begun to go down the jetway to board an aircraft, the passen-
ger certainly has a reasonable expectation that the gate agents
have observed the obvious conditions of both passenger and
pathway and, at a minimum, considered whether the path
presents a hazard for that passenger. 46 7
The district court then turned to the issues of breach and cau-
sation and concluded that summary judgment was improper on
these issues, noting that they are "generally and more suitably
entrusted to fact finder adjudication."1468 The district court
noted that material issues of fact were disputed, such as
"whether the employees' behavior conformed with defendant's
own boarding guidelines, as well as with outside recommenda-
tions relating to the boarding of passengers with disabilities.' ' 469
The district court found that the "many factual disputes" pre-
vented a matter of law determination that Defendant satisfied its
duty to Plaintiff. 47 0 It further found that, "[i]n sum, if the dis-
1463 Id. (quoting Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1218
(N.Y. 1998)).
1464 Id. at *8 (citing Garcia v. Hope Ambulette Serv. Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 605,
605 (2003)).
1465 Id.
1466 Id. at *9.
1467 Id. at *8.
146 Id. at *11 (quoting Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d
189, 192 (N.Y. 1994)).




puted facts are viewed in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], a
fair inference can be made that defendant's actions and inac-
tions were a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. '"1471 Accord-
ingly, the district court denied Defendant's motion for summary
judgment.14 7 2
B. IN RE TRAVEL AGENT COMMISSION ANTITRUST LITIGATION
In In re Travel Agent Commission Antitrust Litigation,473 the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio addressed the
recently-modified pleading standard necessary to establish "par-
allel conduct" in an antitrust suit. 1474 Plaintiffs were travel
agents who opted out of a class in Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc.
1475
and now brought suit against Defendants1476 for allegedly con-
spiring "to cap or cut travel agent commissions on six separate
occasions" over a period of seven years.1 477 Defendant airlines
moved to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiffs could not
meet the pleading standard required to demonstrate parallel
conduct amongst the Defendants1478 as established in 2007 by
the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. a4 79 In
Twombly, the Supreme Court held that "an allegation of parallel
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.
Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy...
when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to
make [an antitrust] claim, they must be placed in a context that
raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement."1
480
In analyzing Defendants' motion, the district court noted four
separate arguments:
1471 Id. at *11.
1472 Id. at *12.
1473 No. 1:03 CV 30000, 2007 WL 3171675 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2007).
1474 Id. at *1-'2.
1475 296 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
1476 Plaintiffs brought suit against thirteen airline defendants, including Alaska
Airlines, Air Tran Airlines, American Airlines, America West Airlines, Continen-
tal Airlines, Delta Airlines, Horizon Air Industries, Frontier Airlines, KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and U.S. Airways/U.S. Air-
ways Group. Id.; In reTravel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 3171675, at
*1. Plaintiffs additionally brought suit against the holding company, Alaska Air
Group, Inc. Plaintiffs dismissed U.S. Airways/U.S. Airways Group previously,
without prejudice. Id. at n.2.
1477 Id. at *3.
1478 Id. at *2-*3.
1479 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
1480 In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 3171675, at *2 (quoting
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966).
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(1) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate parallel conduct with re-
spect to [Defendant airlines] AWA, Alaska, AGA, 14 8 1 Frontier,
and Horizon; (2) Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts regarding
KLM's participation in the alleged conspiracy; (3) Defendants
Delta, United, and Northwest's assertion that Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint should be dismissed because they have
been discharged in bankruptcy; and (4) Plaintiffs have not plead
sufficient facts that "plausibly suggest" an agreement or
conspiracy. 14-
2
With respect to the parallel conduct issue, the district court
found that Plaintiffs claims against the four airlines failed be-
cause Plaintiffs had not "put forth any 'factual matter' sug-
gesting that [the four airlines] engaged in parallel conduct" and
Defendant airlines had either not implemented the alleged caps
on travel agent commissions, or had implemented them at a
later time than other airlines. 4 "3 With respect to Defendant
KLM, the district court found that, because Plaintiffs did not
specifically allege in their Amended Complaint that KLM "re-
duce [d], cap [ped] and eliminate [d]" travel agent commissions
at any time, there was no parallel conduct between KLM and the
other Defendants, and dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against
KLM were warranted.1 484 The district court also found that
Plaintiffs were "permanently enjoined" from pursuing their
claims against Defendants Delta, Northwest, and United by rea-
son of these three airlines' previous discharge in bankruptcy
proceedings. 485 As to the remaining Defendants, the district
court found that Plaintiffs' allegations of parallel conduct alone
did not entitle them to relief, and neither did the additional
allegation that there was an "opportunity to conspire."'48 6 The
1481 While AWA, Alaska, Frontier, and Horizon are airlines, AGA is a holding
company that did not actually pay commissions to travel agents, and as such, the
court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against AGA holding that "there is no factual
matter to plausibly suggest that AGAjoined or participated in an unlawful con-
spiracy." Id. at *3 n.4 (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1956).
1482 Id. at *2.
1483 Id. at *4 (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1956 ("stating a claim requires a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest agreement was
made.")).
1484 Id. The district court noted that "[tihe only appearance of KLM in the
Amended Complaint, other than its identification as a Defendant, is the allega-
tion that KLM was represented at three trade association meetings." Id.
1485 Id. at *7 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2) (2000) ("discharge of a debt 'oper-
ates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action to
collect [or] recover . . . any such debt.")).
1486 Id. at *9.
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district court further noted that deposition testimony from an
American Airlines executive indicated that, although each air-
line had hoped that other airlines would reduce the commis-
sions being paid, "there was no agreement or conspiracy to do
sO. ' '1487 The district court finally noted that Plaintiffs' allega-
tions that Defendants' commission rates were available to the
other airlines, and that throughout history there have been
price fixing cases and investigations against airlines, did not sup-
port Plaintiffs' instant allegations against Defendants. 4 "
The district court thereby granted Defendants' motion to dis-
miss concluding that Plaintiffs did not meet the pleading stan-
dard under Twombly, and as such had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. '4 9
.C. MORROW V. ISRAEL ARCRAFT INDUSTRIES, LTD.
In Morrow v. Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.,1490 the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida addressed the potential
liability of a medical services company for the deaths of passen-
gers in the crash of an aircraft during a medical air evacuation
that it helped to coordinate.'4 9 Morrow arose out of the crash of
an aircraft departing from Panama City, Panama. 149 2 Plaintiffs,
as executors of the estates of three individuals who perished in
the crash, filed suit against, inter alia, Defendant Global Medical
Management, Inc.1493 Global Medical, at the request of one of
its clients, had arranged for the air evacuation of a hospitalized
patient, who was insured by its client, from Ecuador to Italy. 494
Thereafter, Global Medical obtained several bids from air ambu-
lance companies to perform the air evacuation. 495 Its client
then selected one air ambulance company to perform the evacu-
1487 Id. at *10-*11.
1488 Id. at *11 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.16
(1978) ("the exchange of price data... can... increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive."); Hall v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 652, 662 (E.D.N.C. 2003) ("[T]here appears to be ' no case
law ... where history of collusion is used as a plus factor courts consider"')).
1489 Id. at *12.
1490 No. 2:05-cv-295-FtM-34DNF, 2007 WL 2826148 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2007).
1491 Id. at *1.
1492 Id.
1493 Id.
1494 Id. at *2.
1495 Id. The district court noted that "Global Medical provides its clients with
the names of various air ambulance companies and the client chooses one ...
and pays for the service." Id.
2008] 305
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ation. 1 6 Allegedly, unknown to Global Medical, the selected
air ambulance company, thereafter, subcontracted the air evacu-
ation to another company, and the aircraft crashed during the
evacuation. 4
97
Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit alleging that Defendant was neg-
ligent in "(1) [flailing to properly arrange, plan, coordinate and
oversee the flight; (2) [f] ailing to ensure that the proper aircraft
and flight crew were utilized ... ; and (3) [fl ailing to warn [the
decedents] and others of the dangers posed by the inadequate
aircraft and/or crew." 14 98 Defendant Global Medical moved for
summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that its role and duty
owed to decedents was comparable "to that of a travel agent...
because it was not involved in the 'planning, coordinating, or
overs [ight] of the flight,"' and was not aware of any hazardous
condition that would impose a duty to investigate or warn.1499
In responding to Defendant's motion, Plaintiffs argued, inter
alia, that, because no discovery had yet occurred, they could not
properly respond to Defendant's assertions.15 " The district
court agreed with Plaintiffs, denying Defendant's motion for
summary judgment without prejudice on the ground that it was
premature.""0 1
D. CERQUEIRA V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts in Cerqueira v. American Airlines, Inc.,502 addressed, in-
ter alia, whether the trial court's purported failure to provide an
explicit jury instruction regarding the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard for proof of racial discrimination was prejudicial er-
ror. 50" In Cerqueira, Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen of Portuguese de-
scent, had commenced an action against Defendant for the
violation of his civil rights150 4 stemming from his removal from
1496 Id.
1497 Id.
1498 Id. at *1.
14 Id. at *3.
1500 Id.
1501 Id. at *5-*6.
1502 484 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D. Mass. 2007).
1503 Id. at 233.
1504 Amended Complaint at 1, Cerqueira, 484 F. Supp. 2d 232 (No. 1:05-cv-
11652), 2005 WL 5207271. Plaintiff alleged racial discrimination and asserted
violations of law under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); (2) Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000 & Supp. 2005); and (3) MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1992 & Supp. 2008). Id.
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Defendant's aircraft and its subsequent denial of service to
him. 50 5 The jury, which evaluated the allegations of racial dis-
crimination, assessed $130,000 in compensatory damages and
$270,000 in punitive damages.150 6
Plaintiff was seated on Defendant's flight at Boston, Massachu-
setts' Logan Airport, awaiting takeoff for Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida, when two men of "physical appearance similar" to Plaintiff
sat down beside him, and began speaking in English and a for-
eign language. 150 7 After passengers and crew members became
unsettled by the actions of the two men, Plaintiff, along with the
two men, were asked to leave the plane, and were questioned,
while the plane and luggage were rechecked. 150 8
Defendant filed post-judgment motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict ('JNOV"), and for a new trial, arguing that
the trial court did not instruct the jury that evidence of inten-
tional discrimination must satisfy an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. 150 9 Defendant also argued that "the introduction for a
limited purpose of a consent order between the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") and American," which had closed an
enforcement proceeding against American relating to eleven
claims of racial discrimination, "constituted unfair
prejudice.' 51 0  Defendant's motions argued that the Federal
Aviation Act provision on refusal of service requires a jury to
consider evidence in light of the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard. 5 11 In its motion for a new trial, American also argued
that the court's ruling "barring American from making any ref-
erence to Sensitive Source Information ("SSI") in non-public
1505 Cerqueira, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
1506 Id.
1507 Amended Complaint, supra note 1504, at 7, 9, 12, 14.
1508 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2008). Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint stated, in pertinent part: "American Airlines caused Mr.
Cerqueira to be removed from Flight 2237 and questioned by the Massachusetts
State Police because it mistakenly believed that Mr. Cerqueira was of Arab, Mid-
dle Eastern or South Asian descent." Amended Complaint, supra note 1504, at
42.
1509 Cerqueira, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
1510 Id.
1511 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005)). The Federal Avia-
tion Act provides, in relevant part, that "an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or
foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier
decides is, or might be, inimical to safety." Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)).
The court further noted that "The provision makes no explicit mention of the
standard that a plaintiff must satisfy ... [and] no controlling law mandates the
application of an arbitrary and capricious standard." Id. at 233-34.
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regulations issued by the [DOT] prevented American from ef-
fectively presenting its defense.'1 12
In considering American's motion for a new trial, the district
court found the "arbitrary and capricious" standard applicable
in this set of circumstances. 1513 The district court explained that
"this Court [previously has] recognized that 'actions motivated
by racial or religious animus are necessarily arbitrary and capri-
cious, and therefore beyond the scope of the discretion granted
by ... [the applicable Federal Aviation Act provision].' 1 51 4
The district court found that, because the jury was instructed
that Defendant's liability depended upon a finding of inten-
tional discrimination, the jury verdict satisfied the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard and, thus, the court denied the motion for
JNOV, as well as Defendant's motion for a new trial on this is-
sue.1515 The district court stated that the failure to give an ex-
plicit jury instruction relating to the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard was not prejudicial error. 5' 6
In addition, the district court evaluated its discovery order
barring American from introducing SSI into evidence. 5 17 The
district court found that American had "demonstrated good
faith in its concern that it must comply with the disclosure re-
quirements," and sympathized "with the bureaucratic morass
that American apparently entered when it sought permission to
disclose."'' 8 However, the district court noted that the court
"must also discharge its duty to effectuate the imperatives of effi-
ciency and broad discovery," and that "this is not a case where
the governing agency advised the Court that more time was re-
quired to balance security issues with proper discovery disclo-
sures. '" 519 Thus, the district court concluded that it had
properly precluded Defendant from referring to non-public SSI
regulations issued by the DOT at trial. 52 °
1512 Id. at 234.
1513 Id.




1517 Id. at 234-35.
151s Id. at 235.
1519 Id. (citing In re Sept. 11 Litig., 431 F. Supp. 2d 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
1520 Id. The reviewing court also found that the punitive damages award of
$270,000 did not exceed the rational appraisal of evidence, and that there was no
possibility of juror confusion on the alleged issue of punishing the airline for
harm done to other non-parties by racial profiling. Id. at 239-40.
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The district court additionally found that the consent order
between the DOT and American concerning racial profiling by
airline employees was properly admitted for the limited purpose
in the action and was not unduly prejudicial. 112 1 Specifically,
the order was only admitted to demonstrate that "American had
notice of alleged discriminatory practices prior to the case at
hand."
522
In its concluding remarks, the district court stated that "our
system gave, as it ought, the final judgment on a difficult issue of
racial discrimination to the trusted institution of collective wis-
dom-the jury. ' 1 5 2 ' Finding no error in the case, the district
court held that the jury verdict should stand, and denied Ameri-
can's motion for a new trial. 524
The district court's verdict was reversed on appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 525 The First Circuit
found that, "[t] he jury must be instructed that the Captain has
the power to refuse transport because transport of a passenger
'might be' inimical to safety unless that decision was arbitrary
and capricious. "1526
E. WILLIAMS V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
In Williams v. United Airlines, Inc.,1527 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a federal district court
had subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit by an employee
alleging violations, by his employer, of the Federal Airline Der-
egulation Act's Whistleblower Protection Program1528
("WPP"). 1529 Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant United
Airlines at its Oakland Maintenance Facility from 1989 until he
was fired in 2003, filed a pro se complaint against Defendant al-
leging that it had wrongfully terminated him in retaliation for a
1521 Id. at 235-39.
1522 Id. at 238.
1523 Id. at 240.
1524 Id.
1525 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
1526 Id. at 18.
1527 500 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2007).
1528 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
1529 Williams, 500 F.3d at 1020. The WPP "was designed to 'provide protection
for airline employee whistleblowers by prohibiting the discharge or other dis-
crimination against an employee who provides information to its employer or the
Federal government about air safety or files or participates in a proceeding re-
lated to air safety."' Id. at 1021 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106-167, pt. 1, at 100
(1999)).
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dispute over an alleged safety violation, which he claimed was a
violation of the WPP and state law. l" °
Defendant moved to dismiss the state law claims and for sum-
mary judgment of the retaliatory discrimination claim. 53' The
district court, after finding that it had jurisdiction over the WPP
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the state law claims, granted the motions and Plaintiff
appealed. 53 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plain-
tiffs causes of action on the ground that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, which the Ninth Circuit had
raised sua sponte.15 31
The Ninth Circuit stated that although 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pro-
vides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States," 1534 this statute "is applicable only when the
plaintiff sues under a federal statute that creates a right of ac-
tion in federal court. ' 153 5 The Ninth Circuit noted that the WPP
set forth a "detailed administrative scheme for the investigation
and resolution of claims brought by airline employees.1' 536 It,
essentially, provided that if an aggrieved employee filed a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") that set forth-a
prima facie case, the Secretary must investigate the complaint
and issue a final order, which is subject to review in the courts of
appeal. 53 7 Further, if, thereafter, the final order is not com-
plied with, "either the Secretary or the employee may bring a
civil action in a federal district court to compel compliance with
the Secretary's order.' 5 3 8
The district court had found that the WPP administrative fil-
ing requirement (i.e., "[a] person who believes that he or she
has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against ... may
... file.., a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging such
discharge or discrimination") was phrased permissively and,
therefore, according to the district court, Plaintiff was not re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing
1530 Id. at 1020-21.




1535 Id. at 1022 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
807-12 (1986); Utley v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1987)).
1536 Id. at 1021 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2000)).
1537 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).
1538 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 42121 (b) (5), (b)(6)).
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an action pursuant to the WPP in federal district court.1539 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with this construction, finding that it
"conflate [d] the concepts of administrative exhaustion and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. ' 1540 The Ninth Circuit stated the issue
was not whether Plaintiff needed to have filed an administrative
complaint before filing a claim in federal district court, but
rather, was whether he was permitted to commence an action in
federal district court at all. 1541 In finding that there was no ex-
press right of action under the WPP in federal district courts,
the Ninth Circuit stated that "the 'may' language in
§ 42121(b) (1) merely confers authority on the Secretary of La-
bor to accept complaints from aggrieved employees.' ' 542
In finding that there was no implied right of action under the
WPP either, the Ninth Circuit stated that there was "no evidence
that Congress intended to create a direct remedy in federal dis-
trict court,"'' 5 43 and noted that the "carefully-tailored administra-
tive scheme in the WPP" undercut any suggestion that Congress
intended to create an implied right of action. 544 The Ninth Cir-
cuit additionally observed that the "explicit authorization of dis-
trict court jurisdiction found in . . . other federal whistleblower
statutes demonstrates that Congress clearly knows how to pro-
vide for such jurisdiction when it intends to do so. 154 5
The Ninth Circuit then noted that there was no diversity juris-
diction over the case, as Plaintiff and his direct supervisor were
both residents of California.1 546 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
found that dismissal of Plaintiffs federal claim necessitated dis-
missal of his state law claims as well. 5 47 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's action based on the
district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 548
F. PowERs v. LYCOMING ENGINES
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in Powers v. Lycoming Engines154 9 addressed
1539 Id. at 1022 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (b)(1)).
1540 Id.
1541 Id.
1542 Id. at 1023.
1543 Id. at 1024.
15- Id. (citing Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002)).
1545 Id.
1546 Id. at 1025.
!547 Id. (citing Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F. 2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985)).
1548 Id. at 1020.
1549 245 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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whether it was appropriate to certify a class of Plaintiff owners,
and former owners, of aircraft containing allegedly defective en-
gine crankshafts.55" Plaintiffs alleged that the engines, which
were designed and manufactured by Defendant Lycoming En-
gines, could cause in-flight engine failures. 1551 Plaintiffs further
alleged that Defendant knew of and concealed the defect that
prevented the crankshaft from functioning properly. 552
Plaintiffs moved for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1553 Under Rule 23(a), a
party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that: "(1) the
size of the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable ["numerosity"]; (2) there are questions of law and
fact common to the class ["commonality"]; (3) the claims or de-
fenses are typical of the class ["typicality"]; and (4) the repre-
sentatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class ["adequacy of representation"] . '' 155' Additionally, in order
to maintain the class action, one of three bases under Rule
23(b) must be satisfied.1 555 Here, Plaintiffs alleged that all Rule
23(a) requirements were satisfied, and that a class action was
superior to other available methods of adjudication thereby
qualifying them for certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3).1556
Defendant contended that class certification was inappropriate
because, inter alia, "the facts as to both liability and damages
[were] not common to all members." 1557
In evaluating Plaintiffs' motion, the district court found that
Plaintiffs' class was "ascertainable and sufficiently definite," and
that the numerosity requirement was fulfilled since there were
more than 3,000 potential plaintiffs according to FAA
records. 558 The district court further found that commonality
existed because there were "common fact questions regarding
what and when Lycoming knew of the alleged defect," and that
1550 Id. at 227.
1551 Id.
1552 Id.
1553 Id. at 235 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23).
1554 Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1)-(4)).
1555 Id. The court noted that "[P]laintiffs moved for certification only under
subsection (b) (3), which requires a finding that common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and that a
'class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy."' Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
1556 Id. at 239.
1557 Id. at 227.
1558 Id. at 228, 236.
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typicality was established because "each member's claim arises
from the same course of events and each class member will
make the same legal arguments to prove liability.' 1 559 The dis-
trict court determined that the adequacy of representation
prong was satisfied because Defendant had not presented any
reason why Plaintiffs' proposed representatives were inadequate,
and because the proposed representatives' interests were "not
dissimilar to those of the proposed class."'1560 Finally, the district
court agreed with Plaintiffs that "a class action is superior to
other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy" in this case, thereby fulfilling the final requirement
under Rule 23(b) (3) and granted Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. 1561
G. GONZALEZ V. CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES, INC.
The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Pu-
erto Rico in Gonzalez v. Caribbean Sun Airlines, Inc.156 2 addressed
whether the "locus of operations" test or the "nerve center" test
applied to determine Defendant airline's principal place of busi-
ness for purposes of establishing whether the district court had
diversity jurisdiction. 563 Plaintiff had filed a complaint in Pu-
erto Rico against the Defendant for wrongful discharge under
local law. 1564 Defendant removed the action based on diversity
of citizenship, alleging that it was a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Florida, and that Plaintiff was a
"resident" of Puerto Rico whose claim exceeded the jurisdic-
tional threshold set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).1565
Plaintiff moved to remand the case under the "locus of opera-
tions" test, which focuses on the location of the actual physical
operations of a corporation. 1566 Plaintiff stated that Defendant's
principal place of business, and physical operations, were in Pu-
1559 Id. at 228.
156 Id. at 237.
1561 Id. at 237-39.
1562 No. 06-1934 UJAG), 2007 WL 2464508 (D.P.R. Aug. 8, 2007).
1563 Id. at *1-*2. "Diversity of Jurisdiction exists only when there is complete
diversity, that is, when no plaintiff is the citizen of the same state as any defen-
dant." Id. at *3 (quoting Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806)). Further, "a
corporation is a citizen of both the state where it is incorporated and 'the State
where it has its principal place of business."' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)
(2000)).
1564 Id. at *1.
1565 Id.
1566 Id. at *1, *3.
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erto Rico, as, inter alia, its aircraft and the majority of its pilots,
flight attendants, and mechanics were based in Puerto Rico, it
originated or ended flights to ten Caribbean destinations from
its Puerto Rico hub, and it transported the majority of its code
share passengers from Puerto Rico. 1567 Plaintiff further stated
that Defendant had only "some executives," but no physical op-
erations of its core business, in Florida. 1568
Although Defendant did not dispute Plaintiffs assertions, it
contended that because it was a "complex airline" with opera-
tions in several jurisdictions, the "locus of operations" test did
not apply and that instead, the "nerve center" test should ap-
ply.1569 Specifically, Defendant contended that the "nerve
center" test, which looked to "the location from which the cor-
poration's officers direct, control and coordinate all activities
without regard to locale, in furtherance of the corporate objec-
tive," must be applied to establish the location of its principal
place of business.1570 Defendant argued that "courts have con-
sistently applied the 'nerve center' test in determining the prin-
cipal place of business of airlines. ' 1571 Defendant further
argued that, under the "nerve center" test, its principal place of
business was in Florida because its "major corporate and finan-
cial decisions t[ook] place there," and therefore that removal
was proper because there was "complete diversity between the
parties." 1572
The district court noted that "the removing party bears the
burden of showing that removal is proper."'1 573 The district
court found that the "nerve center" test did not apply, as it ap-
plies "only where a corporation has no physical operations...
(e.g.[,] a holding company),1574 or where its [operations] and
activities are so diffuse or pervasive that no place readily comes
up as distinctively dominant. ' 1575 The district court thus con-
1567 Id. at *1-*2.
1568 Id. at *1.
1569 Id. at *2.
1570 Id. (quoting Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 574 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.
1978)).
1571 Id. at *2, *4 (citing Egan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1963),
Briggs v. Am. Flyers Airline Corp., 262 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Okla. 1966)).
1572 Id. at *2-*3.
1573 Id. at *3 (citing Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
1574 Id. at *4 (citing Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57 (1st
Cir. 1993)).
1575 Id. (citing Lugo-Vina, 574 F.2d at 41 ("[t]he 'nerve center' test was devel-
oped for application in cases involving a 'large corporate enterprise with corn-
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cluded that the "locus of operations" test should be applied and,
under that test, Puerto Rico was Defendant's principal place of
business because the majority of its physical operations were lo-
cated there. 1576 Accordingly, the district court held that, be-
cause the action lacked diversity, there was no basis for federal
jurisdiction and granted Plaintiff's motion to remand. 15 77
XI. PASSENGER BILL OF RIGHTS
As passenger traffic has returned to pre-9/11 levels, there
have been an increasing number of delayed flights resulting, at
times, with passengers being forced to remain onboard an air-
craft at an airport for hours.1578 In the past year, these delays
have generated increased news media and public attention, 1579
and federal and state governments have taken steps to address
the services provided by airlines to passengers and aircraft con-
ditions during these delays.
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
1. Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 2007 Bills
The federal government is considering two Airline Passenger
Bill of Rights Act of 2007 bills,1580 introduced by the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, to address these issues.
Both Bills were introduced to amend Title 49, United States
Code, to ensure that air passengers have access to necessary ser-
vices, and are not forced to stay on a grounded aircraft for an
unreasonable period of time before or after a flight. 58 In situa-
tions where the plane is delayed, air carriers must provide food,
plex and farflung activities where only the 'nerve center' can actually be termed
the 'principal place of business"')). Id. at *4 n.4.
1576 Id. at *4.
1577 Id. at *5.
1578 See, e.g., Airline Service Improvements: Hearing on S. 678 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement by Kate
Hanni, Spokesperson and Founder, Coalition for Airline Passengers' Bill of
Rights).
1579 See e.g., Matthew Wald & Jeff Bailey, Push for Action on Hight Delays, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at A; see also Matthew Wald, Washington Taking a Look at Air-
Traffic Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at C.
1580 The Bill was introduced in the Senate by Sens. Barbara Boxer and Olympia
Snowe on February 17, 2007, as S. 678 ("Senate Bill") and in the House of Repre-
sentatives by Representative Mike Thomson (on behalf of fellow co-sponsors) on
March 1, 2007, as H.R. 1303 ("House Bill"). S. 678, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.
1303, 110th Cong. (2007).
1581 S. 678, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. (2007).
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water, and adequate restroom facilities. 582 Moreover, if a flight
is delayed more than three hours after the passengers have
boarded, the air carrier must give passengers the option to dis-
embark the aircraft at least once every three-hour period. 58 "
There are exceptions, however, if the pilot determines that, af-
ter three hours of delay, the aircraft will depart within thirty
minutes or if permitting a passenger to deplane would compro-
mise safety or security.""
The House Bill is more comprehensive than the Senate
Bill.1 5 5 The House Bill would require an airline to establish spe-
cific procedures for handling passengers' complaints; 1586 allow
passengers to deplane an aircraft in case of a departure or arri-
val delay requiring passengers to remain seated in a grounded
aircraft for more than three hours; 58 v provide passengers at the
airport, or onboard an aircraft, with the best information availa-
ble to the air carrier regarding flight delay, cancellation, or di-
version;158 provide passengers on a departure or arrival-delayed
grounded aircraft with ventilation, food, water, sanitary, and
medical services;1589 publish a monthly list of its chronically
delayed flights, and provide such information when selling tick-
ets;1590 publish and update lowest fare and schedule informa-
tion;15 9 ' and make every reasonable effort to return lost baggage
to passengers within twenty-four hours.
1592
The House Bill also directs the Secretary of Transportation to
work with air carriers to ensure that a pilot operating an aircraft
affected by a long departure delay is permitted to return the
aircraft to the terminal to allow passengers to deplane without
losing its position in the flight's departure sequence,' 593 and re-
82 S. 678, 110th Cong. § 41781 (a) (1) (A)-(B) (2007).
1583 S. 678, 110th Cong. § 41781(a) (2) (A) (2007).
1584 S. 678, 110th Cong. § 41781 (a) (2) (B) (i)-(ii) (2007).
1585 See Stephen Beale, Passenger Bill of Rights Time Line, UNION LEADER, Nov. 13,
2007. On September 24, 2007, the House passed a re-authorization bill for the
FAA which includes portions of the Airline Passenger Bill of Rights. Id. On No-
vember 6, 2007, the House passed a continuing resolution for temporary funding
of the FAA, which otherwise would have expired on Nov. 16. Id. Congress
thereby had until December 31, 2007, to approve full funding for the FAA. Id.
1586 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (a) (2007).
1587 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (c)(1) (2007).
1588 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (b)(1) (2007).
1589 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (c)(3) (2007).
1590 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (d)(1)-(2) (2007).
1591 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (e)(1) (2007).
1592 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41782 (f) (2007).
1593 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41783 (a) (2007).
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view air carriers' and airports' emergency-contingency plans to




1. New York Passenger Bill of Rights
Government action relating to a passenger bill of rights has
not been limited to the federal government, as the New York
State legislature enacted the New York Passenger Bill of Rights.
Governor Eliot Spitzer approved the legislation in August of
2007, and it was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2008.1595
As a result of the legislation, New York became the first state to
enact legislation that would require airlines operating at its air-
ports to provide food, water, and services to passengers delayed
on aircraft for more than three hours.1596 However, the legisla-
tion was challenged before it took effect and, although the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of New York found that
it was not preempted by the ADA, 159 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed this ruling. 15 98 Specifically, the
Second Circuit held "that requiring airlines to provide food,
water, electricity, and restrooms to passengers during lengthy
ground delays does relate to the service of an air carrier and
therefore falls within the express terms of the ADA's preemp-
tion provision.' 5 9 9 Accordingly, it found that the New York Pas-
senger Bill of Rights was preempted by the ADA.160 0
1594 H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. § 41783 (b)(1) (2007).
1595 See New York Passes Passenger Bill of Rights, Upgrade: Travel Better, http:/
/www.upgradetravelbetter.com/category/passengers-bill-of-rights/ (last visited
June 21, 2008).
1596 See Aaron Karp, New York Passes "Passenger Bill of Rights, "First of its Kind in
U.S., ATW DAiLY NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.
html?storylD=9795.
1597 Air Transport Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68
(N.D.N.Y. 2007).
.1598 Air Transport Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir.
2008).
1599 Id. at 223. The Second Circuit declined to address whether the Passenger
Bill of Rights was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Id. at 225.
1-600 Id. at 223.
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